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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Emily McGinn 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Comparative Literature 
 
June 2014 
 
Title: The Science of Sound: Recording Technology and the Literary Vanguard 
 
 
This project is a comparative study of Irish and Latin American modernisms and 
the literary responses to the advent of recorded sound. It focuses particularly on George 
Bernard Shaw’s Pygmalion, Flann O’Brien’s The Third Policeman, Leopoldo Lugones’s 
short stories “La fuerza omega” and “Yzur,” and Jaime Torres Bodet’s novel Proserpina 
rescatada. It examines how each author grapples with the dislocation of the human voice 
from the body made possible through new recording technology. This selection of texts 
displays a range of engagements with this new technology, from a critique of rising 
positivism and machines in the early twentieth century, to experiments with aural 
metaphors in the wake of sounded film, and finally to the 1930s, when sound recording 
becomes an arm of government surveillance against its citizens. In each instance, the 
circulation of sound technology causes a shift in modes of representation that require new 
definitions of what it means to be human in an increasingly mechanized world. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The past 15 years has seen a re-examination of the field of modernist studies. As 
Douglas Mao and Rebecca Walkowitz claim in their essay “The New Modernist Studies” 
the future of modernism and modernist studies lies in an expansion of the canonical 
definition of modernism, which, in English departments, has traditionally referred to texts 
from Britain, Ireland, the U.S. and Europe from 1890-1940.  The expansion of 
modernism is occurring in three ways “the temporal, the spatial and the vertical” (738).  
Mao and Walkowitz characterize the vertical as the increased attention to “production, 
dissemination, and reception” of texts and the interrelation between high and low cultures 
(738). The vertical expansion can be seen in the rise of periodical studies in the work of 
critics like Mark Morrisson, Sean Latham, Robert Scholes and Clifford Wulfman who 
examine the initial places of publication in modernism’s “little magazines.” As Mao and 
Walkowitz point out, the temporal and spatial shifts have been demonstrated in recent 
critical scholarship like Laura Winkiel and Laura Doyle’s collection of essays 
Geomodernisms: Race Modernism Modernity. This collection conceives of modernism as 
a plurality that can be carried transnationally and cross-culturally to include texts that 
range from “traditional” modernism in 1920’s England to 1980’s China. In this sense, 
“the term modernism breaks open, into something [called] geomodernisms, which signals 
a locational approach to modernisms’ engagement with cultural and political discourses 
of global modernity” (Doyle 3). This extensive repositioning of modernism opens new 
ways of examining the canonical works of modernism as well as creating space for a 
broader canon that includes transnational, more popular, and less experimental texts.  
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Though this effort is admirable in bringing attention to texts outside the general 
scope of a Western literature department, its inclusivity often looks toward postcolonial 
texts writing back to the empire as in Jean Rhys’ Wide Sargasso Sea or in pairings of 20th 
century postcolonial texts with canonical modernist texts through theories like Susan 
Stanford Friedman’s “cultural parataxis” (Mao 747). This kind of work highlights the 
effects of colonization on culture, economies and education; yet too often it carries a 
notion of “re-writing” or “re-appropriation,” taking literary forms back from the 
colonizer. The emphasis on the prefix “re” implies that the west is the source in a 
unidirectional idea of both progress and artistic expression. Such accounts insist on a 
singular concept of modernity that places the west (the first world/developed nations) 
ahead of other nations and regions (the third world/underdeveloped nations). The 
disjunctions of time and place in geomodernist comparisons have the potential to 
envision a colonial space as having no “literature” prior to contact with the colonizer, 
therefore these regions take time to catch up to the west, creating their own modernism 
decades after the “original.” 
In creating this disjuncture, transnational modernist criticism often looks east to 
former colonies of the British Empire, typically examining work in the Anglophone 
colonies in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean.  The direct contact with the British Empire 
and its literary canon though the imposition of colonial education policies offers a fertile 
ground for exploring the impact on local languages and cultures evident in, for example, 
Chinua Achebe’s response to Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness. However, my 
dissertation shifts the focus to the south and away from the Anglo/American axis of 
modernist studies in English. My approach does not require a temporal expansion of the 
  
 3 
category of modernism as Latin America, though also a colonial sphere, does not fit into 
the reigning account of postcolonial literary history in relation to the British Empire. As 
colonies of Spain and Portugal first established in the 15th century, the nations of Latin 
America colonial history follow a different trajectory in their colonial history. Carlos 
Blanco Aguinaga argues that Latin America is trapped in a triple bind of multiple 
colonialites: “Spain lives in a double cultural world, its nonexportable own and in an 
imported one, while Latin America lives in at least a triple culture: the pre-hispanic, the 
Spanish/Portuguese, and the European-Yankee” (4). The multiple layers of colonization 
and marginalization along with their much longer colonial history make it difficult to 
place this region in conversation with more contemporary visions of postcoloniality or 
subaltern studies particularly when viewed along a temporal axis.  
This is not to say that my dissertation looks to “recuperate” Latin American texts 
as modernist or to rewrite a new modernist canon per se. To do so would be a disservice 
to the complexity of Latin American literature and literary history.  Placing Latin 
American and canonical modernsit texts in conversation with each other raises particular 
problems of appropriation and incongruence. In Latin America, the term modernismo is 
linked to Rubén Darío’s call for a new poetics at the turn of the 20th century. This 
movement worked to establish a new poetry separate from that of the Spanish tradition to 
give new voice to Latin America as a distinct literary sphere and thereby does not map 
easily on to Anglo/American modernism. To identify other writers in this period not 
directly affiliated with Darío’s movement as modernist would be a false cognate. 
According to Aguinaga, accepting the western definition of modernism would be another 
form of literary colonialism: 
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We may stubbornly insist on our two meanings of "modernismo" or, like 
truly neocolonized little lambs we can accept the -for us- new meaning 
of modernism. If we choose the first option one of the most significant 
moments of our modern culture will, at best, be relegated to a brief 
footnote about some irrelevant part of the border while the rest of the 
world moves on. Accepting the second option will, perhaps, permit us to 
speak with those who study Eliot, or Pound, or Kafka, but will make it 
more difficult, if not impossible, to speak coherently among ourselves 
about Rubén Darío or Valle Inclán. (6) 
Absorption into the modernist canon comes at a price. While it may open the modernist 
discourse to new voices and break with its myopic tradition, it also has the potential to 
erase or modify the specific generic, historical and political position of Latin American 
texts in favor of a more universal approach, cutting them off from their origins and Latin 
American peers. As Doyle and Winkiel warn, such projects of cross-cultural analysis 
should be careful to avoid the tendency to “absorb and ultimately re-erase these other 
histories” (6). For these reasons, my dissertation juxtaposes Latin American and 
Anglo/American texts not to privilege one over the other or to place them in opposition, 
but to examine a contemporaneous phenomenon from two distinct vantage points to show 
the polyvalent nature of literary responses to modernity and more specifically to the 
advent of recording technology.  
Rather than pair late 20th century texts with canonical modernist texts, I will 
follow Fernando Rosenberg’s model that moves away from fetishizing the temporality of 
modernity as arriving, early or late, uneven or unfinished. In his book Avant-Garde and 
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Geopolitics in Latin America he suggests a turn toward the “geopolitical” which would 
“recognize the modernity of the Latin American avant-gardes as enunciations from and 
about a global, simultaneous dynamic” (16).  From this vantage point, the avant-garde 
can be viewed as a part of a worldwide culture that displaces the center-periphery model 
in favor of a mutually constitutive dynamic (16). This decentered approach reveals a 
plurality of simultaneous modernities that interact with and influence each other to form a 
network of interrelations that does not privilege one modernity over the other. Similarly, I 
will take a synchronic view of the modern literary experiments in both the 
Anglo/American and Latin American traditions using the advent of recording technology, 
such as phonographs and gramophones, as representative of this “global simultaneous 
dynamic.” My methodology will answer Doyle and Winkiel’s call for a locational 
approach to modernisms by grounding the Latin American texts in their own historical 
moment and cultural contexts while also aligning with Mao and Walkowitz’s vision of 
new modernism, as my method expands the categories of modernism vertically through 
the encounter with media and technology.  
A synchronic view with science and technology as the fulcrum offers a way out of 
Doyle and Winkiel’s methodological and generic complications. The simultaneous arrival 
in Latin America and Anglo/America of the technologies of sound provides a congruence 
that brings these two seemingly incommensurate cultures and histories of modernity 
together. With this approach, Latin American literature does not have to be read through 
a Eurocentric lens or as a footnote to a larger literary history. Instead, it can retain its 
status as an independent cultural production that emanated from the same global 
phenomena in a moment of enormous change and rapid modernization. My dissertation 
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juxtaposes these literary contexts to shed light on the systemic interrelation of national 
literatures that critiques the assumption that modernism occurs only in one singular 
moment in one singular place.  
The impact of the gramophone’s arrival worldwide varies depending on the 
cultural context. As Bruno Latour describes, science happens not in its own isolated 
“black box” of knowledge. Instead it is dependent on a much larger network of allies, 
colleagues, instruments, and most important to this discussion, public representation (98-
101). Latour uses the metaphor of the circulatory system to explain this network wherein 
the heart is science and these external contingencies and influences are the arteries and 
capillaries coursing through the heart. Without this supporting circulatory system of 
players outside of the laboratory or field of study, innovation could not occur. The 
representations of science in literature and cultural productions are part of this circulation 
and are key in anchoring a new theory or technology in the popular imagination.  
Sound technology entered the public sphere in a number of ways ranging from 
newspaper and magazine articles announcing key technologies like the gramophone, to 
public lectures by high profile scientists. The variety of exposure blurs the line between 
elite or hard science and popular or pseudo science, filling the public discourse with 
technical jargon alongside inventions, interpretations, and re-imaginings of the 
technology. Recording technologies made the dislocation of the voice from the body 
possible through the new ability to preserve speech across time, which in turn, sparked 
new investigations into the potential applications of vibration, recording and wireless 
transmission of sound and information. When placed in the public sphere, these advances 
merged with older superstitions like the possibility for mind reading and ESP. Pamela 
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Thurschwell notes that “at the end of the nineteenth century science is severing the links 
between materiality visibility and transmission, allowing for a sort of telepathic 
imaginary” (qtd in Goody 11). The mental, the imaginary and the mechanically possible 
were becoming indistinguishable.  
From mesmerism and telepathy to psychophysics and electromagnetism, the once 
impossible now seemed very real, re-opening thinking about superstition and 
spiritualism. As the hyper-rational world of science comes in contact with the general 
population, the seemingly fantastic new discoveries in sound, physics and energy start to 
resemble ancient superstitions and mythologies. Even the voice of the pragmatic, 
positivist scientist, the marker of authority and precision, seems fallible when the 
experiment enters the world traditionally reserved for the occult or when the results are 
beyond common perception. Prominent scientists like Michael Faraday and John Tyndall 
give public lectures on science in the hopes of translating the mysteries of the world to 
the layperson. While these lectures often seek to debunk pseudo science and quackery,  
“legitimate” science often appears just as marvelous as the imagined for the audience. As 
Gillian Beer explains,  
Such lectures were arresting entertainment, expanding the scope of the 
senses and putting credence to the test. Yet such demonstrations also 
asserted the real presence of unforeseen phenomena ‘out there’: singing 
flames, invisible rays made visible, artificial blue skies. Materialism 
became a form of magic spectacle, and the spectacle implied both the 
relativity of knowledge and the actuality of phenomena beyond the 
customary reach of unaided senses. (305)  
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The new reaches of science extend human knowledge beyond the immediately knowable. 
To understand these concepts meant to stretch the boundaries of the real. Audiences must 
suspend their disbelief in the same way one might at a magic show, and the average 
person cannot count on his or her own knowledge or experience to determine the relative 
truth of the experiment. Instead, these advances usher in a new era in which materialist 
explanations and experience are no longer seem sufficient. 
New modes of perception open new space for literary experimentation. The 
gramophone and its kin serve as points of contact between the material and immaterial 
world with the voice as a bridge between them. Travelling invisibly through the ether, the 
voice, once a unique element of the individual, becomes defamiliarized and removed 
from its immediate experience, warranting the creation of new modes of expression to 
represent this new phenomenon. In literature, these new modes are evident in both form 
and content. As Angela Frattarola argues “modernist writers use sound and auditory 
experience to subvert traditional Enlightenment notions of self and narrative, which tend 
to privilege sight. While vision indicates an analytical self, distanced from the world, 
audition allows for a self immersed in the world…much of the formal experimentation 
associated with modernism is dependent on this representation of sound and auditory 
experience” (132).  Disembodied narrators and speakers mark many modernist texts. For 
example, Joyce's Portrait of the Artist refuses the third person omniscient narrative voice 
of the 19th century in favor of multiple voices and free indirect discourse, and Eliot's The 
Waste Land contains snatches of conversations and bits of voices as if running the dial 
down the radio frequencies (Suárez 758). Voices are no longer connected to distinct 
bodies, but can be recorded, claimed, and reintroduced without explanation. This 
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separation of voice and body and self and speech helps facilitate more experimental 
forms of narration that break the connection between author and speaker and speaker and 
character.  
 I will examine these new possibilities for representation and perception as they 
occur in George Bernard Shaw’s play Pygmalion, Leopoldo Lugones’ two stories “Yzur” 
and “La fuerza omega,” Jaime Torres Bodet’s novel Proserpina rescatada and short story 
“Parálisis” and Flann O’Brien’s novel The Third Policeman. The spectrum of texts 
selected for this project show a range of responses to sound technology and its impact on 
literary expression. The simultaneous arrival of this technology in both Latin America 
and Ireland allows for an interrogation of notions of uneven development and linear ideas 
of modernity. Within the modernist canon, both spaces are often appropriated or 
discounted as capable of reflecting their own form of modernity. Irish authors are often 
discussed as if they were British, erasing any cultural specificity. Conversely, Latin 
American authors are often left out of the conversation entirely and viewed by many 
Anglophone scholars as lagging behind in literary achievement. Yet, the texts of Shaw, 
Lugones, Torres Bodet and O’Brien confirm that modernist sensibilities are alive and 
well contemporaneously with Anglo/American Modernism. 
 The first two chapters examine early twentieth century reactions of skepticism 
toward technology and the erasure of the human beneath the rising power of positivism. 
Argentine writer Leopoldo Lugones’ short story “Yzur” (1906) and Irish playwright 
George Bernard Shaw’s Pygmalion (1912) both include scientists whose disregard for the 
well-being of his subject serves as a critique of the dangers of positivism without 
compassion or allowance for human care. Shaw uses speech as a key element in identity 
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and in marking class, while Lugones marks speech as the divide between human and 
animal. In both texts, phonograph records and grammar lessons are the methods for 
allowing their subjects to “pass” into a new social stratum while engaging with alternate 
theories of linguistic evolution. 
 By the 1930s these initial innovations in sound technology no longer prompt an 
interrogation of the encroachment of science over the human; sound technologies have 
become a part of the general cultural landscape and therefore appear as naturalized 
elements in modernist texts. The fourth chapter analyzes the impact of sound on narrative 
form in Mexican novelist Jaime Torres Bodet’s Proserpina rescatada (Persephone 
Rescued). Using metaphors of sound rather than sight to represent his ephemeral title 
character, Torres Bodet opens new modes of writing in the modern age of sounded film 
and machinery while also wrestling with the viability of an intuitive character in a 
positivist world. 
 The final chapter examines the weaponization of sound on the brink of World War 
II. 1930s Ireland had survived a war for independence as well as a civil war and 
recording had been used as a means of surveillance against Irish citizens. Flann O’Brien’s 
The Third Policeman takes surveillance to its extreme, rendering a world in which voices 
can be collected, stored, and literally turned into energy that the policemen use to heat the 
police station. In an absurd extension of the Irish government’s actual surveillance, 
O’Brien’s novel turns the power of the human voice into energy for the state. O’Brien’s 
dark satire reflects the new pessimism of the modern era. 
 These approaches and reactions to developments in sound reveal the complex 
relation of 20th century science to culture, specifically literature. Each of these texts 
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illustrate a specific response to the growing incorporation of technology into every day 
life and manifest not only the excitement and exhilaration of discovery, but also the fear 
of the unknown. These authors all participate in world culture and respond to the tide of 
modernity through their own local lenses. My dissertation views their worlds from a 
macro level and from an international perspective. Together these texts evidence the 
exchange of ideas and technologies across borders and show a spectrum of aesthetic 
responses to modernity and modernization. My approach, which crosses national 
boundaries as well as disciplinary ones through technology and sound studies, expands 
current methodologies in transnationalist Modernist Studies. Rather than applying an 
Anglo/American model of modernism to world literature, I employ a comparatist 
approach that grounds the individual texts in their own contexts and examines the 
monumental shifts in literature and art in response to rapid industrialization and 
mechanization as a simultaneous, interconnected process. 
 
CHAPTER II: LINGUISTIC METAMORPHOSIS AND SCIENTIFIC CONVERSION 
IN GEORGE BERNARD SHAW’S PYGMALION 
 As an advocate of language reform and student of phonetics, George Bernard 
Shaw had a deep investment in the language politics of his day. He was an Irish 
immigrant and a Fabian socialist who knew all too well that his Irish accent was an 
immediate marker of both national origin and class. In his view, if this linguistic marker 
were eliminated through language training, the speaker would be able to more easily 
transcend class boundaries and break out of Britain’s stringent class hierarchy. Pygmalion 
dramatizes this possibility through Eliza Doolittle, a beggar who sells flowers on the 
  
 12 
streets of London in order to survive. Phonetician Henry Higgins and his fellow linguist 
Colonel Pickering hear her deep cockney accent and make a bet that Higgins can pass off 
this girl as a duchess in six months time, simply through language training. Although 
Eliza agrees to the terms of the experiment, the central conflict in the play is the clash 
between Higgins’s treatment of Eliza as a specimen, something to be tested, trained and 
set loose and the fact that Eliza is a human with her own thoughts and feelings, not 
simply a blank slate for experimentation. While Shaw is an advocate of phonetics, the 
play critiques Higgins’s blind faith in science and favors a transformation of self that 
originates not from outside sources like science or religious faith, but through self-
awareness and introspection. Eliza’s transformation through language does not entirely 
achieve its aims in advancing her social position permanently. It does, however, has 
enable her to move beyond her extreme poverty to a new, articulate state that gives her 
the vocabulary to explain her point of view to Higgins and to find her own inner strength. 
These qualities are those that will remain with Eliza long after Higgins’s experiment 
ends.  
 The drive toward self-actualization that Shaw valorizes is connected to his belief 
in Creative Evolution. Rather than Darwinism’s concept of change over time through 
adaptation to environmental pressures and genetic anomalies, Shaw follows a more 
Lamarckian view of evolution that understands evolution to result from willed change 
and acquired characteristics that can be passed down to future generations. Taken to a 
socio-political level, if all people were able to reach their highest individual potentials in 
life, working toward an idea of positive progress for all people, the following generations 
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would be able to take even greater steps forward. For Eliza, acquiring language is the first 
step in this process.  
CHAPTER III: LUGONES AND THE HUMAN EDGE OF SOUND 
  
Like Shaw who followed alternate theories of evolution that leave room for a Life 
Force or organizing principle other than materialist science, Argentine Leopoldo Lugones 
turned to theosophy for a new epistemological grounding. Theosophical ideas of 
evolution include a similar Lamarckian idea of inherited, willed change with the end goal 
of an advanced human civilization that includes both science and the ancient wisdom and 
knowledge of the world. Theosophists also embrace a notion of devolution in which 
evolution is not simply a tool of progress but a process that can also operate in reverse. 
Lugones uses this concept of theosophical evolution in combination with a physiological 
notion of language in his short story “Yzur.” His scientist narrator claims that over the 
course of generations, monkeys have willed themselves not to speak in order to avoid 
work and subjugation at the hands of the competing human species. His hypothesis is that 
if he can retrain the physiology of a monkey to speak, he can then return the monkey to 
his full human status. The activation of the speech organs will in turn activate the 
metaphysical aspects of the human soul.  
 The third chapter also examines the exchange between scientific jargon and the 
genre of the fantastic in the use of the authority of science to bend logic into a new form 
through an analysis of Lugones’s story “La fuerza omega.”  In “La fuerza omega” voice 
functions not as an evolutionary tool, but as a component of sound to be used as energy. 
Lugones’ work cites the same lectures by Fourier and Tyndall as his Anglo/American 
contemporaries, as well as developments in wave theory that further complicate the 
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relation of voice to the body. Heat, energy, and sound collapse into one and this collapse 
leads to nightmarish consequences, especially when viewed through the eyes of an 
unreliable and potentially dangerous scientist.  
The narrator of “La fuerza omega” is an eccentric scientist working on the edges 
of the scientific community who develops a theory of sound based on his modifications to 
phonograph discs in an attempt to replicate the harmonies of the human voice. He 
discovers that sound waves have a potential power, and this power can be harnessed to 
disintegrate matter by disrupting the cohesion of an object’s molecules. When he runs the 
test with his new apparatus the narrator describes the effect of the machine: 
Un adoquín que calzaba la puerta rebelde se desintegró a nuestra vista, 
convirtiéndose con  leve sacudida en un montón de polvo impalpable. 
Varios trozos de hierra sufrieron la misma suerte. Y resultaba en verdad de 
un efecto mágico aquella transformación de la materia, sin un esfuerzo 
perceptible, sin un ruido, como no fuera la leve estridencia que cualquier 
rumor ahogaba.1 (58) 
The powerful force delivers on its promise and demolishes the objects in its path without 
a sound, reducing them to dust. In the scientist’s mind, this experiment is purely an 
intellectual pursuit   with the aim of discovering the harmony of the human voice in 
accordance with the ancient theory of Orpheus’ lyre and modern day wave theory. The 
observers of the experiment, and potentially readers, however, can immediately see the 
potential this invention has as a weapon (59). If this machine can shatter rocks, then it can 
                                                       
1 A cobblestone that held open the door disintegrated before our eyes, changing with a slight tremor into a 
mountain of impalpable dust. Various fragments of iron suffered the same fate. And that the transformation 
of matter resulted in a truly magical effect, without a perceptible force, without a sound, except for a slight 
shrillness that any whisper drowned.  
  
 15 
surely shatter an enemy or a target. In this final turn of the narrative, Lugones reveals the 
destructive potential of science, even when the impetus for investigation is a benign one. 
In the wrong hands, this beautiful machine that unlocks the complete, harmonic capacity 
of the human voice, could be turned deadly. As machine culture becomes more prevalent, 
these dangers increase exponentially and while scientific knowledge can be beneficial, in 
Lugones’ view it has a very real potential for harm. 
 This interplay between science and the fantastic questions the authority of 
science. By simultaneously voicing physics with long vanished ideas of mystical 
harmony, Lugones advances a theosophist perspective that claims that modern science is 
merely rediscovering ancient truths. Theosophists and other occultists “believ[ed] that 
they were engaged in the true mission of science – a thorough and open-minded 
investigation of the mysteries of the universe” (Owen 34). The distrust they had of 
science was lodged not in the discipline as a whole, but in how it was practiced in the 
Victorian era: with an eye toward instrumentalized reason and a denial of the possibility 
for a spiritual life. The Theosophists wanted to rigorously examine the potentials of the 
universe, while also giving real attention to a spiritual life. The narration of both “La 
fuerza omega” and “Yzur” illustrates this impulse to draw these two discourses together 
while also establishing limits on the knowledge of man. Though these stories contribute 
to the circulation of scientific knowledge, they also warn of the consequences of 
assuming human knowledge or scientific progress could ever completely explain the 
mysteries of the universe.  
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CHAPTER IV: AURAL REPRESENTATION AND THE MODERN SENSORIUM IN 
JAIME TORRES BODET’S PROSERPINA RESCATADA AND “PARÁLISIS” 
The fourth chapter of this project connects the post-revolutionary space of Ireland 
with that of Mexico through Jaime Torres Bodet’s 1931 novel Proserpina rescatada 
(Persephone rescued) and his 1928 short story “Parálisis.” While O’Brien’s work created 
a hellscape from the doldrums of de Valera’s conservative nation building, Torres Bodet 
presents an era in Mexican history with a rapid influx of technology after the Mexican 
Revolution. Torres Bodet writes both pieces in a critical moment of the development of 
cinema in Mexico. In the 1930s, the Mexican studio system was making the shift from 
silent film to sounded and in this shift there is a hyper focus on the role of the voice in 
representation. Experiments in adding sound to image exaggerate the separation of the 
voice from the speaking body and the voice from the image on screen. The recorded 
voice, still a novelty in the 30s, has a new, even stranger role in film. With artists and 
filmmakers wrestling with the place of sound in this new medium, comes a new space for 
literary experimentation. These two works experiment in the inversion of the textual 
sensorium to represent characters phonically rather than simply visually and are 
representative of a modern narrative sensibility that is forced to compete with the sights 
and sounds of the mechanized world. 
The flood of technology that opens the door for vanguard experimentation in 
literature begins with the rapid industrialization in Mexico under the modernization 
project of Porfirio Díaz in the 1910s and 20s, which ushers in a wave mechanical 
innovations. These inventions significantly altered the way the populous perceived and 
interacted with the world around them, particularly in urban centers. Under the Porfiriato, 
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writers and artists had largely retreated to the aesthetic space in opposition to the 
regulated sphere of efficiency, modernization, and instrumentalization. They viewed 
technology with suspicion due to its ties to the governmental structure and often figured it 
as equipment for the further repression of the individual citizen. When this regime 
collapses and modernization becomes a way forward rather than a conservative space, 
these technologies are embraced in a new way, engaging with the new vanguard in 
literature and art in a way that was impossible under Díaz.  
The influx of technologies of recording and the experience of modernity expands 
the possibilities for text and creates the space for the polyphonic, polyvalent, multiplicity 
of Proserpina. Much like the mythical Persephone, who is forced to live two lives, one in 
the summer above in “real” world and the other in the winter in the underworld, the 
novel’s Proserpina is a character cut in half. She is both a doctor and a medium for 
séances. She is both a modern and a mystic. In her duality she is a symptom of a rapidly 
shifting modern world ready to embrace science and technology but still clinging to the 
remnants of superstition. For Proserpina these two sides are distinct and 
incommensurable, while Delfino her friend, colleague, and lover struggles to connect 
these two sides into a single cohesive narrative. Delfino is a man of science and his first 
person narration relies on modern technology as the mediation between him and 
Proserpina. Though the text is not about cinema or sound recording, it confronts the 
problematic dislocation of body from voice and representation from reality that results 
from these technologies. In doing so, it also positions the positivist, Delfino, in 
opposition to Proserpina, who exists in the realms of both the positivism and spiritism 
with Delfino the victor. 
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CHAPTER V:  “I DO NOT CARE FOR CELERY”: SOUND, REPETITION, AND 
SURVEILLANCE IN THE THIRD POLICEMAN 
In Ireland, Flann O’Brien’s 1939 novel The Third Policeman moves from the 
fantastic to the absurd in creating a surreal world where the laws of science and 
philosophy have been turned inside out. O’Brien’s text, though written later than 
Lugones’s, calls upon these same scientific sources and filters them through the fictional 
philosopher/scientist De Selby. The Third Policeman is a spiraling novel of a man caught 
in a hellscape of his own creation. After a botched robbery attempt that results in the 
narrator’s death, he finds himself trapped in an odd world governed by strange rules of 
physics and guarded by three policemen. Most importantly in this context, this alternate 
world is based on “omnium,” an all-encompassing substance from which all things are 
created. As one of the officers, Sergeant MacCruiskeen, explains how this substance 
works to combine elements of both energy and sound: “light is the same as omnium on a 
short wave but if it comes on a longer wave it is in the form of noise, or sound” (110). To 
illustrate how light and sound work together MacCruiskeen uses a mangle, a machine 
with a hand crank originally used to wring out clothes, that he has altered to physically 
stretch out light until sound is emitted, usually in the form of a scream or a simultaneous 
screech of all noise which can then be converted to heat. The officers spend their 
summers collecting noises to use for heat in the winter (111). Anyone in charge of the 
omnium has control of all that happens in this world. The collection of voices converts 
noise and speech into energy, reincorporating all of this energy back into the workings of 
the space/state. This is the shape of the narrator’s hell, held together by omnium and 
driven by the regulation, monitoring and mutability of energy.  
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Those who control the forces of the hellscape are not gods, deities, or scientists; 
they are the police. By the 1930s the recorded voice had already become part of the 
surveillance of the state, a phenomenon all too familiar during the Irish Civil War of the 
1920s, in policing tactics against the IRA (Plauder 216), as well as in secret police forces 
that arise globally, particularly in fascist states. In the novel, the narrator’s own words, 
which the officer had stored in the mangle, are used as evidence of his original crime and 
as the site of repetition for the novel. The elements of surveillance in the text are 
indicative of Eamon de Valera’s post-independence Irish government, a government 
focused on establishing the infrastructure of a new nation while simultaneously enacting 
conservative social policy. In this atmosphere, the shadow of the impending Second 
World War shatters the idea of progress and the advancement of human potential in a 
century already ravaged by economic and political upheaval. Instead, these technologies 
are increasingly turned against the populace. Science, theosophy, and politics have all 
proven ill-equipped to make sense of the new century. The multiple layers of O’Brien’s 
narration and the grandiose theories of atoms, light, and energy all prove ineffectual and 
meaningless in the shadow of a post independence republic where speech itself is 
dangerous.  
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CHAPTER II 
LINGUISTIC METAMORPHOSIS AND SCIENTIFIC CONVERSION IN GEORGE 
BERNARD SHAW’S PYGMALION 
 
In an 1878 article, Thomas Edison proudly proclaims that his latest invention, the 
phonograph has already made major changes to the human relation to sound. Among the 
phonograph’s miraculous feats, he lists the “indefinite multiplication and preservation of 
[sounds] without regard to the existence or non-existence of the original source” and “the 
captivation of sounds, with or without the knowledge or consent of the source of their 
origin” (“Phonograph” 530). This technology no longer requires a human being to 
articulate speech. Replaced by a cylinder and the turn of a crank, there is no longer a need 
for a specific speaker, a revelation in efficiency in the workplace and in the preservation 
of information. With this technology, the voice can also be isolated and studied as a 
discrete element without concern for the original speaker or the human body. By the turn 
of the twentieth century, the phonograph and other sound technologies like the radio have 
revolutionized the notion of the voice. Separated from the body, sound moves from an 
ephemeral phenomenon to one that can be replicated and codified. The scientific 
treatment of language, breaking it down into its linguistic parts and isolating the human 
voice through recording technologies, creates an objective standard for speech, a baseline 
for “proper” pronunciation and norms of articulation.  
Voice and accent provide an instant recognition of place, and therefore caste, for 
the listener, that recording technologies now bring into sharp relief. This is particularly 
true in early twentieth century Britain where the range of accents from cockney to the 
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King’s English are immediately intelligible by the average citizen. Neutralizing the 
negative connotations of a lower class accent is key to ascending from the lower caste 
into a more egalitarian class system not so stringently constructed through superficial 
markers. Playwright, philosopher and political agitator, George Bernard Shaw sees the 
opportunity to break down these markers of class in this moment of linguistic 
codification. In Shaw’s socialist vision for a new British society, he views accent, 
including his own Irish accent, as a barrier that can be overcome through training. 
Shifting one’s linguistic code has the power to change external perceptions of class 
making it easier to cross economic and social borders.  
Shaw’s answer to this crisis of accent is in the study of phonetics. He is an avid 
supporter of the democratic aims of this linguistic dissemination, leaving most of his 
estate to the founding of a phonetic alphabet that would allow for easier language 
acquisition and a more efficient form of writing. Yet, he is also aware that these kinds of 
programs and reforms are a stopgap measure until a larger reform of the entire economic 
system can occur through gradual change, an economic program based in Fabian 
socialism. His play Pygmalion recognizes language as a product of class and breeding 
that can be corrected; yet, it also criticizes the mediation of the voice through science and 
technology. This mediation ruptures the self, violating the individual’s autonomy, the one 
thing that must be preserved in Shaw’s ethics. 
Pygmalion: A Romance in Five Acts, centers not on a love plot as the title might 
imply, but instead on a bet between gentlemen that they can pass off a lowly beggar as a 
duchess through linguistic training. The gentlemen, Professor Henry Higgins, a 
phonetician, and Colonel Pickering, a moneyed gentleman with an interest in the science, 
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find their subject in the boisterous Eliza Doolittle, a flower-seller who hopes their 
language training can improve her station in life. For the two men, this project is a lark, 
an experiment, while for Eliza it has very real consequences for her future. The central 
conflict in the play is in the collision between the carelessness of the two men in regards 
to Eliza, and her refusal to be relegated to the status of mere experiment.  
This play is seemingly didactic, a pleasant play about scientific morality and the 
possibility of transformation once the shackles of poverty have been lifted. As a vocal 
supporter of linguistic change through phonetics, it should follow that Higgins, a 
representative of phonetics, is the hero, the key reformer that will prove the effectiveness 
of language training to help alleviate class bias. Higgins appears to be the holder of truth 
and morality in his role as scientist and catalyst for change, yet this phonetician, 
seemingly the perfect advocate for Shaw’s own policies ultimately fails in his endeavor. 
The complexity of Higgins’s role in the play becomes clearer when one takes Shaw’s 
“sequel” to the play into account. Shaw writes this prose piece, an epilogue of sorts, to 
make clear the nature of the relationships between his characters. His sequel enforces a 
specific reading of the text and leaves little room for reader or actor interpretation, but 
more importantly, it illuminates his political investment in this play, which is not entirely 
clear in the play itself.  
In the sequel, Shaw describes what happens after the training is over revealing 
that Eliza and her middle class husband Freddy, despite having the accent and the 
clothing to make their way in the middle class world do not have the basic skills 
necessary for survival in that world. Eliza cannot read nor calculate sums, and her 
husband’s classical education has not provided him with any functional skills. Language 
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proves not enough to successfully cross these boundaries. The root of Higgins’ failure is 
in his attempt to cause a change in Eliza from an external source rather than that change 
coming from a deep-seated need within Eliza herself. 
This key premise of self-motivated change evident in the sequel connects this play 
to Shaw’s broader oeuvre and to his philosophical and political ideals more often 
attributed to his more overtly political plays like Major Barbara, and Man and 
Superman. Higgins’s failure is not in his instruction, but in his intention. Eliza is an apt 
pupil and learns her lessons quickly, but the linguistic transformation is one that is 
administered from Higgins’ external influence. In Shaw’s allegiance to Creative 
Evolution, vitalism, and Fabian socialism, any lasting change must come from within, 
driven by an intense recognition of the imperative for change. Those who can achieve 
this level of actualization are those who will create a lasting impact in their own lives but 
also on the creation of an equitable, progressive world.  
Much has been written on Shaw’s notions of morality and politics from his 
connections to Stalinism, Nietzsche, socialism, and most recently his connection to Irish 
politics of the era. The criticism of Pygmalion tends to rest on its use of phonetics, its 
critique of class structure, or Eliza’s place in Shaw’s pantheon of unruly women. Rarely 
are these two strands connected, often discounting Pygmalion as a mere lark due to 
Shaw’s superficial rendering of his characters and light-hearted subject matter. I argue 
that when read alongside of Shaw’s articulations of Creative Evolution and its political 
applications, most clearly evident in his prefaces to Back to Methuselah and Androcles 
and the Lion, Pygmalion takes on a new political resonance that connects the play to 
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Shaw’s larger body of work and clarifies both Higgins and Eliza’s positions in regard to 
Shaw’s own ideologies.  
As writer at the turn of the century with an investment in the politics and sciences 
of the era, George Bernard Shaw (1856–1950) offers a window into this age of immense 
change and development. In his enormous output of plays, novels, political treatises for 
the Fabian Socialists, and pamphlets, letters and articles about language reform, Shaw 
shows a consistent engagement with the debates of the era, particularly of evolution and 
phonetics. Behind Shaw’s views on willed change in politics and economics lies an 
investment in overturning the Neo-Darwinian trend in culture that denies any willful 
progress in favor of random evolution over time. Although Darwin publishes Origin of 
Species in 1859, the impact of this groundbreaking book is still filtering into the political 
and social realms at the end of the 19th century. In Shaw’s view, the encroachment of 
Neo-Darwinism into the social world means a validation of the most brutal elements of 
the economic system that let the vulnerable die and the rich rise to astronomical heights 
due to nothing more than the accident of their birth into privileged circumstances.  
To combat this linkage between the inevitability of social progress through 
circumstantial change and biological development over time, Shaw backs the (now 
obsolete) theory of Creative Evolution. Following the theories of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, 
Shaw advocates for a version of evolution that includes an element of free will and self-
determination that can be carried forward across generations. The idea of a willed change 
is critical to his stance as a social reformer because change can then be created in the 
world through positive action. In contrast, under Neo-Darwinism, improvement of the 
human condition and passage into a new phase of existence, presumably for the better, 
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depends entirely on random events. Creative Evolution does not relegate men to a 
predetermined position from which no escape can be made. With enough intensity, 
desire, and internal drive, an individual can will a change in themselves that will set a 
new course for those that follow.  
Shaw is aware that his position as a Lamarckian evolutionist is not a popular one 
in his era and that it is a difficult biologic position to take. He describes his complicated 
relationship to the science in his lengthy preface to his work Back to Methuselah, a trio of 
plays that address the metaphysical aspects of civilization. In the preface, he critiques 
August Weismann’s experiments to disprove Lamarckian evolution as an example of a 
scientist blinded by method. Weismann sets out to disprove Lamarck’s concept that if an 
organism acquires a trait in life, as in the famous example of a giraffe stretching its neck 
to reach leaves higher on a tree, it would then pass those traits on to its offspring, in this 
case baby giraffes with longer necks than their peers. In Weismann’s experiment, he cuts 
off the tails of a colony of mice and waits to see if their children will be born without 
tails, which, of course, is not the case (Shaw, BM lvi). While for many this is an effective, 
if not brutal, experiment, for Shaw it illustrates a mistake in intention. As Shaw explains 
it, in order for the change to be effective, Weismann should have found a colony of mice 
who were susceptible to hypnosis and then “hypnotized them into an urgent conviction 
that the fate of the musque world depended on the disappearance of its tail…Having thus 
made the mice desire to lose their tails with a life-or-death intensity, he would very soon 
have seen a few mice born with little or no tail” (lvii). The key to this change is in the 
mind of the mouse. It is obvious to Shaw that without addressing the internal and urgent 
need of the mouse to lose its tail no change will happen.  
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Shaw aligns the internal aspect of Creative Evolution with Vitalist philosophy. In 
the preface to Back to Methuselah he concludes “Nietzsche, for example, thinking out the 
great central truth of Will to Power instead of cutting off mouse tails, had no difficulty in 
concluding that the final objective of this Will was power over self, and that the seekers 
after power over other and material possessions were on a false scent” (lxi). Shaw 
privileges those who will change to occur in their own lives as the superior beings above 
those who seek material goods and power over others, or the capitalists who survive on 
the backs of the laborers of production below them. In his political views, he believes that 
humankind has not yet reached its culmination and awaits the unique man who can 
advance human civilization past its current capitalist, Neo-Darwinist barbarism. 
To examine how this idea of Creative Evolution plays out in Shaw’s politics and 
in Pygmalion, it is helpful to first examine its application in Major Barbara, a play that 
more immediately addresses these concerns. In Major Barbara, Shaw contrasts the pious 
Barbara, a middle class woman who has dedicated her life to saving souls and serving the 
poor with the Salvation Army, with her estranged father Andrew Undershaft, an affable 
and charming arms dealer. While negotiating the terms of the inheritance of the company 
with the rest of family, Barbara and Undershaft make a deal that she will have the chance 
to try to convert him through the Salvation Army, and in turn she will have to come visit 
his munitions factory and he will attempt to convert her to his system of economic ethics.  
While touring Undershaft’s community around his munitions factory, a gleaming 
white utopian town free from strife and poverty, he explains to his daughter the 
differences between his own viewpoint and Barbara’s. She asks him what virtue and light 
exist behind the cleanliness and order that he finds in his factory, and he explains:  
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Undershaft: Cleanliness and respectability do not need justification, 
Barbara; they justify themselves. I see no darkness here, no dreadfulness. 
In your Salvation shelter I saw poverty, misery, cold and hunger. You 
gave them bread and treacle and dreams of heaven. I give from thirty 
shillings a week to twelve thousand a year. They find their own dreams; 
but I look after the drainage. (Act III) 
Whereas the conversion that Barbara promotes through the Salvation Army advocates 
humility and service to the Lord as virtue despite the grinding poverty that surrounds 
them, the work that Undershaft pursues is immoral on its surface (providing arms to 
conflicts and wars) but his workers are given the immediate reward of a decent wage, 
shelter, and adequate food. They do not have to rely on the promise of eternal salvation 
after a mortal life of suffering. Through meeting the basic needs of his workers first, 
Undershaft leaves their minds and their souls to their own steering. He believes that 
delivering them from suffering and toward a self-sufficient life, is an inherently godly 
operation.  
 While Undershaft does not pull Barbara away from her piety, and she does not 
convert Undershaft from his faith in economics, their true conversions come in moments 
when they recognize their own inner strength and identify the power of the self. 
Undershaft recounts his conversion with conviction.  
Undershaft: [his energetic tone dropping into one of bitter and brooding 
remembrance] I was an east ender. I moralized and starved until one day I 
swore that I would be a fullfed free man at all costs--that nothing should 
stop me except a bullet, neither reason nor morals nor the lives of other 
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men. I said "Thou shalt starve ere I starve"; and with that word I became 
free and great. I was a dangerous man until I had my will: now I am a 
useful, beneficent, kindly person. That is the history of most self-made 
millionaires, I fancy. When it is the history of every Englishman we shall 
have an England worth living in. (Act III) 
In his conversion narrative there is a clearly defined moment of recognition and 
transformation in which he realizes his true purpose. His conversion, however, is secular 
and based in transcending the morals and limits of man until he has found a productive 
space for him within the confines of the material world. Once he recognizes his own 
power and refuses to be the victim of the system, he becomes capable of harnessing his 
full potential. Shaw provides lengthy protestations in the preface to Major Barbara that 
Undershaft does not in fact resemble Nietzsche’s concept of the ubermensch, admitting 
simply that he borrowed the term Superman from Nietzsche, but found the base concepts 
in philosophers of the British Isles, not needing to rely on the continent for brilliant 
philosophical propositions. Yet, through his protestations there is a bit of truth. 
Undershaft does embody the characteristics of a man who can see beyond the boundaries 
of conventional morality to create great change in the world.2    
Next to this ideal form of conversion, Barbara can only manage a more limited 
change beginning after her encounter with her father. His broad views of morality and his 
cynicism toward faith shake her to the core:  
Barbara: … I was in the power of God. […]I stood on the rock I thought 
eternal; and without a word of warning it reeled and crumbled under me. I 
                                                       
2 For more about the connections (or disconnections) between Shaw and Nietzsche see Shaw’s “Preface to 
Major Barbara: First Aid to Critics,” Turco’s Shaw’s Moral Vision and Gassner’s “Bernard Shaw and the 
Making of the Modern Mind.” 
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was safe with an infinite wisdom watching me, an army marching to 
Salvation with me; and in a moment, at a stroke of your pen in a cheque 
book, I stood alone; and the heavens were empty. (Act III) 
This conversion seems incomplete. The miraculous moment comes with a signature in a 
checkbook rather than in a moment of self-reflective activation. After Undershaft 
supplies the needed donation to keep her shelter open with money procured through the 
sale of arms, Barbara can no longer continue her work in good conscience. With the 
foundation of the Salvation Army taken away from her, she is left empty and purposeless. 
She has to look within herself for a new way to define who and what she is and find her 
own definitions of salvation not dependent on the structure of the Salvation Army. She 
needs to tear down the structure holding her back in order to find a space for her own 
conversion, yet she finds nothing there.  
Barbara’s conversion remains unfinished by the end of the play. She has found a 
new outlet for her teachings, but the inspiration comes from an external source: 
Barbara: My father shall never throw it in my teeth again that my 
converts were bribed with bread. [She is transfigured]. I have got rid of the 
bribe of bread. I have got rid of the bribe of heaven. Let God's work be 
done for its own sake: the work he had to create us to do because it cannot 
be done by living men and women. When I die, let him be in my debt, not 
I in his; and let me forgive him as becomes a woman of my rank. (Act III) 
By preaching to the workers of her father’s community rather than to those on the brink 
of starvation, she can convert their souls in a more substantive way than simply trading 
platitudes for bread and a blanket. In this community, any soul she converts has been 
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converted in an earnest commitment to God, thereby freeing Barbara to do the best work 
she can. Free from the accusation of holding bread hostage for souls, she is nonetheless 
dependent on Undershaft’s economic order for this tranquility. The stage directions “she 
is transfixed” marks a Pauline moment of conversion, but, in effect, this moment is an act 
of resignation rather than conversion. She has found her vocation but perhaps not herself. 
Her work is only possible within the confines of Undershaft’s utopia. In her final lines in 
the play she calls out for her mother, clinging to her skirts like a child, undermining the 
possibility that she has achieved her own enlightenment. 
The narratives of salvation parodied here are reformer tracts that, in transforming 
the souls and bodies of young girls and the poor, find their origin in the long Protestant 
history of Pauline conversions stories. The performative function of the narratives (i.e. 
public confessing of sins and the detailing the exact moment of salvation) finds a new 
application in the contemporary moment in self-help organization and support groups like 
Alcoholics Anonymous and Weight Watchers while in the 19th Century, they were used 
by reform groups like the Salvation Army. The original source for this kind of narrative is 
in Chapter 9 of the Acts of the Apostles in the New Testament. The passage tells of the 
instantaneous and miraculous conversion of Judaic Saul to the Christian Paul that forms 
the cornerstone of many Protestant denominations. On the road to Damascus, Saul is 
shouting out “threatenings and slaughter against the disciples of the Lord” (Acts 9:1) 
when a bright light descends from Heaven and Jesus himself appears to Saul. The 
encounter strikes Saul, now reborn as Paul, blind for three days. With his sight restored, 
he immediately begins preaching “Christ in the synagogues” (Acts 9:20). According to 
Giorgio Agamben, the shift in name from Saul to Paul marks not only of conversion in 
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nomenclature, but of conversion in his relationship to God as well. In the Koran, Saul is 
named Talut, a word that translates to highest. To the Israelites, Saul was also depicted as 
regal in both beauty and stature. Therefore, the shift from “s” to “p” “signifies no less 
than the passage from the regal to the insignificant, from grandeur to smallness – paulus 
in Latin means ‘small, of little significance’” (Agamben 9). This new relation to God 
means a humbling before God and for many Christians shifts the religion to one of 
proselytizing and outward proclamations of faith. 
Shaw, though Protestant, does not adhere to the Pauline philosophy. In the preface 
to Androcles and the Lion, one of Shaw’s few plays that addresses religion directly, he 
discusses the notion of Pauline conversion as a theatrical sham: ‘‘The conversion of Paul 
was no conversion at all: it was Paul who converted the religion that had raised one man 
above sin and death into a religion that delivered millions of men so completely into their 
dominion that their own common nature became a horror to them, and the religious life 
became a denial of life’’ (qtd. in Grene 63). In Shaw’s view, Christianity after Paul 
became a religion of fear, doubt, and shame that worked to repress the individual and 
contain the baser aspects of human nature. It also became a weapon to wield over 
believers, requiring them to take Paul’s stance of humility before God. From this position 
of prostration, it is nearly impossible for the individual to find an inner salvation or self-
actualization, which Shaw feels is far more important than adherence to dogma. 
The consequences of this shift in Christianity can be seen in some of the more 
extreme versions of conversion narratives, which belong to the Puritans of colonial 
America. Following the example of preacher Thomas Shepard, the members of the 
Cambridge congregation would publically confess their moment of calling and direct 
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connection with God. These moments provided evidence of the speaker’s “visible 
sainthood” or membership as one of the elect chosen by God for salvation. This elect can 
never be taken for granted and must constantly be re-assessed, questioned, and sought 
after with constant vigilance (McGiffert 136). The telling of conversion stories takes on a 
kind of performativity and narrative form that was overseen by the community. Stories 
could not be too long, contain too many Biblical citations, or too many details, or else 
they would be seen as false and told out of vanity rather than faith. The culture that 
surrounds the telling of conversion narratives is one of self-punishment, and self-denial 
where the threat of eternal damnation looms large.  
The Salvation Army used similar tactics, advertising meetings with tales of abuse, 
hardship, and misery from people who were delivered from this pain by the Army. When 
salvation, or the promise of bread and a warm bed depend on a formulaic story, the more 
heartbreaking the better, there is a natural inclination to embellish. Shaw describes his 
rancor towards these kinds of confessions in his preface to Major Barbara: 
Then there is the nasty lying habit called confession, which the Army 
encourages because it lends itself to dramatic oratory, with plenty of 
thrilling incident. For my part, when I hear a convert relating the violences 
and oaths and blasphemies he was guilty of before he was saved, making 
out that he was a very terrible fellow then and is the most contrite and 
chastened of Christians now, I believe him no more than I believe the 
millionaire who says he came up to London or Chicago as a boy with only 
three halfpence in his pocket. (“First Aid”) 
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Confessions are performance and not salvation. In this context, they only function to raise 
the status of the savior, the Salvation Army, rather than to tend to the souls in need of 
saving. The greater the scoundrel, the greater the salvation, the greater the donation to the 
Army. Shaw does not blame the person seeking salvation; why not trade a story for some 
bread? Instead, he blames the system that does not see poverty as the real crime, the real 
atrocity. The promise of an eternal reward in the afterlife as payment for suffering 
through a mortal existence does nothing to alleviate the pain of the mortal world. Instead, 
Shaw sees it as a moral imperative to improve conditions on earth in the present moment.  
Shaw’s belief in the self as the root of conversion as seen in Undershaft moment 
of clarity, is based both in his politics and his notions of evolution. Fabian socialism 
advocated not for an immediate revolution but for a gradual change over time, advancing 
policies like minimum wage and pensions in order to provide security and move toward a 
better economic system. But while the idea of change over time seems in line with 
Darwinian notions of evolution, Shaw subscribed to the vitalist idea of Creative 
Evolution. In contrast to what he saw as amoral, animalistic and random evolution in 
Darwinism, Shaw believed that a Lamarckian view of evolution allowed space for will 
driven evolution that strives for positive change rather than simply survival (Griffith 9). 
Like Lamarck, Shaw believed that evolutionary changes come from within an organism 
and are not solely the result of environmental pressures. Such changes would then be 
passed on to the offspring of the newly adapted organism. Moreover, Shaw subscribed to 
the idea of a Life Force, or élan vital, that functions as a progressive, organizing force in 
the world and helps activate these evolutionary advances. The root of this Life Force is 
not divine, but rather it operates as a teleological proposition (Mills 124-125).  
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To be a socialist, vitalist, realist is no easy feat. And while Shaw’s concepts can 
seem at odds with one another, his complex web of politics, science, and morality 
converge in the idea of self-evolution toward a greater good. Fabians advocate for 
economic reform that eradicates the grinding poverty that results from capitalist 
exploitation of productive labor. To achieve this goal they envision a “professionally 
administered society” headed by the Ablest of men rather than the wealthiest (Ray 218). 
Progress in such a system requires that the Ablest come to the fore to lead and guide the 
proletariat forward. This man needs to be the best suited for the task at hand and have the 
will to create positive change, a tenet he describes in one of his clearest applications of 
Creative Evolution in his 1944 political treatise, Everybody’s Political What’s What? in 
which Shaw describes the qualities of an ideal future leader: 
His God must not be an existing Omnipotent Omniscient Perfection, but as 
yet only an ideal towards which creative evolution is striving, with 
mankind merely its best attempt so far, and a very unsatisfactory one at 
that, liable to be replaced at any moment if creative evolution gives it up 
as hopeless. He must face the evil of the world, which apparently reduces 
the goodness of God to absurdity, as but the survival of errors originally 
well intended. He must treat life as everlasting, but treat his 
contemporaries as ephemeral mortals having no life beyond the grave to 
compensate them for any injustice they may suffer here and now. (qtd. in 
Griffith 154) 
Evident here is Shaw’s faith in the exceptional man, again reminiscent of Nietzsche’s 
philosophies. This man must understand that utopia is always a future oriented 
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proposition and humankind is always in a state of evolution forward. In contributing to 
the growth of future generations, he must also work to make the current state as the best 
possible given contemporary conditions. Like Major Barbara’s Undershaft, he must be 
able to face the true causes of unrest and with a clear pragmatism work to better these 
conditions, offering citizens a better life in the present moment rather than promising 
redemption in some eternal afterlife. Like many of his generation, Shaw favored a 
government that while operating outside of a capitalist system that depends on poverty 
and oppression also has at its head an extraordinary man of genius. This position would 
later lead to his questionable positions on Stalin, Hitler, and Mussolini (Gassner 524).  
 The evolutionary force involved here is not just a gradual, progressive, social 
evolution, but also entails a Lamarckian evolution of Shaw’s leader. In order for the man 
of genius to exist, he must recognize the power within himself to bring about a rupture in 
the current status quo. Not a conversion manipulated by an outside force or omnipotent 
God, Undershaft’s conversion results in a willed change from within. As Alfred Turco 
explains, this will is at the heart of Shaw’s views on socialism as a potential economic 
and political structure. As such Shaw “never urges anyone to become a socialist by 
sacrificing his own interests: on the contrary, he argues that socialism is in the long-range 
interest of all persons. His very insistence that the common man has no choice but to look 
out for himself until the system changes is intended to provoke the uncommon man into 
seeing the value of changing the system” (Turco 128). Undershaft recognizes that no one 
else will look out for his interests and without his own determination, he will starve, 
unnoticed, amid the throngs of others starving in the London slums. With his own 
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liberation he is able to become the uncommon man who can help to raise others up from 
the same circumstances, seeing the benefit to all. 
This same array of characteristics can be seen in Pygmalion, a play most 
remembered for inspiring the musical My Fair Lady and not typically aligned with 
politics or Shaw’s philosophies aside from his engagement with the study of phonetics. I 
argue that the idea of the evolution and metamorphosis through language in Pygmalion 
functions in accordance with Shaw’s moral and political positions articulated in his 
earlier play Major Barbara, and in his socio-political understanding of Creative 
Evolution. Whereas Major Barbara presents the idea of conversion through a dichotomy 
between religion and economics, Pygmalion presents this same proposition through a 
dichotomy of science and social morality. In this modern day conversion narrative the 
Shavian scientist fails in the same way as religion and economics have before; linguistic 
reform from the outside functions no differently than Weismann’s experiment in cutting 
off mice’s tails. The only true Shavian conversion occurs when one is able to see the 
hypocrisy of the economic system to break free of the confines of middle class morality 
from an internal will to change. The linguistic change must match the internal notion of 
self in order to create a true metamorphosis of character. 
 Shaw sets up an intrinsic relationship between voice and self in the initial scenes 
of the play in which Professor Higgins first encounters Eliza selling flowers in Covent 
Garden to the passersby.  
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The Bystander (to the girl): You be careful: give him a flower for it. 
Theres3 a bloke here behind taking down every blessed word youre 
saying[…] 
The Flower Girl [Eliza]…Oh sir, dont let him charge me. You dunno what 
it means to me. Theyll take away my character and drive me on the streets 
for speaking to gentlemen. (222) 
The Flower Girl, Eliza, is immediately concerned that the man taking down every word 
she says, Professor Higgins, is a police officer. She is afraid that by being so bold as to 
speak to a gentleman from her position as a beggar, that her actions could be 
misinterpreted as prostitution or some attempt to rob the man. From her social position 
there is little she can do or say to counter such an accusation, as the word of a gentleman 
holds more weight with a court than her own. In this moment all she can do is plead with 
the crowd in hopes that they will confirm that she is simply selling flowers and not 
soliciting anything or being untoward with the gentleman at hand. The act of recording 
her words is, in Eliza’s view, a violation that could turn her own words against her. The 
threat of injury to her person springs from an act of surveillance and the ability of 
strangers to identify her as out of place among the “civilized” members of society. Her 
accent and her clothing immediately expose her as an outsider and put her in danger. 
 While her voice and diction are what the Professor is recording, his interest in not 
in Eliza herself, but rather in her pronunciation and her speech patterns. He is out 
collecting sounds and voices of the people around him to add to his collection and his 
knowledge base. Eliza is, in Higgins’ eyes, an object of study and a potential specimen. 
                                                       
3 Shaw often omitted punctuation like apostrophes unless they are used for orthographic purposes. I have 
preserved this system as it appears in the version consulted for this project. 
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Therefore, he sees value in her as a way to advance and reaffirm his own research 
agenda. Higgins makes a wager with Colonel Pickering, an officer with an interest in 
phonetics who has recently returned from India and met Higgins at Covent Garden: 
The Note Taker [Higgins]: You see this creature with her kerbstone 
English: The English that will keep her in the gutter to the end of her days. 
Well, sir, in three months I could pass that girl off as a duchess at an 
ambassador’s garden party. I could even get her a place as lady’s maid or 
shop assistant, which requires better English. Thats the sort of thing I do 
for commercial millionaires. And on the profits of it I do genuine 
scientific work in phonetics, and a little as a poet on Miltonic lines. (228) 
This lowborn subject is nothing more than a “creature” he can mold into a new form, 
advancing her through science in a way that economics and breeding cannot. Higgins 
interest in the intricacies of language is the driving force of the play, one that ensnares 
Eliza and examines the human edge of sound and voice. He contends that his teaching 
will help Eliza evolve from her bestial state and be able to pass through society as any 
proper lady might. Language use is the evolutionary leap necessary to move this girl from 
beast to duchess. Higgins imposes his experiment on Eliza dooming the experiment in 
terms of Shaw’s worldview because the impetus for this change does not come from 
Eliza but instead from Higgins, a force external to Eliza. 
 At the same time, Shaw does find redemptive qualities in the advancement of 
phonetics. The character of Henry Higgins is based, at least in part, on the real life 
phonetician Henry Sweet, a friend and colleague of Shaw’s, whose work he admired. 
Shaw had known Sweet since the 1870s and both men saw phonetics not simply as a new 
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science of language, but as a tool that could be applied directly to social ills in 
accordance with Shaw’s Fabian ideals. In the preface to the play, Shaw explains that 
because the study of phonetics provides linguistic access to higher levels of employment 
and access to economic advancement, “the reformer England needs today is an energetic 
phonetic enthusiast” (213). According to Lynda Mugglestone, “phonetics becomes the 
agent of Fabian ideals in the consummate ease with which it levels class distinctions and 
fills in class divides, providing, as a cancelled passage of Pygmalion made clear, the 
means for ‘the regeneration of the human race through the most difficult science in the 
world” (382). If the barrier of language is lifted, there is one less impediment for those in 
the lower classes to gain passage through to a self-sustaining economic state. The use of 
the term “regeneration” in this passage also reaffirms the notion of evolution through 
language that will help humankind advance to a new stage of evolutionary progress if 
these outdated modes of social hierarchy can be undone. 
Higgins functions as a representation of this kind of reformer and the work he 
pursues is akin to that which was practiced by phoneticians in the early 1900s. As a 
believer in the potentials of phonetics, Shaw takes great care in the stage directions to 
provide a very specific description of Higgins’ lab to identify him as a proper scientist:  
In this corner stands a flat writing table, on which are a phonograph, a 
laryngoscope, a row of tiny organ pipes with bellows, a set of chimney 
lamps for singing flames with burners attached to a gas plug in the wall by 
an indiarubber tube, several tuning-forks of different sizes, a life-size 
image of half a human head, shewing in section the vocal organs, and a 
box containing a supply of wax cylinders for the phonograph. (230) 
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The setting provides all of the trappings of a legitimate lab for a legitimate scientist. The 
collection includes traditional scientific tools, a laryngoscope, rubber tubes, anatomical 
drawings etc, as well as more contemporary items like the gramophone. This setting 
gives Higgins the authority of a scientist, which would be easily identifiable to someone 
like Eliza, and as a scientist, Higgins holds a societal position above common morality. 
The scientist/sage enjoys a certain degree of reverence and this setting allows for that title 
to be bestowed upon Higgins.  
The presence of the chimney lamps for singing flames signals an interest not only 
in linguistics, or the structures of speech and language, but also in sound as an object of 
study in and of itself. Experiments with singing flames use heat to create vibration and 
when enclosed in an appropriately sized tube, the vibrations create a tone akin to the 
sound of the human voice. Irish physicist John Tyndall explains the phenomenon at great 
length in his 1867 treatise on sound. According to Tyndall, this idea harkens back to the 
18th century when, a perhaps not coincidentally named, Dr. Higgins first heard the sounds 
while working with hydrogen flames. There is a renewed interest in its potential in the 
19th century when experiments from Michael Faraday begin work on energy, heat, and 
sound. In 1818, Faraday advances the hypothesis by discovering that the sounds were 
produced when the temperature surrounding the tube was higher than 100 degrees Celsius 
(Tyndall 226). After subsequent experiments in Germany in 1857, Tyndall attempts to 
repeat the experiment himself and his results are of particular interest for Shaw’s Dr. 
Higgins.  
Tyndall discovers that he can extinguish the singing flame with the power of his 
own voice by matching the tone exuded from the cylinder.  
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While executing these experiments, I once noticed that, on raising my 
voice to the proper pitch, a flame which had been burning silently in its 
tube began to sing. The song was interrupted, and the proper note sounded 
several times in succession; in every case the flame responded by starting 
into song. (28) 
The human voice is able to spark the flame into producing the singing effect. Tyndall is 
able to repeat the experiment using tuning forks and a siren, matching the tone and the 
vibration from the cylinder with the outside stimuli. The voice, then, operates in the same 
way as any sound vibration. It can be manipulated and can also manipulate other forces in 
the world. In its reduction to a physical force, the metaphysical aspects of voice become 
knowable. If Shaw’s Higgins has these materials in his lab, they signal his own 
preoccupation with voice as a manipulable force, rather than as a uniquely human 
possession. As a linguist, he interprets the voice as its atomized parts of inflection, 
speech, and tone without reverence for the speaker as a specific, individual human.  
The gramophone in the lab aids in separating the voice from the body, recording 
and preserving this otherwise ephemeral phenomenon. With the human voice frozen in 
time, the aural record can work together with the visual to provide a more comprehensive 
record of a subject’s speech pattern. For the student of language, these tools provide 
access to an unprecedented wealth of information. To be able to copy, transfer, and share 
a subject’s recorded voice rather than having to rely simply on the phonetic notations of 
visible speech or other graphic modes, the student can directly correlate these signs and 
the utterance. The permanence of the recording allows for endless playback, a technique 
that allows Higgins to learn to distinguish such a broad number of vowel sounds and 
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methodically memorize the linguistic idiosyncrasies of a host of regional English accents. 
The value of the gramophone is evident in the description that Higgins provides to 
Pickering about his working process upon Eliza’s arrival at his laboratory.  
Higgins: This is rather a bit of luck. I’ll shew you how I make records. 
We’ll set her talking; and I’ll take it down first in Bell’s Visible Speech; 
then in broad Romic; and then well get her on the phonograph so that you 
can turn her on as often as you like with the written transcript before you. 
(232) 
Higgins’ system of symbolic representations of Eliza’s speech patterns uses both the 
Visible Speech and Romic notation systems. He then records a phonograph record to 
correspond with the written transcript. The process allows him to collect and store his 
aural data. With this information Higgins no longer needs Eliza. Her insignificance to the 
long-term goals of the project is evident in the final sentence of the passage in which he 
explains that once Eliza’s voice is on the cylinder, Pickering can “turn her on” as often as 
he likes. The pronoun “her” refers back to both Eliza and the machine, conflating the two. 
Once the voice has been preserved, the body becomes disposable. What happens to the 
person Eliza is of little consequence to Higgins who sees her as merely a data point, a 
specimen for dissection. Separating the voice from her body seems natural to Higgins, 
while for Eliza, having Higgins break her down into components of speech, speaker, 
body and soul, presents a complex dissolution of the self that cannot easily be repaired.  
Higgins process as described above provides insight into the phonetic practices 
contemporary to the play. Bell’s Visible Speech refers to Alexander Melville Bell’s 
(father of telephone inventor Alexander Graham Bell) physiological phonetic alphabet. 
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His notation system uses symbols that represent not syllables, but the mouth shape 
required to make the sounds in the word. His system is one that could make a stronger 
correlation between word and sound than the standard English alphabet (Conolly 2 n.3). 
In the early 20th century, it was used as a tool for the instruction of deaf students, who, 
without the aid of the sonic representation of speech, could mimic sound, forming the 
unheard sounds in the mouth instead of in the ear. The Romic alphabet is one of Henry 
Sweet’s developments, a phonetic alphabet that served as the precursor for the 
International Phonetic Alphabet still in use today. The Romic symbols aim to reproduce 
the phonetics of a word, including tone, accent, and diacritical qualities in a manner that 
renders them pronounceable to speakers of any language (Conolly 28). Shaw values both 
systems as alternate methods of providing accessible and universal forms of written 
language as opposed to the non-intuitive English spelling and pronunciation.  
Shaw felt so strongly about the creation of a new English alphabet that he left 
provisions in his will to create a proposed British alphabet of at least forty letters 
“enabling the said language to be written without indicating single sounds by groups of 
letters or by diacritical marks, instead of by one symbol for each sound” (166). He also 
specified that his play Androcles and the Lion should be transliterated into this new 
alphabet and distributed in a side-by-side translation, including a glossary for the 
promotion and dissemination of this new phonetic alphabet. Although a judge later ruled 
that the will could not be enforced because the conditions set forth were not enough to 
establish a specific charity where the funds could be channeled, the will illustrates 
Shaw’s deep commitment to language reform and its potential as a social good.  
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 Part of the appeal of language acquisition, made easily available to the average 
consumer through the gramophone, was its ability to democratize language. Though the 
play will eventually show that blind faith in science is just as detrimental to the subject as 
religious zealotry, phonetics offers the hope of leveling the linguistic playing field. By 
the early 20th century, several companies had already seen the same potential to provide a 
broader base for language acquisition. The Cortina Company claims to have been the first 
to institute “language–phone” methods in language instruction. The company, founded in 
1882, won awards at the World’s Fair in both 1893 and 1901 for their innovations. Emma 
Gertrude Kunze describes the uses of the gramophone in perfecting intonation and 
achieving a proper accent in her 1929 article detailing the array of products available 
including a class from the taught by one Professor Fougeray:  
The recorder, Professor Fougeray, has an excellent accent. His voice is 
clear, he pronounces slowly, with a pause long enough for the student to 
imitate him immediately. When he pronounces a single work, he sustains 
the last syllable, raising his voice slightly, thus getting the pupils used at 
once to the tonic accent. How hard we have to work to prevent their 
saying “con-ver-sa’-tion” instead of “con-ver-sa-tión.” But if they hear it 
often enough and correctly before they try to imitate, they acquire the 
property intonation as a matter of course. (540-541) 
The focus of this review is on attaining the “correct” accent and in defeating students’ 
proclivities and bad habits of pronunciation. The repetitive training available through the 
gramophone allows students to hear the exact same pronunciation over and over again in 
a way that even the most practiced linguist would have difficulty repeating in a physical 
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classroom. Students can then perfect their imitation of the sounds, replaying the disk as 
often as they need for their own, personalized training.  
Linguaphone, a company still in existence now and offering web based language 
training, sells gramophone disks that the student could use at home. Their 1939 
advertisement claims: “You listen to the records – spoken by a native speaker, and 
automatically become able to understand the spoken language, and to speak it yourself. 
Simultaneously, the famous Linguaphone Key Books give you the printed words, so that 
your self-education is thorough” (Linguaphone). Their sales pitch finds its base in 
convenience and accessibility for the average user who can put the increasingly available 
gramophone technology to a new purpose. Subscribers can choose between twenty 
languages, ranging from Irish and English to Esperanto and Persian, while the records 
give listeners the ability to learn at their own pace and repeat the lessons endlessly until 
they reach a satisfactory imitation.  
The Key Books featured recordings by prominent members of society, authors, 
and intellectuals, including Shaw himself. Shaw addresses his listeners, presumably 
English language learners, and uses the space of his records to discuss the complexities of 
emphasizing the “proper” pronunciation: “Now, whether you are a foreigner or a native, 
the first thing I must impress on you is that there is no such thing as ideally correct 
English. No two British subjects speak exactly alike” (7).4 As a member of the BBC 
committee on establishing the proper pronunciation of English for the radio, Shaw makes 
the distinction between “perfectly correct” English and “presentable” English. For him, 
there is no exact, static method of speaking. Instead, he recognizes a range of registers 
and accents, from his own Irish speech to the accents of Newcastle in the north and Essex 
                                                       
4 The audio recording can be heard at http://sounds.bl.uk/Oral-history/Early-spoken-word-recordings 
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in the south, as valid and equally presentable in terms of communication. Each differs 
from the other, and speakers all hold their own idiosyncratic speech patterns within those 
accents. Therefore, for the language learner, clarity of communication is the goal rather 
than mimicking a high-toned British accent. 
At the same time, Shaw portrays a hierarchy of language and pronunciation. 
Though there may not be one single, correct English, the word “presentable” does carry 
with it a degree of personal taste and discernment between kinds of English. In one of the 
final minutes of the recording, Shaw seems to hold both of these principles in a balance 
between clarity of communication and an attention to the details and nuances of language 
of native English speakers. 
[…] there is no such thing as perfectly correct English, there is presentable 
English which we call “Good English”; but in London nine hundred and 
ninety nine out of every thousand people not only speak bad English but 
speak even that very badly […] Therefore the first thing you have to do is 
to speak with a strong foreign accent, and speak broken English: that is 
English without any grammar. (11) 
Even within the constraints of presentable English, Shaw claims that the majority of 
native English speakers can barely muster a passable English. His advice to the English 
language learners in his audience to speak in broken English is based in the idea that 
those who speak English, their own language, very poorly will take offense to someone 
who attempts to speak it in a manner too precise or too proper. Instead, Shaw advises that 
non-native speakers to expose their novice state, which will endear them to the average 
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English person, who with the upper linguistic hand, will then feel obliged to offer 
assistance.  
 In a letter to the phonetician Henry Sweet, Shaw clarifies his position regarding 
the connection between accent and social mobility. He claims that what is necessary is to 
write down the phonetic pronunciation in the best manner possible and have it signed by 
a number of high profile members of society authorizing this pronunciation. He is quick 
to deny, however, that even with an agreed upon standard that there is any one correct 
pronunciation 
…or [that this pronunciation is] in any way binding on any human being 
or morally superior to Hackney cockney or Idaho american, but solely that 
if a man pronounces in that way he will be eligible as far as speech is 
concerned for the post of Lord Chief Justice, Chancellor of Oxford, 
Archbishop of Canterbury, Emperor, President, or Toast Master at the 
Mansion House. (qtd. in Conolly xxxix n.79) 
His concern here is not that anyone necessarily needs to speak in a particular way or that 
speech patterns inherently imply any moral or cultural superiority, but that speech can be 
a barrier in reaching a higher social standing or taking advantage of all possible 
employment opportunities. This notion of mobility marks the intersection of his socialist 
leanings and his ideas of language training. The simple accident of hereditary or location 
should not be an impediment to acquiring a position equal to the individual’s merit.  
While Shaw opens the category of accent to include a diverse range of acceptable 
modes of speech, he recognizes that some accents and modes of speech will always mark 
the speaker as lower class. Altering one’s speech patterns is a pragmatic solution to 
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circumventing the existing social structure and erasing a linguistic marker, like a cockney 
accent, in favor of a more palatable one. As Mugglestone notes: “the cockney, throughout 
the nineteenth century, is…seen not only as a kind of social pariah, but also becomes, in 
terms of the prevailing prescriptive ideology, a butt for all the linguistic sins of the age, 
the stereotype of every linguistic, and particularly phonemic, infelicity” (380). The 
boisterous and often imitated accent of chimney sweeps and flower girls is a marker not 
simply of region, but specifically of class. The harshness of its tones collides with the 
softer, more lyrical speech of the aristocracy. Thus, the caricature of the cockney accent 
is often attributed to the fool or the pub dweller, indicating a lack of education, breeding, 
and manners. Because the cockney accent becomes intertwined with these social notions, 
the speaker, like Eliza, is automatically endowed with all of these negative qualities upon 
speaking. Shaw addresses the attitude toward cockney in a 1906 comment that “most 
Englishmen and women would almost rather die than be convicted of speaking like 
costermongers and flower girls” (qtd. in Mugglestone 380). This comment reflects the 
weight of Eliza’s transformation in the play Shaw would write six years later and of the 
prevailing sentiment in English society that links voice and speech to “innate” social 
qualities. A speaker must evolve beyond the confines of social class and break loose from 
these associations in order to achieve social mobility. 
However, in order for a person to “pass” as a speaker of a higher class, even with 
language training, his or her voice must match both the internal and external qualities of 
the speaker. The final lines of Pygmalion’s preface warn against a false linguistic 
pretension: 
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An honest and natural slum dialect is more tolerable than the attempt of a 
phonetically untaught person to imitate the vulgar dialect of the golf club; 
and I am sorry to say that in spite of the efforts of our Royal Academy of 
Dramatic Art, there is still too much sham golfing English on our stage, 
and too little of the noble English of Forbes Robertson. (217)5 
Like the foreign speaker addressed in his Linguaphone recording, pretense or the 
imitation of a too proper accent always rings false and creates a bias toward the speaker 
in the listener. Care must be taken in cultivating the appropriate level of expertise within 
the attainable goals of the individual speaker. At least the speaker of the slum dialect 
speaks honestly whereas the untrained speaker who attempts to simply imitate an 
aristocratic dialect will sound false, an imposter, like an amateur actor who over 
pronounces their words. The rest of the speaker’s trappings must coincide with the voice. 
Herein lies the additional complexity of metamorphosis in the play. To Shaw, a 
superficial alteration will also be discoverable, an example of artifice and chicanery 
rather than an earnest attempt at self-actualization and self-evolution. Higgins attempts to 
perfect this notion of imitation without investing in Eliza’s mental or emotional attitudes 
toward this change, leading ultimately, to his failure.  
In the play, Shaw’s views on language are caricatured through Higgins, a man 
who believes that language and pretense are enough to, at least temporarily, cause a shift 
in social class. Eliza’s dirty accent is an affront to the English language that, for Higgins, 
lowers Eliza’s status not just as an Englishwoman, but also as a human. Her decreased 
social value correlates to her low accent as he demonstrates during their first meeting.  
                                                       
5 Johnston Forbes-Robertson produced a number of Shaw’s later plays and was “famous not only as an 
actor but for the beauty of his speech” (Shaw, “Broken” 7)  
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The Note Taker [Higgins]: A woman who utters such depressing and 
disgusting sounds has no right to be anywhere – no right to live. 
Remember that you are a human being with a soul and the divine gift of 
articulate speech: that your native language is the language of Shakespear 
and Milton and The Bible: and dont sit there crooning like a bilious 
pigeon.  
The Flower Girl [Eliza] (quite overwhelmed, looking up at him in mingled 
wonder and deprecation without daring to raise her head): Ah-ah-ah-ow-
ow-ow-oo! (227)  
Higgins debases Eliza to the point of advocating her destruction. He perceives her abuse 
of language as akin to animality. The inarticulate groan of this “creature,” which will 
repeat throughout the play as an innate part of her language, reaffirms his idea that she 
possesses a bestial quality in both her speech and in her very being. At the same time, 
Higgins holds “proper” English in such a high regard that he sees language as holding 
redemptive qualities. If Eliza can simply remember that she has received the divine gift 
of language and harness it properly, she will elevate her soul and potentially her status in 
the Great Chain of Being, a linguistic and metaphysical metamorphosis. 
 Higgins refuses to use human descriptors for Eliza in her current bedraggled state. 
She is “baggage,” a “creature,” “a squashed cabbage leaf,” never a full-fledged person. 
Laura Otis identifies this trend as Shaw’s parodying of conversion narratives like those of 
William Booth’s Salvation Army works also utilized in Major Barbara which describe 
miserable creatures of the lower class achieving enlightenment, salvation, and redemption 
back into human status. Although Shaw’s redemption results from a more secular 
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process, Pygmalion mirrors the patterns of Booth’s works. As Otis describes, “these 
stories depict the poor as animals, creatures whose humanity can be restored through 
near-miraculous interventions. The first step in such a conversion was a thorough 
scrubbing, aimed to confer dignity by returning the poor creature’s human appearance” 
(487). This is the first act Higgins takes against Eliza. As soon as she and Higgins have 
agreed on the terms of their arrangement, that Eliza will be in Higgins’s care for six 
months while undergoing her language training and transformation to a passable duchess, 
the first step is cleansing her of the street. Like the Salvation Army’s Orders and 
Regulations for care of wayward girls that specified that each girl admitted to a home was 
to be “bathed without delay” with her clothes “washed, fumigated, or destroyed as 
necessary” (qtd. in Jackson 112), Mrs. Pearce, Higgins’s housekeeper burns all of Eliza’s 
old clothes, sticks her hat in the oven to bake off any lingering fleas and bugs, and 
immediately puts her in a hot bath. While the Salvation Army was working to save 
“fallen” women and girls from sexual abuse and homelessness, scrubbing clean the 
influence of the streets and returning them to a purified state, Higgins is working to scrub 
Eliza’s bad habits. He wants to turn her into a blank canvas on which he can inscribe his 
own training. 
 Though less dramatic than Major Barbara in its moralism, Pygmalion uses the 
same structure of conversion narrative to provide a basis for Eliza’s transformation from 
poverty stricken flower seller to a duchess. In the original version of the Pygmalion, the 
scene in which Mrs. Pearce bathes the gutter out of Eliza takes place off stage, with little 
detail about what happens to Eliza during this scrubbing. The 1941 version that Shaw 
wrote after producing the screenplay for the 1938 movie includes additional details about 
  
 52 
the cruelty of this process of scrubbing clean the “guttersnipe.” The added scene reveals 
that Higgins’s modern bathroom with running water and an array of soaps, perfumes, and 
luxurious towels, is the first of its kind for Eliza. Never before has she taken a bath, nor 
has she owned pajamas or slept in a warm bed. Mrs. Pearce tells Eliza she must bathe 
despite her fear of getting wet and therefore cold, a condition that would be hazardous in 
her former life. In trying to calm her Mrs. Pearce reveals the motivations for her bath: “I 
want to change you from a frowzy slut to a clean respectable girl fit to sit with the 
gentlemen in the study” (43). The idea of being unclean has resonances not only in 
bestiality but also in purity and morality. Despite the fact Eliza adamantly repeats that she 
is not that kind of woman and sells flowers, but never her body, her lack of bodily 
cleanliness correlates to “slut.” Her filth is a mark of impurity and corruption that needs 
to be washed away and sanitized before she can even attempt to make a foray into decent 
society.   
To accomplish this task, Mrs. Pearce puts on rubber gloves, and “takes a 
formidable looking long handled scrubbing brush and soaps it profusely with a ball of 
scented soap” (43). Mrs. Pearce’s rubber gloves and menacing scrubbing brush seem the 
tools of a kitchen made for scrubbing pots, rather than human bodies. These implements, 
tinged with the threat of violence, contrast with the scented soap and the care Mrs. Pearce 
takes in drawing the bath for Eliza and the close of this scene brings the violence to the 
fore. Eliza cowers in the corner afraid of this foreign process, letting out her trademark 
animalistic howl. Mrs. Pearce then snatches off her dressing gown and throws Eliza down 
on her back. The final stage directions are “Eliza’s screams are heartrending” (44). The 
violence here resembles that of a sexual assault. In order to elevate this subhuman, 
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impure specimen to a woman capable of participating fully in society, her perceived 
corruption must be undone by a similar, yet “civilized” violence. Bourgeois morality is 
the default position for British society and Shaw’s inclusions of scenes like this one 
scratch the veneer of “proper” society. Shaw draws Eliza as a sympathetic figure who has 
the power to subvert the seemingly benign reformist platform of uplifting the lower 
classes by revealing it as harmful to the individual body.   
This code of ethics in bourgeois morality functions as an even stronger boundary 
to class mobility than economics or speech. Its invisible entrenchment into the very fiber 
of society makes it the most difficult force to overcome. In his objective, scientific view, 
Higgins is acutely aware of this quandary. When forced momentarily to socialize with his 
mother’s well-bred friends, Mrs. Hill and her children Clara and Freddy, Higgins finds it 
hard to contain his true feelings:  
Higgins. You see, we’re all savages, more of less. We’re supposed to be 
civilized and cultured – to know all about poetry and philosophy and art 
and science, and so on; but how many of us know the meanings of these 
names? (To Miss Hill) What do you know of poetry? (To Mrs Hill) What 
do you know of science? (Indicating Freddy) What does he know of art or 
science or anything else? What the devil do you imagine I know of 
philosophy? (264) 
Higgins reveals his contempt for the petty small talk of the bourgeoisie. He shatters the 
illusion that anyone in this room has any expertise or even interesting commentary to 
offer on the humanist topics of philosophy, art, and science. His outburst shows his 
underlying assumptions about speech and manners; he views this kind of banal 
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conversation as learned behavior. Rather than discussing things that the participants of 
the conversation actually have an interest in, or knowledge of, drawing room 
conversations are guided by a small set of acceptable topics. While at this stage in her 
training Eliza can only muster a stilted conversation about the weather and her well 
being, she is no different than Clara or Freddy in that all three young people are 
conditioned to respond to these situations in coded and artificial ways – Clara and Freddy 
simply have had more training.  
Eliza’s trained speech differs from the accepted norms. Higgins instructs her to 
talk of the weather and her health and other safe topics, while Eliza starts from this point, 
her conversation quickly devolves into topics she would have discussed in the streets, like 
alcoholism and her aunt’s suspicious death from influenza, wherein Eliza implies that 
someone might have “done her in” (72) a reference to her possible murder. Her speech is 
still peppered with slang including her infamous line “Not bloody likely” (74) in response 
to Freddy’s offer to walk her across the park. Her use of “bloody” was scandalous for 
audiences and this one word was enough to get the play banned from a number of 
playhouses. In the context of the scene, because of her appearance and her genteel accent 
the disjoint between the content of her speech and her delivery gains attention in this 
room of middle class acquaintances. They perceive her speech as edgy and representative 
of the “new small talk” something that the savvy young set is now speaking This 
disruption to protocol makes Mrs. Hill feel that she has underprepared her own daughter 
who appears to be Eliza’s equal and apologizes to their host Mrs. Higgins that her 
daughter has made such a poor showing in front of Higgins and Pickering.  
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Mrs Eynsford Hill (to Mrs Higgins): You mustnt mind Clara…We’re so poor! 
and she gets so few parties, poor child! She doesnt quite know. (Mrs Higgins, 
seeing that her eyes are moist, takes her hand sympathetically and goes with 
her to the door). (269) 
The humor in this scene is that Eliza has bumbled through the conversation while Clara 
did exactly what she was supposed to do as a well-bred young woman. In addition, we 
have already seen what real poverty looks like through Eliza’s life as a flower girl. In this 
context, the notion that the Hills are poor is absurd. Though much of the Hills’ inherited 
money runs out, and they now spend what’s left keeping up appearances and hoping the 
children can marry into new money, Clara has certainly benefitted from far more 
advantages that Eliza. Not being able to attend a few parties does not warrant Mrs. Hill’s 
tearful lament in the face of Eliza’s real struggles. Yet, Clara’s lack of party attendance 
also affirms Higgins’s approach to language and trained speech. If Clara had been in 
contact with those in her social circle more often, she would be more familiar with the 
latest conventions and with current linguistic trends, making her able to identify Eliza as 
a fraud. Mrs. Hill’s reaction confirms that everyone participates in the performance of 
language and culture to varying degrees. 
 This scene also marks the space of genteel manners and morality as a space of 
privilege that requires money and social influence for entry. Language alone will not 
allow Eliza to keep up her sham. Long-term survival in the aristocracy requires money 
behind the manners. Shaw uses Mr. Doolittle, Eliza’s father as a foil for Eliza’s passing 
via speech. He is a dustman by trade and, like Eliza, living on the lowest rungs of society. 
When he learns that Eliza has moved to Higgins’s house to undergo her training, 
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Doolittle comes by not to check in on the welfare of his daughter or to say goodbye to 
her, but to see if he can get a cut of the action. He asks Higgins to pay him for the use of 
his daughter in their experiments. The request takes both Pickering and Higgins by 
surprise and when questioned as to his ethics, Doolittle’s response reveals that morality is 
in fact a luxury:  “Pickering: Have you no morals man? Doolittle (unabashed): Cant 
afford them, Governor. Neither could you if you was as poor as me. Not that I mean any 
harm, you know. But if Liza is going to have a bit out of this, why not me too?” (251). 
Higgins and Pickering are taken aback by Doolittle’s gall and can hardly imagine a world 
in which a father would ask for a price for his daughter. Conversely, Doolittle knows that 
survival comes at any cost. Much like Undershaft, Doolittle knows that until his basic 
needs are met anything else, including morality, is a luxury. 
Doolittle’s position aligns with Shaw’s thoughts on class and morality in which 
there are no absolute values and morality shifts depending on the context. As Turco 
explains, “Shavian heroes […] succeed not because they believe in this or that ‘right’ 
system, but because of their ability to respond resourcefully and without the prejudices 
that arise from a reliance upon ‘systems’”(35). While Doolittle may not be a hero, per se, 
he is a complicating factor in the play, much like Major Barbara’s Undershaft. Shaw 
contrasts Doolittle’s moral pragmatism with the seemingly upstanding gentlemen whose 
actions are just as callous toward Eliza. While Doolittle acts out of necessity, trying to 
scrape any money he can from any situation in order to survive and slightly improve his 
condition, Pickering and Higgins wager on Eliza’s life, altering her existence and trading 
on her abilities, not for economic necessity, but for sport. In Shaw’s world, it is clear that 
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the two moneyed men have committed the greater offense, yet they are blind to their own 
transgressions.  
Through Doolittle, Shaw breaks down the perceived moral authority of the 
scientist. Higgins’s secular and “objective” worldview is rooted in a belief that science, 
and therefore reason, are the ultimate arbiters of truth. As Shaw explains in his exposition 
on Ibsen, “faith in reason as a prime motor is no longer the criterion of a sound mind, any 
more than faith in the Bible is the criterion of righteous intention” (qtd. in Turco 28). 
Higgins’s faith in reason is simply a replication of a religiosity and carries with it the 
same limitations as a faith-based epistemology. Doolittle and Eliza live outside these 
moral codes, and from their position of poverty, can more clearly see the hypocrisies and 
contradictions inherent in this faith in reason, making each the perfect candidate for 
becoming the uncommon man with the potential to will an evolutionary change. 
Yet, Doolittle too falls victim to artificial environmental pressures at the hands of 
Higgins. When Doolittle unexpectedly comes into a fortune from a benefactor in the Pre-
Digested Cheese Trust, he comes directly to Higgins in order to resolve the problem of 
the clash between his low class accent and mannerisms, and his newfound social status.  
Doolittle: …You talk of losing Eliza. Dont you be anxious: I bet she’s on 
my doorstep by this: she that could support herself easy by selling flowers 
if I wasnt respectable. And the next one to touch me will be you, Henry 
Higgins. I’ll have to learn to speak middle class language from you, 
instead of speaking proper English. Thats where youll come in; and I 
daresay thats what you done it for. (288-9) 
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Doolittle aspires to pass not as a Duke or Earl, but simply as middle class, a goal that 
requires its own specific training and education. Doolittle feels Higgins has a 
responsibility to teach him because he blames Higgins for his sudden admission into the 
middle class – an unwelcome change for him. Addressing Mrs. Higgins, Professor 
Higgins’s wealthy mother, Doolittle explains why this sudden fortune is such a burden 
for him.  
Doolittle: …But I, as one of the undeserving poor, have nothing between 
me and the pauper’s uniform but this here blasted three thousand a year 
that shoves me into the middle class. […] Theyve got you every way you 
turn: it’s a choice between the Skilly of the workhouse and the Char Bydis 
of the middle class; and I havnt the nerve for the workhouse. Intimidated: 
that what I am. Broke. Brought up. Happier men than me will call for my 
dust, and touch me for their tip; and I’ll look on helpless, and envy them. 
And thats what your son has brought me to. (289) 
Forced out of his previous life through this windfall, Doolittle is left in an antithetical 
situation to that of his daughter. She is now class-less and without a place in society 
because her economic situation now does not match her cultured affectation, while 
Doolittle now has the financial means but lacks the social standing to match. Nor does he 
aspire to attain it. The artificial conditions that Higgins short-circuit the evolutionary 
potential of the Doolittle family. His meddling removes the internal pressures for survival 
that could have sparked a need for Creative Evolution in both Eliza and her father.  
 He feels Higgins owes him this training because Higgins still cannot foresee the 
consequences of his actions. As a joke, he had included Doolittle’s name in a letter to an 
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American businessman Wannafeller, describing him as the “most original moralist at 
present in England” (106). The concept of a dustman as the most original moralist 
intrigues Wannafeller, who wants to set up Moral Reform Societies all over the world. 
Therefore, upon his death, he leaves Doolittle three thousand pounds a year on the 
condition that he lectures on morality during the year. While Higgins finds this hilarious, 
it has thrown Doolittle into a quandary. As the reference to Homer’s Scylla and 
Charybdis implies, Doolittle has two undesirable choices: to be under constant economic 
threat and mired in poverty, but among people he understands and enjoys; to be 
economically stable, yet constrained in the social hell of the middle class. While Doolittle 
is a bawdy character mostly present for comic relief, he provides a striking viewpoint 
because he has no aspirations to social mobility. Doolittle knows who he is, and knows 
that he is more comfortable and secure in his own surroundings. Upward mobility is not 
the cure-all for everyone and, from this vantage point, Higgins’s interference and 
experiments cause damage that Higgins has no ability to anticipate or even understand 
once the damage has been done.  
From the heights of the class structure, Mrs. Higgins, Professor Higgins’ wealthy 
mother, can also foresee the potential harm in her son’s experiments, though she looks 
not through the lens of class, but through that of gender. She sees that in order for 
Higgins and Pickering to treat Eliza as a specimen, they must also look at her with a 
dehumanizing gaze. 
Mrs Higgins: You certainly are a pretty pair of babies, playing with your 
live doll. 
Higgins: Playing! The hardest job I ever tackled: make no mistake about 
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that, mother. But you have no idea how frightfully interesting it is to take a 
human being and change her into quite a different human being by 
creating a new speech for her. It’s filling up the deepest gulf that separates 
class from class and soul for soul.  
Pickering…Yes: it’s enormously interesting. I assure you, Mrs Higgins, 
we take Eliza very seriously. Every week – every day almost – there is 
some new change…We keep records of every stage – dozens of 
gramophone disks and photographs – (271) 
Mrs. Higgins identifies their mishandling of Eliza and their lack of attention to her needs 
as a fully functioning human. Yet, the men still cannot understand the problem. Higgins’s 
response, gives no account of how difficult this process must be for Eliza, only a 
recounting of his own hard work making this transformation possible. He sees his work 
as a triumph for man in general and places himself in the role of master and creator, 
building a new self for Eliza. But she remains a generic example of a human being that 
could be replaced with any other, nameless and inconsequential. Even Pickering, who is 
the more sympathetic and insightful of the two, thinks little of Eliza the person and is 
focused on Eliza the project. When he says, “we take Eliza very seriously” he goes on to 
enumerate neither Eliza’s concerns nor well being, but the records, data, and information 
they have gleaned from her. While the project holds their rapt attention, they cannot see 
Eliza as more than the accumulation of dozens of gramophone disks and photographs.  
In her transformed status as a living doll, Eliza is a breath-taking figure of beauty. 
Her transformation reoccurs in popular culture in the play’s immediate successor, the 
musical My Fair Lady and the more recent retelling, She’s All That. Scrubbing off the 
  
 61 
dehumanizing traces of poverty allows the “real” Eliza to shine through, yet there is no 
room to find value in Eliza the flower girl. In this way, Shaw’s Pygmalion reverses the 
role of Ovid’s sculptor. Ovid’s Pygmalion, disgusted by the vices and unsavory 
dispositions of mortal women, chooses to be chaste and sculpt his perfect woman from 
ivory. Venus recognizes his true love for this well-made woman and turns her into a 
woman of flesh and blood, Galatea. The sculptor and the former sculpture are 
consequently married and have a child (241-3). Shaw’s Pygmalion, Higgins, has no 
interest in the conventional marriage plot, he has not made a sculpture human – he has 
made a human into a doll. He has turned a functioning person already complete with 
thoughts and feelings into an automaton, programmed to mimic the aristocracy. Rather 
than easily molding herself into this new form like Galatea who turns to wax then flesh 
under Pygmalion’s touch, Eliza has the additional burden of retaining her own sense of 
consciousness during her metamorphosis. Higgins is not starting with a blank canvas and 
cannot simply replace or erase Eliza’s personality. In Shaw’s world there is no goddess to 
intervene to complete the transformation, it is a path Eliza must take on her own.  
Higgins, so focused on his experiment, fails to anticipate Eliza’s own existence 
independent from the experiment and has given no thought to the consequences of his 
actions. Only after Eliza has done her duty and performed for the crowd, winning the bet 
for Higgins and Pickering, does this issue come to a head between them. After the garden 
party, Pickering and Higgins sit in the drawing room with Eliza close by and still in her 
finery from the evening, recounting their success and speaking of Eliza in the third 
person as if she was not there. When Higgins finally notices she is upset, she boils over in 
rage.  
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Liza [breathless]: Nothing wrong–with you. I’ve won your bet for you, 
haven’t I? That’s enough for you. I don’t matter, I suppose. 
Higgins: You won my bet! You! Presumptuous insect! I won it. What did 
you throw those slippers at me for? 
Liza: Because I wanted to smash your face. I’d like to kill you, you selfish 
brute. Why didnt you leave me where you picked me out of–in the gutter? 
You thank God it’s all over, and that now you can throw me back again 
there, do you? (She crisps her fingers frantically) 
Higgins: (looking at her in cool wonder) The creature is nervous after all 
[….] 
Liza: I sold flowers. I didnt sell myself. Now youve made a lady of me 
I’m not fit to sell anything else. I wish youd left me where you found me. 
(278-281) 
As soon as Eliza has broken the façade of the experiment, Higgins immediately returns to 
using animalistic terms like “insect” and “creature” to refer to her. Having met his goal, 
he has no use for Eliza, except to perhaps fetch his slippers. He expects that she will 
either stay on at the house with Mrs. Pearce, or make her own way out in the world. He 
has not considered how difficult it would be for her to return to her old life selling 
flowers in the gutter. Her aristocratic affect no longer matches any physical or material 
existence she could build for herself outside of Higgins’ laboratory. As Eliza explains: 
“You told me, you know, that when a child is brought to a foreign country, it picks up the 
language in a few weeks, and forgets its own. Well, I am a child in your country. I have 
forgotten my own language, and can speak nothing but yours” (295). Language has 
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indeed transformed her, but in an unsustainable way. Her character and her presentation 
to the world are now out of joint with no viable solution as to how to rejoin these aspects 
of her being. The regression in Higgins’ language use mirrors Eliza’s devolution back to 
her former state. His attempts at advancing her beyond her station cannot be maintained.  
The seemingly obvious solution here would be for Eliza to marry Higgins, the 
self-proclaimed bachelor, or Pickering, who is more of a father figure to Eliza than a 
potential lover. Eliza is interested in neither. And, in inverting the Pygmalion myth, Shaw 
has created conditions in which a marriage between the creator and the work of art would 
be out of the question. While Ovid’s Pygmalion eschews the base tendencies in human 
experience for the purified life of art, creating very literally a living art, Higgins eschews 
the human for a purified science. Higgins’ devotion to science in the 19th century 
positivist tradition means that functionality, data, and repeatable results become the 
highest goal, with very little attention to aesthetics. Therefore, Eliza serves as a tool for 
Higgins. It is through her that Higgins can test his theories, and since the experiment is 
the ultimate goal rather than the creation of a perfect aesthetic specimen, anything beyond 
the results of the experiment are uninteresting and outside of Higgins’ world view.  
While Higgins will never see Eliza as a sexual object or potential mate, he does 
soften his empirical exoskeleton when he realizes she will no longer be a part of his life. 
Higgins: I can do without anybody. I have my own soul: my own spark of 
divine fire. But (with sudden humility) I shall miss you, Eliza…I have 
learnt something from your idiotic notions: I confess that humbly and 
gratefully. And I have grown accustomed to your voice and appearance.  
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Liza: Well, you have both of them on your gramophone and in your book 
of photographs. When you feel lonely without me, you can turn the 
machine on. It’s got no feelings to hurt.  
Higgins: I cant turn your soul on. Leave me those feelings; and you can 
take away the voice and the face. They are not you. (300) 
The saccharine didacticism of this play is clearly evident in these closing lines. Running 
parallel to the initial scene in Higgins’ laboratory where he explains that through the 
phonograph Pickering can “turn her on” whenever he wants, this scene is the culmination 
of Higgins’ education. Through the course of the play, he has at least softened his hard 
line faith in reason to see outside the boundaries of his experiment. He can now 
acknowledge that she is a living, breathing human and has gained more respect for her as 
she has learned to voice her opinions and stand her ground against him.  
However, in many of the play’s original productions the ending is changed to 
provide a more traditional and satisfactory ending for audiences. The original actor who 
plays Higgins in the 1914 production, Beerbohm Tree, changes the ending on his own. 
Instead of letting Eliza walk away in triumph, Tree throws flowers after her implying a 
love connection between the two. Rather than take this alteration, and others like it, in 
stride, Shaw is incensed and when he publishes the play in 1915 he adds a “sequel” that 
explains Eliza’s life after the experiment (Alexander 21). It is important to Shaw for Eliza 
to have her own life defined on her own terms, and for Higgins to be cast as a scientist 
above the base concerns of the average mortal. A marriage would demean both of them. 
Instead, in the prose sequel Eliza marries Freddy, Mrs. Hill’s middle-class son whom she 
meets while selling flowers. Pickering sets the two up with a flower shop so that they 
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might build a life appropriate to their social standing. From this ending, there is little 
mistaking Shaw’s view of Higgins and Eliza’s relationship.  
Whereas the play ends triumphantly for Eliza, the sequel undercuts any romantic 
idea that she had a happy ending. Though Pickering sets up the shop for Eliza and 
Freddy, they are not on their way to a stable economic future. Because Eliza has no 
schooling at all and Freddy has only a completely impractical education while his family 
works hard to maintain the pretense of wealth, neither one has any idea how to run the 
shop. Shaw expansively details months of bookkeeping and business classes the two 
attend to no avail. He makes clear Eliza’s shortcomings including her “deepest 
humiliation,” her inability to write. She asks Higgins to teach her and while he contested 
that she was “congenitally incapable of forming a single letter,” he throws himself into 
the project again overlooking Eliza’s actual needs. “Eliza ended by acquiring an 
extremely uncommercial script which was a positive extension of her personal beauty, 
and spending three times as much on stationery as anyone else because certain qualities 
and shapes of paper became indispensable to her. She could not even address an envelope 
in the usual way because it made the margins all wrong” (138). While Eliza is a prodigy 
in language acquisition, Shaw reveals her as an utter failure at most any other skill 
necessary for survival in the middle class. Higgins has taught her to write in an ornate 
form inappropriate for her new life and much like her language training he has ignored 
her needs in order to teach his student the most elaborate method possible. The sequel 
reinforces the reformist notions of the play that real change must match the station and 
the spirit of the individual. Higgins’s actions always reflect of his own concerns. The 
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changes he precipitates in her voice and writing are out of joint with the necessities of her 
life.  
Interestingly in this sequel, Shaw offers up a vision of a true conversion, 
mirroring the language of both Pauline conversion and William Booth’s Salvation Army, 
in Clara, a character hardly utilized in the play except as the example of a typical 
bourgeois young woman in contrast to Eliza’s facsimile. In the sequel, Shaw gives Clara 
a moment of conversion. Clara’s life or death imperative, her desperate internal need to 
achieve her own Creative Evolution comes when she realizes that from her current 
station, middle class but penniless, she has no hope of securing a decent marriage and 
therefore a stable future for herself. In turning away from her potential suitors, she finds a 
home with the artist class. There she is expected to be able to converse about the latest 
topic in the arts, including the works of H. G. Wells. She devours his work and, as Shaw 
explains: “The result was a conversion of a kind quite common today. A modern Acts of 
the Apostles would fill fifty whole Bibles if anyone were capable of writing it” (135). 
Referencing the Acts of the Apostles that contains Paul’s conversion, Shaw marks Clara 
as the only character to have achieved a true Shavian conversion. Clara’s moment of 
clarity comes when she learns that Eliza, a girl she admired and wanted to emulate after 
meeting her at Mrs. Higgins house, was merely a flower girl recently transformed. 
It shook her so violently, that when Mr. H. G. Wells lifted her on the point 
of his puissant pen, and placed her at the angle of view from which the life 
she was leading and the society to which she clung appeared in its true 
relation to real human needs and worthy social structure, he effected a 
conversion and a conviction of sin comparable to the most sensational 
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feats of General Booth or Gypsy Smith. Clara's snobbery went bang. Life 
suddenly began to move with her. (135) 
Wells, though today remembered most for his contributions to science fiction, was at the 
time also known for his work in support of the British labor movement. Wells and Shaw 
had written countless political pamphlets and essays that had a significant impact on 
shaping the progressive agenda in British politics (Griffith 1). Reading these texts along 
with the discovery that Eliza had so easily infiltrated her social class, Clara awakens to 
the suffocating class structures around her. Linking this event to the sensational 
conversions at the hands of William Booth and Gypsy Smith, one of his most treasured 
acolytes in the Salvation Army, Shaw renders Clara’s new awareness of her existence 
outside of the economic system as no less extraordinary. Clara is free to be herself and 
embrace life as a total experience not simply what had been prescribed for her by her 
social position. The difference between the transformations of Clara and Eliza’s is that 
Clara comes to this understanding and embraces it on her own. Only Eliza can make her 
own transformation complete.  
Pygmalion examines the limits of passing from one class to the other. In 
attempting to train Eliza Doolittle to pass as a duchess simply through diction lessons, 
Professor Higgins exposes the problems in neglecting the human side of economics. Like 
the gramophone recordings Higgins makes of Eliza’s “educational” progress, she is a 
mechanical reproduction of a duchess. Though Eliza dresses and sounds like a duchess by 
the end of the experiment, her soul and state of being remain stunted. Instead, Higgins 
has made a strange hybrid creature that belongs nowhere; no longer able to return to her 
life selling flowers in the gutter, she lacks the social or economic standing to truly belong 
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to the aristocracy. The presence of technology and the study of phonetics in the text 
implicate science as a potential cure for the ills of society, but a cure that must be applied 
carefully and always with the aim of helping the subject rather than exploitation or 
erasure of the self.  
 The evolutionary force involved here is not just a gradual, progressive, social 
evolution, but also entails a Lamarckian evolution of Shaw’s leader. In order for the man 
of genius to exist, he must recognize the power within himself to bring about a rupture in 
the current status quo. His moment of recognition would occurs much as it does for 
Undershaft and for Clara, as a refusal to be at the mercy of others and a determination to 
take action on one’s own priorities. Not a conversion manipulated by an outside force or 
omnipotent God, his conversion results in a willed change from within. The key to the 
continuation of Shaw’s ideal system is the Lamarckian ability to pass the acquired 
characteristics of self-actualized citizens on to future generations and thereby 
incrementally improve social conditions.  
The first of these society-altering ruptures occurs in the development of language. 
According to Lamarck, language use coincides with the practice and use of speech 
organs. As the speech organs develop through acquired use in a lifetime, so too do the 
potentialities of speech. The complexity of language is directly proportional to the 
complexity and practice of the speech organs.  
…the dominant race [humans], having had need of multiplying the signs 
for the rapid communication of their ideas, now become more and more 
numerous, and, no longer contented either with pantomimic signs or 
possible inflexions of their voice to represent this multitude of signs now 
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become necessary, would succeed by different efforts in forming 
articulated sounds […]  Indeed, the habitual exercise of their throat, their 
tongue, and their lips to make articulate sounds, will have eminently 
developed in them this faculty. (Qtd. in Packard 368) 
In Lamarck’s formulation of advancement from apes, which predates that of Darwin, 
developments in language not only result in an in increase of vocabulary and culture over 
time, but also correspond to the physical evolution of man. Therefore, the increasing 
complexity of the physiology of man leads to a complexity in language and it is in this 
advancement in articulation that separates man from beast on the evolutionary chain.  
To return this theory to Shaw, Eliza’s transformation through language, though it 
does not entirely achieve its aims, has enabled her to move beyond her animalistic groan 
at the beginning of the play, to a new articulate state that gives her the vocabulary to 
explain her point of view to Higgins and to find her own inner strength. From guttersnipe 
to duchess, Eliza has undergone a linguistic and social evolution. The opportunities this 
evolution affords her also elevate her physical wellbeing and the wellbeing of her 
potential children. Following Shaw’s logic, if Eliza’s children have met their base 
physiological needs their brains will be free to develop in new ways, like Undershaft’s 
utopian workforce. Eliza’s transformation opens the possibility that her offspring will 
find a new course perhaps as arms dealers, perhaps as shop owners, scientists, or creators 
of a new crack in the social and economic structure.  
Lamarck’s linking of language to physiology has resonances with a number of 
alternative theories of evolution in the early 20th century for those who, like Shaw, were 
looking to find a teleological explanation for evolution that left room for will and 
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progress rather than chance and brutal survival. Theosophical ideas of evolution include a 
similar Lamarckian idea of inherited, willed change with the end goal of an advanced 
human civilization that includes both science and the ancient wisdom and knowledge of 
the world. Theosophists also include a notion of devolution in which evolution is not 
simply a tool of progress but a process that can operate in reverse. Argentine author and 
Theosophist Leopoldo Lugones uses this concept of theosophical evolution in 
combination with a physiological notion of language in his short story “Yzur.” His 
scientist narrator claims that monkeys have willed themselves not to speak in order to 
avoid work at the hands of the competing human species. His hypothesis is that if he can 
retrain the physiology of a monkey to speak, he can then return the monkey to his full 
human status. The activation of the speech organs will in turn activate the metaphysical 
aspects of the human soul.    
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CHAPTER III 
LUGONES AND THE HUMAN EDGE OF SOUND 
 
Leopoldo Lugones’ 1906 collection of short stories, Las fuerzas extrañas, is one 
of the first examples of the genre of the fantastic in Latin America. This text created the 
scaffolding for the genre that his contemporaries Horacio Quiroga and Jorge Luis Borges 
would later perfect. The fantastic has its origins in German Romanticism and the Gothic 
tradition. Lugones’ protagonists spring from the same lineage as Geothe’s Faust, Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein and Edgar Allan Poe’s detectives as well as the popular fiction of 
H.G. Wells, Jules Verne and Bram Stoker (Speck 424). This form emerges alongside of 
developments in science and uses the cultural authority granted to the objective and all-
knowing scientist to push the boundaries of possibility, challenging the reader to discern 
between fact and fiction, natural and the supernatural. This form is particularly useful for 
Lugones, an active participant in Theosophy who believed strongly in science, but 
eschewed positivism and utilitarianism in favor of type of scientific research that 
included ancient knowledge and spiritism. The genre of the fantastic allows him to use 
the tenets of modern science while adding a layer of mysticism. Las fuerzas extrañas 
creates an arc of stories that ends with Lugones’ cosmology, an ordering of the universe 
that operates in accordance with his theosophical and modernista worldview.  
In this chapter I will examine two of the stories from this collection, “Yzur” and 
“La fuerza omega.” Structurally, both texts operate in accordance with the genre of the 
fantastic, using the lexicon of contemporary science through their empirical scientist 
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narrators to present potentially supernatural findings to the reader. The indeterminacy 
between the logical, scientific explanation and the supernatural solution undermines the 
cultural authority of science. As Jorge Luis Borges explained in a 1932 essay: “Omitir la 
explicación entre dos hechos cuya causalidad supone una realidad distinta es una forma 
de postular la magia” (qtd. in Lugones 218n).6 If this omission can indeed be seen as a 
form of magic, the inverse of reason in positivist discourse, then this literary form of 
uncertainty and omission can be seen as an aesthetic undermining of the increasingly 
authoritative modern science, a theme that plays out again and again in Lugones’ work 
through theosophy, alchemy and alternative cosmologies.  
From their position of critique these stories examine the limits of scientific 
investigation within the context of human morals. While “Yzur” navigates the space 
between human and animal through speech, “La fuerza omega” breaks the sacred human 
voice down into particles of energy that are then converted into a weapon. From animal 
to human and from human to machine, these two stories chart the boundaries of the voice 
and its connection to human experience. In Lugones’ epistemology, when the voice is 
released from its human container, the result is catastrophe, thereby reaffirming the 
intrinsic connection between body and mind, speaker and speech.   
In examining the boundaries of the human, Lugones explores notions of evolution 
that exist outside of the typical Darwinian or even Lamarckian ideals to one that includes 
a multi-directional idea of biological change through theosophy. Before detailing the 
specifics of Lugones’s theories, however, the particular historical resonance of Darwinian 
evolution in Argentina that must be examined. Much of Darwin’s research for The Origin 
                                                       
6 To omit the explication between two facts whose causality supposes a distinct reality is a form of 
postulating magic. [All translations are my own unless otherwise noted.] 
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of Species took place in South America, particularly Tierra del Fuego. A European reader 
at the time would have received a view of Argentina as an exotic empty space filled with 
amazing natural resources, unique species, and an occasional cannibal. In reality, while 
the interior of the nation was largely rural, Argentina had undergone 300 years of Spanish 
settlement and colonization, a war for independence, and a civil war by the time Darwin 
arrived in 1830s. Buenos Aires was one of the biggest metropolises in the world. 
Darwin’s voyage was one that was only possible thanks to Britain’s vast empire both of 
direct colonies and an even larger network of indirect commercial ties (Hunt 314). The 
exoticized, wild terrain that Darwin and other naturalists like Alexander von Humboldt 
report back to the metropolis of London is part of the colonial discourse that sees empty 
space as a place to map, civilize, and occupy or in this case extract specimens (Rodríguez 
260-261). 
In addition to the outward representations of the nation filtering back to Europe, 
an internal campaign to replicate the modernity of Europe and the United States within 
Argentina was underway in this same time period. In 1845, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento 
wrote Facundo: Civilización y barbarie, a text that follows the life of a gaucho who 
terrorizes the pampas. The figure is a representation of Juan Manuel de Rosas who had 
exiled Sarmiento to Chile and ruled Argentina with an iron fist. He and people like him, 
violent, uncouth and ruled by fear, are figured as the barbarians ruining Argentine 
civilization. In Sarmiento’s version of the future, the cities and the erudite populations are 
the aspects of civilization that will advance the nation towards a more progressive future 
that will look more like Europe than the pampas. According to Peter Ahrensdorf’s 
analysis of Sarmiento’s politics, Sarmiento defined civilization as:  “the cultivation and 
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perfection of reason…Reason must be cultivated by schools in settled society, through 
conversation and discussion, through schools and through social and commercial 
intercourse, through political debate and deliberation about common, public affairs, and 
hence through political participation” (36). To meet these specifications, urbanization is 
necessary. Without the focus on education, reason, and debate, Sarmiento felt that any 
nation, any group of people, could fall into barbarism. For some, his re-entrenchment of 
old divisions of civilization and barbarie would make it easier to justify campaigns of 
extermination against the indigenous populations of the pampas in the 1870s under 
commander Julio Roca.  
 Sarmiento would go on to be Argentina’s seventh president, taking office in 1868. 
The tenets he set out in Facundo would guide his presidency, which invested heavily in 
education, the university system and in creating deeper intellectual ties to Europe and the 
United States. Though these are progressive changes for a nation barely fifty years past 
colonial rule, with these policies came concessions that altered the fabric of Argentine 
society. The liberal elites who favored Sarmiento’s support of European modernization 
also agreed that Argentina’s future could go either the way of barbarism, backwards 
toward gauchos and an agrarian lifestyle, or to civilization, a modern future. In this vision 
for the future, social problems are resolved through reason and positivist philosophy and 
the Spanish cultural heritage is left behind in favor of a cosmopolitan culture of 
immigration and foreign investment (Spektorowski 86). This dualist stance further 
advances the civilization/barbarism dichotomy into the political sphere. A citizen could 
not choose both positivist philosophy and the spiritual (mainly Catholic) heritage left 
behind by the Spanish. One had to choose one or the other, with definite values placed on 
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the decision. The gaucho who Sarmiento saw as at war with society and the law, the 
indigenous man who had survived extermination, or those living in the interior were de 
facto relegated to the sphere of the barbaric while the urban elites were the way forward 
in a unidirectional vision of progress.  
 This discourse is not so different from that of the modernistas in that they shared a 
number of affinities with this line of thinking, including that the educated urban 
intellectual stood on the highest rung of society. In fact, Lugones wrote Historia de 
Sarmiento in 1911 commemorating the centennial of Sarmiento’s birth. The work is more 
of a national epic than a history, mythologizing Sarmiento and canonizing him in 
Argentine history. Above all the work praises the work of the author (in this case 
Lugones himself) as the creator and disseminator of national myth. Diana Sorensen 
Goodrich identifies this text as the beginning of Lugones’s political turn from 
communism to his fascist politics of the 1930s (177-180).  As Sarmiento was a great 
admirer of the United States and their utilitarian view of economic and social progress, 
Lugones’s alignment with Sarmiento also marks his politics as slightly outside those of 
the modernistas who actively rejected American influence (Rockland 48-50).  Much like 
Yeats’s politics later in life, Lugones’s prime concern was for the position of the 
intellectual as the arbiter of truth than a democratic or populist vision of the future.  
 With the increased reliance on reason and intelligence as a marker of civilization, 
Darwinism becomes synonymous with progress by the end of the nineteenth century. The 
endless forward motion and development of species created a mirror for political theories 
that saw progress as this same endless march along a single path. Leila Gómez explains 
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this connection in the introduction to her book La piedra del escándalo: Darwin en 
Argentina (1845-1909): 
…tanto el darwinismo como el positivismo de las décadas anteriores al fin 
de siglo argentino fueron los discursos representativos de la 
modernización de las instituciones sociales y políticas, la laicización del 
estado y el debate de la elite ilustrada. El progreso se entendía en términos 
de evolución y superación de los estadios “primitivos de la humanidad”, 
como aquellos que la nación combatiría militarmente en la campaña del 
desierto. (13)7  
The forward motion of mechanization and the course toward modernity is replaced by the 
rhetoric of Darwinism. Beyond the competition for resources or incremental changes in 
the physiology of a species, Darwin’s theories take root in political and social realms. 
The progression of animals across geological time shifts to a conversation about man and 
his own development over time. Men still living in agrarian or communal societies are 
viewed as throwbacks to an earlier stage of human development. Progress is not just the 
advancement of technology but also the advancement of people toward an urbanized, 
industrialized worker no longer dependent on an agricultural economy or on the 
mythologies and teachings of religion. These ideas, along with the arrival of a Spanish 
translation of Origin of Species in 1877 bring debates about evolution and science in 
general to the forefront in discussions within the intellectual circles of Argentina 
(Montserrat 31).  
                                                       
7 Much like the positivism of the decades before the end of the century in Argentina, these were 
representative discourse of the modernization of social and political institutions and of the illustrious elite. 
Progress can be understood in terms of evolution, the laicization of the state, and superceding of the 
“primitive states of humanity,” like those that the nation would combat on the field in the desert.  
  
 77 
The evidence of the continued presence of evolutionary debates that are 
contemporary with Lugones’ Las fuerzas extrañas can be seen in a 1903 cartoon in an 
edition of Caras y Caretas. This particular cartoon depicts a man and what appears to be 
a curator or professor in front of a painting of a monkey. The caption reads: “--Después 
de todo, ¿sabe usted lo que le falta al orangután para ser hombre? –La palabra. – Sí señor; 
la palabra. Si el animalito pudiese decir ‘soy orangután,” sería un hombre” (qtd. in H. 
Fraser).8 As Howard Fraser explains this cartoon is just one of many in Caras y Caretas 
that played with these distinctions between man and monkey and also between speech 
and the human. From cartoons to articles to photos of chimps riding bicycles, 
evolutionary discourse had manifested in these humorous explorations in popular culture 
(17). These kinds of representations reveal an anxiety about the place of man in a new 
modern world as well as the instability of man’s domination over his environment. While 
these debates continue on in the public sphere, opposition is mounting against 
Sarmiento’s version of progress that ties scientific achievement to nationalist pride, and 
pride to moving closer to Europe and the United States. For this literarily inclined 
intellectual elite, theosophy offered a vision of both evolution and the future that was a 
far cry from Sarmiento or Darwin. 
Theosophy created the space from which intellectuals could debate and engage 
with modern science while retaining a human element in their vision of the future. 
Theosophical Societies, organizations dedicated to the study of ancient eastern 
epistemologies to discover new meanings of science, philosophy, and religion, offered 
their members new ways to imagine the world that directly countered the narratives 
                                                       
8 When all is said and done, do you know what it is that the orangutan lacks in order to be a man? –The 
word. –Yes sir, the word. If the little animal could say, ‘I am an orangutan’ he would be a man. 
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constructed by positivist sciences. The group’s focus on learning and receptivity meshed 
well with the concerns of artists, writers, and thinkers looking to carve out a new space 
for humanist thinking. The tenets of theosophy as they are imagined in this era are based 
on Helena P. Blavatsky’s text The Secret Doctrine, which she claims contains theories 
handed down to her from Tibetan spiritualists, ancient wisdom only known to a 
privileged few. Within the societies, pupils could dedicate themselves to the study of 
theosophical texts in earnest. By the late nineteenth century, cities all over the world, 
including London, New York, Madras India, and Buenos Aires, have chapters that attract 
a wide variety of intellectuals. The impact of the movement has heavily influenced other 
groups such as the Rosicrucians and Christian Scientists (“Early History”). Some of the 
most influential writers and artists of the time including W.B. Yeats in Ireland, T.S. Eliot 
in England and Jack London in the U.S. were active members in this society. Today there 
are still hundreds of lodges, nearly fifty in England alone.  
In Argentina, the appeal of spiritualism resonates with the foundations of the 
modernismo movement which takes its lead from a variety of distinct influences 
including French Symbolism and the Parnassians, the radical transformations of the 
Castilian poetic tradition offered by Spanish and Latin American Romantics, as well as 
the American gothic tradition, chiefly Edgar Allan Poe. At the turn of the century as 
North American influence grows in both Latin America’s economic and cultural realms, 
so too does resistance among the artistic community against this coming tide. In 1900, 
Uruguyan José Enrique Rodó (1871–1917) addressed the young urban elite in his essay 
“Ariel.” Rodó describes Latin American artists as Ariel from William Shakespeare’s The 
Tempest. In the play, Ariel is a marker for the sprit and the arts, diaphanous and light. He 
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is set in opposition to Caliban, a representation of all the basest concerns of nature. Rodó 
takes the figure of Ariel as a rallying cry for Latin American youth to reject the 
utilitarianism of the United States that reduces the individual to a replaceable part in the 
industrial machine and instead embrace a modernity that uses Athens as its model and 
values the unique composition and erudition of South America as its core. While the 
arielista movement inspired a young generation of authors, it was not an all-inclusive 
vision.  
Rubén Darío, founder of the modernismo movement uses this same figuration of 
Ariel in a 1905 essay to describe the influence Edgar Allan Poe had on Latin American 
modernisms.  
Poe, como un Ariel hecho hombre, diríase que ha pasado su vida bajo el 
flotante influjo de un extraño misterio. Nacido en un país de vida práctica 
y material, la influencia del medio obra en él al contrario. De un país de 
cálculo brota imaginación tan estupenda. El don mitológico parece nacer 
en él por lejano atavismo y vese en su poesía un claro rayo del país del sol 
y azul en que nacieron sus antepasados. (“Edgar Allan Poe”)9  
Here Darío describes Poe as an Ariel, Rodó’s reconceptualizing of this figure in which he 
casts Ariel as the learned and erudite Latin American intellectual against Caliban, the 
utilitarianism of the United States. For Darío, Poe is a bright intellectual light that breaks 
through from the cold precision of the growing materialism in U.S. culture. His work 
manages to keep a sense of mystery and mythology alive in the face of hyper-rationalism. 
                                                       
9 Poe, like an Ariel made man, it would seem that he has spent his life under the floating influence of a 
strange mystery. Born in a country of practical and material life, the influence of his work to the contrary. 
From a nation of calculations springs so great an imagination. The mythological gift appears to be born in 
him from some far away atavism y one can see in his poetry a clear ray from a country of sun and blue in 
which his ancestors were born.  
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He is the perfect model of resistance for a new Latin American literature that seeks to 
retain a differentiation from the increasing presence of the United States and that resists 
this deification of science and reason above all else. 
As a founder of modernismo, Lugones incorporated these aspects into his work 
and combined it with his theosophical practices in his fantastic stories. According to 
Rachel Haywood Ferreira, this impulse in Lugones’ work functions as an attempt “to 
achieve a viable synthesis between an alternate belief system and orthodox science” 
(132). Its format is a familiar one and follows a structure much like tales of the fantastic 
from Edgar Allan Poe and H.G. Wells. The framing of these stories with an credible 
witness that retains their authority and questions the fantastic events harken back to 
stories like Wells’ “The Crystal Egg” and many cite Poe’s “The Murders at the Rue 
Morgue” as one of the numerous precursors to “Yzur.” Poe has a significant influence on 
early modernista work as a figure that resists the pragmatism and positivism of North 
American culture. Ventura García-Calderón’s 1910 work Del romanticismo al 
modernismo characterizes modernismo as “la aspiración idealista [en arte] que solidariza 
á la América del Sur contra las concepciones utilitarias del Norte”(n xvi).10 García-
Calderón’s observations, contemporary to the movement, mark modernismo as a Latin 
American form with its roots in symbolism and from the same idealistic and sentimental 
impulse that created naturalism and parnassianism in France, yet in Latin America, 
without a significant transition to naturalism, modernism finds its most direct roots in 
romanticism (xiii). Poe becomes a useful transitional figure in this configuration despite 
his death nearly sixty years prior.  
                                                       
10 …the idealist aspiration [in art] that solidifies South America against the utilitarian conceptions of the 
North. 
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Las fuerzas extrañas uses theosophical and alchemical ideas of sound and voice to 
explore the limits of both human understanding and scientific reason. The content 
reaffirms a humanistic vision that requires consideration for the subject of the 
experiment. Both pieces use the exploitation of the human voice as their center and 
defend this uniquely human element as an aspect of humanity worth protecting and 
abusing the voice leads to the destruction of the scientist narrators. Their destruction 
functions as a rebuff to those who think the world can be known only through reason, 
hypotheses and materialist results. Therefore, Lugones’ censure also re-affirms the sacred 
space of the human that should not be tampered with for the vain pursuit of 
experimentation. These stories stand as an example of the competing narratives of 
modernity, progress, and science, on the one hand, and spiritualism and the return to the 
human on the other, narratives that modernismo works to counter.  
Theosophy’s dual and sometimes contradictory stance that both acknowledges 
contemporary science and critiques it draws in many artists and thinkers of the era 
providing room to explore ideas of the universe while not exclusively tied to modern 
science. Philadelphia, Buenos Aires’ main theosophical magazine, attracts members of 
the literary community including Ruben Darío, José Inegieros, and Leopoldo Lugones. 
The magazine gets its name from the pseudonym of its editor, Antonia Martínez Royo 
and it runs from 1898–1903, serving as an early platform for both Lugones’ fiction and 
also for his broader aesthetic theories (Quereilhac 72). In 1901, Lugones published 
“Nuestras ideas ésteticas” in Philadelphia in which he lays out some of his principles for 
aesthetic production while maintaining the main doctrines of theosophy: 
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... el sentimiento puro, es decir, el fenómeno en virtud del cual nos 
sentimos uno con la humanidad o con el Universo, no tiene manifestación 
objetiva, siendo en su aspecto inferior instinto, y en el superior, conciencia 
absoluta: lo Inexpresable. Semejante impotencia de expresar lo que se 
siente, ocasiona el deje de melancolía visible a poco de andar en todo 
esfuerzo de Arte, y más aún en la poesía. (Qtd. in Salazar 614)11  
Art is the result of the endless quest for expressing pure sentiment that necessarily falls 
short of its goal. It can only approximate the feeling of oneness with the world, yet the 
drive to represent or capture this sentiment is what moves aesthetic production forward. 
The collapse of theosophy into aesthetics has a profound effect on not only the way 
Lugones writes, but also the way he views the world; the theosophical is inseparable from 
the aesthetic in his writing. The poet, like the theosophist, has the sensitivity to feel the 
harmony of the universe and his poetry is an expression of this unity.  
This vision of unity offers an alternative to the fractured chaos of industrialized 
modernity. With the human relegated to a cog in the machine and god and religion 
figured as relics from an uncivilized past, there is little space left for the individual mind 
in a search for enlightenment. Theosophy fills this void especially for the modernista 
writers whose form and content were often expressions of the struggle to both incorporate 
new discourses of the modern world, yet also to find some meaning in an increasingly 
disjointed society. Searching for a new kind of language, the modernistas often included 
spiritualist, alchemical, and cosmological references in attempts to subvert the dominant 
                                                       
11 Pure sentiment, that is to say, the phenomenon by virtue of which we feel one with humanity or with the 
universe, does not have an objective manifestation, being in its inferior aspect instinct, and in the superior 
aspect, absolute knowledge, the Inexpressable. Such impotence of expressing what one feels, causes the 
end of melancholy visible just steps into the quest for  Art, and even more so in poetry.  
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discourse. “They perceived literary language as an elastic and flexible instrument to 
express a spiritualist vision of the cosmos while undermining traditional scientific 
discourse. In this way, the modernists’ linguistic mission, if it can be viewed as such 
sought to infuse language with an anti-scientific imprecision to bear witness to their 
‘horror por el progreso’” (H. Fraser 9). The archaic references and often erudite diction 
found especially in modernista poetry functions as a way to resist rapid thoughtless 
consumption of information. Slowing the reading and interpretive process is not simply 
an aesthetic choice, but a political one. 
As Julio Ramos point out however, the modernismo movement was not simply 
this search for unity or synthesis between the two cultures of art and science. He analyzes 
“the antitechnological discourse elaborated by literature not as an aggregate of ‘truths’ 
about the world, but rather, as a strategy of legitimation for intellectuals who had become 
estranged from the utopia of progress and modernity” (166). The increasingly positivist 
world view at the turn of the century led to a new paradigm of intellectualism that valued 
the scientist and materialist findings over the artistic endeavor. As Rubén Darío put it: 
“the artist has been supplanted by the engineer” (qtd. in Ramos 165). Therefore, this use 
of theosophy and alternative epistemologies acted not strictly to discount science, but to 
paradoxically use these discourses to reaffirm the role of the humanist intellectual 
(typically urban and elite) in a materialist world. They are the only ones who can see the 
way forward to a modern future by unlocking and transforming these ancient texts for a 
modern audience.  
Las fuerzas extrañas gives a clearer picture of Lugones’s stance against 
materialism and in favor of a more harmonic view of the world. The collection includes 
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Lugones’s own cosmology as well as several stories that directly address contemporary 
issues in science. For instance, “Viola acherontia,” is about a botanist who engineers a 
violet of death bred to match its exterior with its internal composition, in this case its 
black petals match its poisonous interior. The black violet is fed on the blood of children, 
weeps when it is hungry, and its perfume is a deadly toxin. Lugones undercuts the 
violence in the story, hiding it beneath technical jargon and scientific speech revealing 
the calculating, depraved indifference to suffering in the name of science.  
As Beatriz Sarlo notes, in stories like these that manipulate scientific views, “the 
voice of ‘science’ frees the story from moral limits; with science comes the right to say 
even that which offends social convention; when it is science that speaks of a 
transgression, there is none” (29). The scientist narrator commands a voice of authority 
that speaks from a position above the reader. As the disseminator of knowledge and 
reason, the scientist can claim all of his or her actions as necessary for society’s progress 
and since he or she defines the boundaries of the scientific realm, there can be no 
transgression beyond them, all experiments and actions are regarded equally. The 
utilitarian concerns of the morally exempt scientists are analogous to the concerns in 
Latin America over the encroaching North and their ideas of a heartless industrial 
capitalism. Like Rodó’s Caliban, the scientist is a brute force working only toward his 
own ends, whereas the theosophist and artist is Ariel, who works toward a vision of 
progress for the greater good, advancing knowledge and protecting the humanist center of 
worldly experience. The literary response to this crisis is the inclusion of alternate 
dogmas and a vision of the sage artist who can lead the layperson toward a new future. 
The formal conventions of the fantastic open space for this critique by exposing the cold 
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calculations of the materialist scientist as abusive and harmful to society. Almost all of 
Lugones’ stories end with the sanctioning of the scientist’s transgressions of moral 
boundaries through madness, punishment, or death.  
The story “Yzur” uses this same manipulation of the authority of science to 
expose the scientist’s abuse while the text also promotes an alternate, theosophical 
version of evolution that links the human voice to the movement between evolutionary 
stages. The story is the culmination of a half a century of debate and a keen skepticism of 
an industrialized future for Argentina. The scientist narrator provides the story with an air 
of credibility and yet, Lugones reveals the hypocrisy beneath the narrator’s claims of 
authority. Though he is not actually a scientist, he feels confident about the knowledge he 
has gleaned from reading that he believes he can prove that monkeys are really “degraded 
humans” who simply refuse to speak. To do so he buys a monkey named Yzur from a 
defunct circus and takes on the mantle of scientist from his layman’s understanding of the 
latest scientific research. In the narrator’s estimation the only difference between man 
and ape is speech. What ensues is three years of tortuous language training that leads only 
to ambiguous results and the death of Yzur at the abusive hands of the “scientist.”  
This self-trained scientist believes he has learned enough from articles, 
newspapers, and other lay reports to understand the complex physiology of monkeys. 
From his basic analysis of the mouth, throat, and tongue of a chimp, he believes the 
presence of these apparati is proof enough that he would need only to re-activate these 
organs in order to return the animal speech. “Sabía únicamente, con entera seguridad, que 
no hay ninguna razón científica para que el mono no hable” (200)12. In his estimation, 
monkeys have simply chosen not to speak. Fraser traces this phrase back to an issue of 
                                                       
12 All I knew for certain was that there was no scientific reason why monkeys shouldn’t speak. 
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the popular magazine Caras y Caretas that included an article “Un mono que está 
aprendiendo á hablar” in which a monkey named Ham learns to speak. The article 
includes the scientific rationalization that a chimp’s larynx and phonic organs are 
identical to a human’s and therefore “no hay razón para que no hable” (Fraser 13). The 
similarity is striking in both phrasing and content. Lugones’ narrator replicates this same 
type of experiment, and perhaps this article was one of the pieces the narrator had read in 
preparation for his work.  
Yet, Lugones takes this postulate to a new level adding an alternate theory of 
evolution to explain the monkey’s lack of speech despite his physiology. The basis for 
the scientist’s hypothesis is in an alternate conception of evolution that includes a degree 
of choice. According to the narrator, the monkey has opted out of evolution in a willful 
regression: 
Los monos fueron hombres que por una u otra razón dejaron de hablar. El 
hecho produjo la atrofia de sus órganos de fonación y de los 
centros cerebrales del lenguaje; debilitó casi hasta suprimirla la relación 
entre unos y otros, fijando el idioma de la especie en el grito inarticulado, 
y el humano primitivo descendió a ser animal. (199)13  
In this configuration, evolution is not a millennia long process of gradual change over 
time. Instead, it is a multidirectional process, which can move both forward and 
backward. All monkeys were once primitive humans who stopped speaking, and this lack 
of speech is the last distinction between man and animal. Once the monkey stops 
                                                       
13 Monkeys were once men who, for one reason or another, stopped speaking. This fact produced an 
atrophy of their phonetic organs and of the language centers in their brains, which were weakened almost to 
the point of ceasing to exist, leaving the sole idiom of their species an inarticulate screech, as the primitive 
human descended to the level of the animal. (102) 
  
 87 
speaking the species gradually experiences an atrophy of the physical attributes of 
speech, their tongues become weak and the organs of phonation regress to the point 
where speech is no longer possible, reducing the monkey to a series of inarticulate grunts 
and some approximation of language. Speech becomes the singular aspect that delineates 
the space between human and animal. Therefore, by this logic if the scientist can “volver 
el mono al lenguaje” (199)14 he also can return him to human form.  
 The scientist also believes that the species has stopped speaking for fear that 
humans will put them to work. If this is true, silence becomes a space of resistance for 
Yzur’s species from which they can opt out of the horrors of the modern world, 
abdicating their powers of speech and connection to the human for a safer space of 
solitude. Yet, the scientist bought Yzur from a circus where humans had put him to work, 
performing acts of mimicry. Silence could not preserve him from participation in the 
economic system and purposefully opting out is an affront to a growing notion of 
pragmatism and efficiency in the early 20th century. Simply the potential for speech is 
enough to convince the scientist and the circus that the monkey should be made to 
participate thus proving a willful disavowal of speech might have been a smarter choice 
for the ancient monkeys who were able to avoid subjugation at the hands of human 
industry. 
The idea that evolution is reversible and the element of willful regression comes 
from tenets of theosophy that advocate for a more complicated, cyclical version of 
evolution. According to theosophy, the evolution of man occurs simultaneously across 
                                                       
14 return the monkey to language 
  
 88 
seven human races of seven human groups on seven different portions of our globe.15 
Each stage is millions of earthly years long with different races moving through at a 
different pace. According to current teachings five root races have almost finished the 
rotation through evolution with two races yet to come (Santucci 46). A clearer idea of the 
meaning behind this complex cosmology can be seen in Annie Besant’s autobiography. 
Besant was an activist, socialist, progressive in Britain and took over a number of duties 
in the Theosophical Society after Blavatsky’s death in 1891. She recounts a conversation 
she had with Blavatsky after the first society meeting she had ever attended:  
The powers we possess are not supernatural, they are latent in every 
human being, and will be evolved as the race progresses. All that we have 
done is to evolve them more rapidly than our neighbors, by a procedure as 
open to you as it was to us. Matter is everywhere, but it exists in seven 
modifications of which you only know four, and until lately only knew 
three; in those higher forms reside the causes of which you see effect in 
the lower, and to know these causes you must develop the capacity to take 
cognizance of the higher….so the “Secret Doctrine” points to living forms 
on higher planes of existence, each suited to its environment, till all space 
thrills with life, and nowhere is there death, but only change. Amid these 
myriads are some evolving towards humanity, some evolving away from 
humanity as we know it, divesting themselves of its grosser parts. (348-
349)  
                                                       
15 Race refers not to a phenotypical idea of distinct groups of men, instead on stages of spiritual 
development which are constantly evolving through seven planetary rounds. For a more detailed account of 
race and evolution in theosophy see James A. Santucci, “The Notion of Race in Theosophy.” Nova Religio: 
The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions 11.3. (2008): 43-47.  
  
 89 
The mixture of scientific speech and mysticism creates a powerful combination of 
imagery. Instead of only a physical evolution, theosophy contains, perhaps more 
importantly, a spiritual evolution. The end point is this balanced universe in which there 
is no death. Evolution continues through a higher self, which is immortal, never dying, 
only changing in its composition. There is also a component of willful evolution in this 
explanation as well. If some can evolve away from humanity “divesting themselves of its 
grosser parts” there is some choice in the directionality of theosophical evolution. Also 
by learning of these evolutionary paths through theosophy it is possible to evolve more 
quickly than one’s contemporaries. Knowledge and indoctrination into this society can 
hasten one’s chances at a glorious astral future. It’s no wonder that this mystical vision of 
the world that ends in harmony would come as a welcome relief to those alienated from 
the dominant narratives of progress, mechanization and struggle for survival that marked 
Lugones’s era.  
Although theosophists vehemently oppose materialism, sciences that depend on 
observations of material in the world, the scientific language in The Secret Doctrine is 
not purely oppositional. Many theosophists earnestly referred to themselves as scientists. 
As Alex Owen explains, “theosophists and other occultists “believe that they were 
engaged in the true mission of science – a thorough and open-minded investigation of the 
mysteries of the universe” (34). The distrust they have of science is not lodged in the 
discipline as a whole, but how it was practiced in the Victorian era: with an eye toward 
instrumentalized reason and a denial of the possibility for a spiritual life. The 
Theosophists want to both rigorously examine the potentials of the universe, while also 
giving real attention to a spiritual life. These two goals are the underlying tenets that form 
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the basis for the complexity of The Secret Doctrine and other texts that would follow in 
the decades to come.  
As these societies travel around the world and establish themselves in other 
countries, this message remained intact. In Argentina, the story was no different. After 
independence, industrialization and the importation of foreign interests had created a 
similar capitalist society to the nation’s European counterparts. As a result, the 
intellectual circles of Buenos Aires and Córdoba had a similar reaction as the European 
bourgeoisie. Their mistrust and skepticism about the coming of the industrial age is 
accompanied by the arrival of Theosophical Societies to the nation. A 1901 edition of 
Caras y Caretas reveals the juxtaposition between rapid industrialization and the 
entrenchment of theosophy in Argentine intellectual spheres. On one page there is their 
semi-regular feature “Inventos útiles” in which there are a number of new inventions 
from both Argentina and around the world detailed for the readership. In this particular 
issue there is an announcement about new illuminated signs at Niagara Falls, a personal 
drink holder that keeps your drink cool with nickel compartments for your ice, a new type 
of hand held nutcracker and a new way of mounting incandescent lights (58). Aside from 
being a fascinating snapshot on technology in 1901, the feature illustrates Argentina’s 
connection to the modernity and to Europe. Argentina is producing its own new 
inventions and participating in the innovations of the era. In addition, the readership is 
kept abreast of the latest developments in Europe.  
In this same edition, just a few pages before the useful inventions, there is an 
article that announces the arrival of Colonel Olcott, a co-founder along with H.P. 
Blavatsky and the president of the original Theosophical Society. Olcott is a huge figure 
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in Theosophy, and his arrival marks a significant endorsement of the Argentine chapters. 
According to the article there are already “cuatro ramas de la Sociedad Teosófica, tres en 
Buenos Aires que trabajan con setenta y tantos miembros, y una en el Rosario” (38).16 As 
a special feature, though missing from the archive copy, Caras y Caretas had published a 
page of one of theosophy’s sacred texts to give the readers an idea of what the movement 
was about. The article uses this space to emphasize theosophy’s connections to science.  
Es una alta filosofía que pretende armonizar la religión con la ciencia. 
Explica los misterios de que aquella se rodea, descubriendo el significado 
de sus símbolos y mitos, y probando cómo todas no son sino una misma 
con distintas apariencias, relaciona las verdades que ellos ocluían con las 
mismas leyes naturales á que obedecen los fenómenos físicos que 
investiga la ciencia, leyes de las cuales se dice estar en posesión y cuya 
exactitud parecen demostrar los últimos descubrimientos hechos como el 
aire liquido, la fabricación del argentaurum, etc. (35)17 
Instead of the emphasis on the stranger aspects of theosophy like the automatic writing 
pursued by Yeats, or the more radical fringe religions that splintered from theosophy that 
are found in many modern day analyses of theosophy, here the focus is on the 
combination of science and religion. The claims made to contemporary science appear 
alongside of claims to discovering the myths and secrets of the universe. In the same 
                                                       
16 four branches of the Theosophical Society, three in Buenos Aires that work with more than seventy 
members, and one in Rosario. 
 
17 It is a high philosophy that tries to harmonize religion with science. It explains the mysteries that 
surround the former (religion), discovering the significance of its symbols and myths, and proving how all 
of them (religions) are really one, with distinct appearances, it relates the truths that used to be occluded 
with the same natural laws obeyed by the physical phenomenons that science investigates, laws that one 
says to be in possession of, and whose exactitude seems to be demonstrated by the latest discoveries made 
like liquid air, the fabrication of argentaurum etc.  
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sentence the article refers to theosophy contributing to the recent scientific discoveries of 
liquid air and argentaurum. Liquid air is still a viable innovation similar to liquid nitrogen 
or liquid oxygen used in cryogenics. However, argentaurum is an alchemical substance 
that was supposed to be the intermediary stage between gold and silver discovered by 
Stephen Emmens. The scientific community largely denounced Emmens as a “charlatan” 
with “cracked brains” in 1898 upon the announcement of his discovery (Emmens). 
Although theosophy makes claims to science, even in this article that provides credibility 
to the society, the science it claims is on the fringes of the scientific community. 
Not only do theosophists make claims to being scientists, but they also go so far 
as to put into question the very word “science.” Argentina’s theosophical magazine, 
Philadelphia, makes this assertion in one of its first editions in 1898.  
La Teosofía es una ciencia, o más bien dicho, es la ciencia, toda la ciencia, 
la sola y única ciencia, es decir, la síntesis de la sola, única y eterna 
verdad, encerrando en su seno y poniendo de acuerdo todas las religiones, 
todas las filosofías y todas las ciencias. (…) siendo la Teosofía la ciencia,  
todo lo que ella afirma puede y debe ser demostrado.  Por esto, difiere de 
las religiones y filosofías ordinarias. (Qtd. in Castro 195)18  
Theosophy is figured as the school of thought that can unify all others. It holds the 
answers to the questions of the universe and, according to this article, the truths it 
expounds can be verifiable, therefore earning it the title of a science. Paradoxically, 
theosophy takes up the methodology of materialism in that it claims its ideas can be 
                                                       
18 Theosophy is a science, or better yet, it is the science, all science, the only and unique science, that is to 
say, the synthesis of the only, unique and eternal truth, enclosed in its breast and putting into agreement all 
religions, all philosophies, and all sciences. (…) being that Theosophy is a science, all that it affirms can be 
demonstrated. Therefore, it differs from ordinary philosophies and religions.  
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proven, while also claiming that positivism was detrimental to the human soul (Castro 
195). With claims like these, theosophy could herald itself as both modern, in that it was 
a player in the new scientific arenas of the nineteenth century, and as a recuperative agent 
of the past, in that its text were based on exclusive ancient knowledge.  
The narrator in “Yzur” has taken on this position falsely. His claims to science are 
not theosophical, simply those of a layman immersed in the pubic culture of science at 
the time. He is not one of Blavatsky’s few who can harness the power of a mystical 
world, instead an arrogant man who abuses a monkey in the name of science. Lugones 
positions the narrator as this false prophet with a narrative voice that mimics the 
trappings of a clinical report, but lacking in the rigor, logic, and knowledge that someone 
with more training might exhibit. The narrator’s treatment of the chimp is detached and 
cold. His descriptions of his findings about the anatomy of a chimp and his aptitudes for 
language learning reveal his detachment from Yzur as a subject: “Felizmente, el 
chimpancé es de todos los grande monos el que tiene labios más movibles; y en el caso 
particular habiendo padecido Izur de anginas, sabía abrir la boca para que se la 
examinaran” (203).19 Here, Yzur is a specimen, an object of study. Not only is he a 
chimpanzee, one of the species closest to human, but also his particular history makes 
him an even better subject. He was trained in mimicry during his time in the circus, and 
because of his need for medication, he had developed the mobility of his mouth and an 
ability to open it on command. Deemed a perfect specimen for the experiment, Yzur is 
subject to all of the tests and manipulations the narrator can think of.  
                                                       
19 Fortunately, of all the great apes the chimpanzee has the most mobile lips…This first inspection 
confirmed my suspicions at least in part. Yzur’s tongue lay at the bottom of his mouth, an inert mass, 
evidencing no movements except those attending to the act of swallowing. (104) 
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The narrator’s experiments are mainly based in 18th and 19th century experiments 
with educating the deaf. The narrator references Samuel Heinicke, the inventor of an oral 
method for educating deaf mutes as one of his inspirations (203). Heinicke’s strange 
methods included assigning a flavor to each vowel sound to associate the mouth shape 
and movement with a particular taste. He would use a feather to apply the flavor to the 
tongue of the patient and repeat these steps until the patient could replicate the desired 
sound through the connection to a particular liquid (Rée 164). While the oddity of 
Heinicke’s work is useful for Lugones’s portrait of a misguided scientist, the reasoning 
behind these experiments with flavor are at the base of the narrator’s understanding of 
language and voice. Heinicke was working on a method to teach language, and more 
specifically speech, to his deaf students without recourse to gestural or tactile languages. 
For him, sounds are what activate mental activity and that acquiring language has to 
come from learning the names of things or concepts and voicing them. Without sound, he 
felt the words had no intellectual anchor, leaving the deaf student awash in meaningless 
letters without any means of mental organization (Rée 163-4).  
Although Heinicke’s theory may seem strange and even offensive today, it stems 
from a long philosophical and theological history of speech that imagines the voice as the 
seat of the soul. Johann Gottfried Herder was one of many philosophers who linked 
speech to human consciousness. In his view, the voice is simply the means for 
articulation, while speech is what marks reason and an entry into human existence: 
By speech alone the eye and ear, nay the feelings of all the sense, are 
united in one, and centre in commanding thought, to which the hands and 
other members are only obedient instruments…The delicate organs of 
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speech, therefore, must be considered as the rudder of reason, and speech 
as the heavenly spark, that gradually kindles our thoughts and senses to a 
flame. (Qtd. in Rée 67) 
Speech is the catalyst that unites all other senses and creates the possibility for 
consciousness. As a “heavenly spark,” speech takes on a divine essence in Herder’s 
account. This uniquely human attribute that allows humans to communicate and articulate 
emotion is what separates us from animals and establishes communities, nations, and 
traditions (Rée 67). From this vantage point, without speech the possibility for a soul or 
complete participation in humanity is not possible, evidenced by the term “deaf and 
dumb” that presupposes that one follows from the other. “Mutism, in short, [is] a state of 
utter spiritual dereliction, the atrophy or the death of the soul” (Rée 90). The narrator 
replicates this line of thinking as he puts Yzur in a category above “deaf mutes” in his 
conceptual hierarchy: “Poseyendo el mono la voz, es decir, llevando esto de ventaja al 
sordomudo, con más ciertas articulaciones rudimentarias” (204).20 He sees similarities 
between teaching deaf mutes and chimpanzees to speak; yet the monkey has the 
advantage in that he can hear and repeat the sounds rather than roughly approximate 
them. All the narrator has to do is link these sounds to concepts and the monkey’s voice 
can be converted to actual speech.  
 The scientist finds evidence of his progress in the similarity of the monkey’s 
behavior to that of humans. In the text there is a gradual sense that alongside the speech 
lessons Yzur is incrementally adopting human behaviors. “Cada vez que lo veía avanzar 
en dos pies, con las manos a la espalda para conservar el equilibrio, y su aspecto de 
                                                       
20 Monkeys hold an advantage over deaf mutes in that they not only have a voice, but have an excellent 
innate capacity for controlling rudimentary articulation. (106) 
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marinero borracho, la convicción de su humanidad detenida se vigorizaba en mí” (200).21 
These mannerisms, the fuel for countless cartoons and comedy routines, are, in this 
scenario, evidence of the monkey’s innate humanness. All he needs to do is restore the 
functionality of the organs and receptors of language, and all other elements of sentience 
will be unlocked.  
 Beneath the discussion of the degree of humanity that a monkey could possess 
lies a broader discussion of what constitutes human. In the same equation in which 
someone who is both deaf and mute is less human than a speaking monkey, lies the idea 
that women, children, and indigenous populations are less fully developed than a fully 
articulate white man. In Descent of Man, Darwin begins to extrapolate the hypotheses of 
evolution onto human society. Problematic in a number of ways, this text includes an 
articulation of these levels of development. Although Darwin admits that “with woman 
the powers of intuition, of rapid perception, and perhaps of imitation, are more strongly 
marked than in man” (311), but he does not value these characteristics labeling them the 
faculties “of the lower races, and therefore of a past and lower state of civilization” (311). 
In this oft-cited passage, Darwin places women and the “lower races” on a similar 
evolutionary trajectory that leaves them behind, languishing in the past and in a lower 
position on the evolutionary scale than white men. On a conceptual level, Darwin marks 
the human in terms of spoken language, which privileges a certain kind of language that 
performs this linear progression of progress. Spoken language abandons a more direct 
connection to emotion and feeling that can be exhibited in languages that include gestures 
and three dimensional expressions of thought (133). Emotions and intuition are 
                                                       
21 Every time I saw him approach on two feet, with his hands held behind his back to keep his balance, and 
his drunken sailor’s swagger, my conviction that he was a lapsed human grew stronger. (103) 
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weaknesses, holdovers from an ancient and now obsolete version of history. Ideas like 
these are what have justified oppression and subjugation under the banner of saving 
“backwards” “underdeveloped” peoples. In Argentina, the idea of progress is bound up 
with the separation of urban, cosmopolitan civilization from the rural and agrarian 
Barbary of the interior. 
The scientist replicates this attitude through his attempts to return the monkey to 
speech, an act that would save him from his ancestral fate and bring him back on par with 
his human relatives. The scientist truly believes that as the monkey’s ability to speak 
increases, so too will his degree of humanness, reaffirming the link between speech and a 
sense of humanity. Despite reporting that Yzur has not yet uttered a word, the scientist 
feels the lessons are working and as a result, the monkey has become more human.  
Por despacio que fuera, se había operado un gran cambio en su carácter. 
Tenía menos movilidad en las facciones, la mirada más profunda, y 
adoptaba posturas meditabundas. Había adquirido, por ejemplo, la 
costumbre de contemplar las estrellas. Su sensibilidad se desarrollaba 
igualmente; íbasele notando una gran facilidad de lágrimas. (205)22 
In his observations, the scientist inextricably links language to emotion and the capability 
to think. He attributes Yzur’s new habits of contemplating the stars to his work in 
developing his speech organs. In opening these channels of understanding and 
interpreting the world, the scientist has also opened a new world of emotion that 
overwhelms Yzur. There are no traces of joy in these observations, only profound 
                                                       
22 However slow the process, there gradually came a great change in his character. He flexed his facial 
features less and less, his expression grew profound and turned inward, and he struck poses which can only 
be described as meditative. He had acquired, for example, the habit of gazing at the stars. His sensitivity 
heightened in the same way; I noticed that he was easily brought to tears. (107) 
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sadness and isolation. Whether these are the scientist’s own reflections on the state of the 
human that he projects onto Yzur, or if they are Yzur’s own awakening into sense is 
unclear, yet they reveal a troubling aspect of humanity. The more human he becomes the 
more burden there is on his psyche. Like Adam and Eve’s awareness of their own 
nakedness in the Garden of Eden after eating from the Tree of Knowledge, Yzur’s 
awareness of human suffering and emotional complexity comes after eating from the tree 
of language. 
The more Yzur begins to show these slight signs of humanity, the more obsessive 
the scientist becomes. The first person narration makes it impossible to discern the line 
between the scientist’s actual observations and his obsessive theories. The mixture of 
plausible scientific theory and his own conjecture obscure any possibility for the reader to 
unravel the reliability of the narrator. The first glimpse of an outside observer is the 
scientist’s housekeeper, who tells the narrator she has heard Yzur speaking real words in 
the garden. Even here, the report comes from the scientist not from the housekeeper 
herself, but this discovery enrages the scientist who feels betrayed when the monkey 
refuses, or is unable, to repeat the phrases for his master. Furious with resentment, 
frustration, and anger, the scientist beats Yzur nearly to death. Simply the suspicion that 
he is withholding his knowledge from the human, the greater of the two species, seems a 
deep affront to the scientist and an insult to his hard work. Beginning to speak opens 
Yzur to a new level of victimization. The damage he has done to Yzur proves 
irrevocable. He grows weaker and weaker until all of the medical remedies have failed 
him, leaving the scientist with the results of his experiments and cruelty — a silent 
tortured monkey slipping toward death.  
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It is unclear from this point on if the scientist himself slips into a psychosis of 
remorse or if the monkey does actually become more human. What is evident is that the 
tone and the language of the story shifts from clinical, medicalized, experimental terms to 
a more mystical tone sympathetic to the trials the monkey and his species must have 
faced:  
Mas, a pesar de le mansedumbre que el progreso de la enfermedad 
aumentaba en él, su silencio, aquel desesperante silencio provocado por mi 
exasperación, no cedía. Desde un obscuro fondo de tradición petrificada 
en instinto, la raza imponía su milenario mutismo al animal, 
fortaleciéndose de voluntad atávica en las raíces mismas de su ser. Los 
antiguos hombres de la selva, que forzó al silencio, es decir al suicidio 
intelectual, quién sabe qué bárbara injusticia mantenían su secreto 
formado por misterios de bosque y abismos de prehistoria, en aquella 
decisión ya inconsciente, pero formidable con la inmensidad de su tiempo. 
(207-208)23  
This passage takes on a new tone of compassion for the creature. No longer a clinical 
description of the function of the monkey’s mouth, instead a contemplation on the archaic 
relationships between species and speculation on the kind of brutality that would lead to a 
purposeful abdication of language. Like Blavatsky’s seven forms of human “some 
evolving away from humanity as we know it,” Yzur and his species had divested 
                                                       
23 From some deep well of evolutionary habit, which the eons had petrified into instinct, his race imposed 
its millennial mutism on the animal, fortifying an atavistic will at the very roots of his being. The primal 
men of the jungle, subdued and forced into silence – which is to say intellectual suicide – by who knows 
what barbarous injustice, kept their secret; forest mysteries formed in the abysses of prehistory, and 
spanning measureless oceans of time, still held in the thrall of the dark unconscious of this chimpanzee. 
(109) 
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themselves from the “grosser parts” of humanity. Speech was the bond that tied the 
anthropoids to man and to the oppressive work that man required of them. Breaking that 
bond releases them back into the safety of silence and distance from humans. There is the 
trace of multidirectional theosophist evolution in the delusional ponderings of the 
scientist/narrator. The choice to remain silent and relinquish this “higher bond” is not 
possible in Darwinian evolution.  
Lugones’s shift to this alternate discourse in the latter half of the story is in 
opposition to the highly rational and logical experimentation at the beginning of the text. 
Although the narrator seems to now feel more compassion towards Yzur and to examine 
the monkey’s long history of oppression, he is blind to his own propagation of violence. 
As soon as Yzur shows signs of returning to speech, the scientist replicates this 
millennia-old pattern of violence. Although the narrator laments the species’ need to 
break the common bond of speech that linked them to humans as a way to retain their 
dignity in the face of degradation and slavery at the hands of the ancient human race 
(209), he replicates this same pattern, beating Yzur back into silence. The secret that the 
scientist fears Yzur will take to the grave is that he has learned to speak, but refuses to. 
This suspicion is what fuels the scientist’s rage and that plagues his mind as he continues 
his brutal lessons with the monkey day after day.  
His rage and paranoia stand on the brink of psychosis and the narrative begins to 
break down, becoming ever more clouded by the narrator’s imbalance. On the day of 
Yzur’s death the scientist wakes after a bout with fever to find the monkey in the process 
of dying.  
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El mono, con los ojos muy abiertos, se moría definitivamente aquella vez, 
y su expresión era tan humana, que me infundió horror; pero su mano, sus 
ojos, me atraían con tanta elocuencia hacia él, que hube de inclinarme 
inmediato a su rostro; y entonces, con su último suspiro, el último suspiro 
que coronaba y desvanecía a la vez me esperanza, brotaron –estoy seguro– 
brotaron en un murmullo (¿cómo explicar el tono de una voz que ha 
permanecido sin hablar diez mil siglos!) estas palabras cuya humanidad 
reconciliaba las especies: –AMO, AGUA, AMO, MI AMO…(209)24 
With his last breath, Yzur repeats a version of the words that the scientist would say at 
the end of all of their lessons “yo soy tu amo[…]tú eres mi mono” (207).25 Broken and 
dying, the monkey replicates this phrase of ownership either resigning himself to his fate, 
or desperately asking his master for water that might alleviate his suffering. This moment 
of total vulnerability is the one in which the scientist sees Yzur as the most human, so 
human in fact that the monkey’s uncanny face is horrifying to the man and it is at this 
most human of moments that Yzur begins to speak.  
Yet, this moment that seems to function as a vindication for the scientist is 
marked by a more sinister undertone. The narrator has just awoken, there are no 
witnesses to this event, and the words themselves are unclear as they are uttered by an 
untrained voice silenced for a millennia. The string of sounds that make up this sentence 
                                                       
24 The monkey, with his eyes wide open, was definitively dying this time, and his expression was so human 
that it filled me with horror, but his hand, his eyes, drew me towards him with such eloquence that I 
immediately drew close to his face; and then, with his last breath, the last breath that rose and faded at the 
same time it gave me hope, they broke –I’m sure – they broke out in a murmur (how can one explain the 
tone of a voice that had existed without speaking for ten thousand centuries?) these words whose humanity 
reconciled the species: –Master, water, master, my master. 
 
25 I am your master…you are my monkey 
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with its open vowel sounds and lack of strong consonants, are the most basic of speech 
elements and could be construed as simply a dying groan without any substance or 
linguistic complexity (H. Fraser 17). This “sentence” is very similar to Eliza Doolittle’s 
groan “Ah-ah-ah-ow-ow-ow-oo!” in Pygmalion, a marker that Bernard Shaw uses in 
moments when Eliza has slipped to the lowest rungs of society. Yet, the narrator in 
“Yzur” hears them as a fully articulated sentence, a validation of all he has worked for. 
These words would be the total culmination of his efforts, not just to teach the monkey to 
speech, but also to make him more human. The repetition of the scientist’s own words 
would reaffirm this hierarchy and mark the monkey’s total subjugation. Therefore, the 
phrase Yzur utters represents the perfect result for the scientist’s experiments, and in his 
deep desire for success, his report of these findings cannot be trusted.  
The uncertainties about the scientist’s mental state as well as the ambiguity of the 
phrase itself are hallmarks of the fantastic genre. This text sits on the borderline between 
science fiction and the fantastic. Whereas science fiction often requires that the world is a 
rational one within the logic of the story even if it is an unfamiliar realm for the reader, 
literature of the fantastic has an element of undecidability. There are elements that cannot 
be explained in either the logic of the story, or in that of the reader’s world. The 
ambiguity is often achieved either through omissions, unreliable narrators, or elisions. In 
this case, Lugones undercuts the authority of the narrator at every turn and the reader 
becomes aware of the narrator’s myopia and brutality that denies him the ability to 
narrate his story without creating a sense of doubt.  
If speech can elevate a monkey to human status, then language also adds 
complexity to the emotional and psychological capacity of the monkey. What then can 
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language do to advance the human, the organism already at the top of the food chain? 
The next advancement would be to the level of a creator, a god, one who can see outside 
human limits. To elevate man to the status of a god, language would need to go beyond 
human understanding to unlock a new level of consciousness. In “La fuerza omega,” 
which appears in the same collection as “Yzur,” a scientist attempts to find the perfect 
harmony of the human voice. His experiments that begin as mere larks or investigations, 
result in the creation of a powerful machine that can harness the secret chords of 
language into a direct stream of energy that can break down any form of matter that 
surrounds it. In Lugones’s formulation, the power the scientist unleashes is one that 
human consciousness is not yet prepared to handle and a power that has been revealed 
too soon.  
In “La fuerza omega,” The narrator is an objective observer, placed in the story to 
add authenticity to the reporting of events. He shares the reader’s skepticism about the 
extraordinary events that are about to unfold and acts as a mediator between the 
seemingly impossible and the plausible, creating the tension between the known and the 
unknown, characteristic of the fantastic genre. When both the scientific and the fantastic 
solution feel equally plausible, the scientific loses some of its cultural authority and its 
claim to reason. The presence of the skeptic asks the questions the modern reader would 
want to know in his place, attempting to disprove the seemingly crazy theories of the 
pseudo-scientist. If even the skeptic is convinced in the narrative, then the reader has little 
choice but to hold out the possibility for the fantastic to be true. 
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With this narrator as a guide, we are introduced to the scientist who claims to 
have “descubierto la potencia mecánica del sonido”(100).26 Sound is once again the 
central point, this time not only as a marker of human, but also as an innately mechanical 
force. The scientist is known to his friends to have often built small inventions like coffee 
grinders and machines to collect streetcar fares yet had never patented them or attempted 
to sell his inventions (97). Instead, the creative process is what drives him and occupies 
his mind. As a tinkerer, and lay inventor, his knowledge base is wide and pulls on 
information from diverse sources. This narrator is, according to Beatriz Sarlo, more in 
line with the ideas of the general populace than the modernista writers. She identifies a 
current in Argentine popular culture in this era that embraces technology as a 
democratizing force. Many technological innovations like the radio were inventions that 
could be cobbled together by the average citizen with spare parts, a few tools and a little 
bit of insight. As evidenced by the numerous articles and images in popular culture and 
mass circulated magazines like Caras y Caretas, there was an enormous interest in 
consuming information about new scientific ideas. Many thought that “technological 
wonders would bring about progress and a social paradise did not mean hurtling into an 
abyss of authoritarian scientific rationality but rather throwing the doors open to a 
homogeneous, well-balanced society” (Sarlo 73).  
Sarlo’s account changes the image of technology from the modernista vision of 
repression and social order imposed on the population, to one of excitement and promise 
for the future. This distinction places Lugones apart from mass culture and distanced 
from this democratized future. Lugones speaks from a position above the general 
readership. He saw modernismo as harnessing a particular power to discern and 
                                                       
26 discovered the mechanical potential of sound 
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disseminate culture to the masses and he would later turn to fascism as a viable political 
position. In his early years, Lugones was a radical Marxist in his political thinking. He 
rejected traditional Marxism as a continuation of the liberalism and rationalism of the 
West and by the time of his suicide in 1938, he had shifted his views to a form of fascism 
in which a national army would replace the proletariat as the seat of rebellion against 
imperialism and economic intrusion. As Alberto Spektorowski notes, “Lugones was 
representative of this new revolutionary fascist synthesis which combined industrial 
modernization with national integration, introducing a direct theoretical connection 
between economic anti-imperialism and the revolution of the right” (82-83). This 
distance between the populace evidenced in his aesthetics, plays out in his political life in 
a pattern followed by a number of modernists both in Latin America and Europe.  
Lugones articulates this position in “La fuerza omega,” and writes from a place of 
anxiety and mistrust of this kind of democratic social order built by the masses. In the 
story, the objective narrator becomes acquainted with the scientist through a conversation 
about occult sciences, in which, though they disagree on the validity of these theories, 
they share a sense of scorn for the general populous who hang on to dogmatic ideas and 
are not open to new knowledge (98). Science, the official arbiter of knowledge for these 
men, carries authority and information that the general populous could not possibly 
understand. They believe the average citizen to be mystified by new ideas and blinded by 
theology that makes them cling to outdated dogmas. While the inventor in the story 
believes in occult theories, based in arcane mythologies and ancient epistemologies, he 
views these to be more informed and more powerful than even science. Therefore, he is 
at an even further remove from the general population than the scientist narrator.  
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As the inventor explains, these occult theories are at the base of his latest 
invention. In order to find sound waves he can manipulate he turns to the myth of 
Orpheus to determine the proper proportional progression of sounds that he needs: 
Eran el do-fa-sol-do, que según la tradición antigua constituían la lira de 
Orfeo, y que contienen los intervalos más importantes de la declamación, 
es decir el secreto musical de la voz humana. La relación de estas ondas es 
matemáticamente 1, 4/3,3/2,2; y arrancada de la naturaleza, sin un 
agregado o deformación que las altere, son también una fuerza original. 
(106)27  
His explanation is an interesting conflation of occult knowledge and contemporary 
theories of ether, waves and energy. In mapping a mathematical explanation of this 
legendary harmony, he essentially “proves” not only the existence of this divine harmony 
of the human voice, but uses new scientific theories to bend it to his will. This concept 
comes to him all at once, as if by some divine inspiration, while he was modifying 
gramophone discs as way to test the harmonies of the human voice without the use of a 
piano, but instead with direct perception. Instead of creating a special tuning fork as was 
his original goal, he harnesses the harmonies of the human voice to collapse their specific 
energy waves so he can direct and expel the wave like an “etheric missile” (77). He has 
created a weapon from Orpheus’ tone.  
 This notion of Orphic harmony has a particular resonance for modernistas of the 
era. As Ricardo Gullón explains, modernismo used the conception of a universal rhythm 
                                                       
27 There were the do, fa, sol, do, that, according to ancient tradition, constituted the lyre of Orpheus, and 
which contained the most important rhythmic unites of declamation, which is to say, the musical secret of 
the human voice. The relationship of these waves mathematically is 1, 4/3, 3/2, 2; and, transcending nature, 
invulnerable to adulteration or deformity, they also, are an immanent force. (76) 
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and meter as a central idea in its poetics, wherein harmony and rhythm function as the 
key principles of beauty (15). The idea draws on a much older idea of harmony and meter 
with its basis in mathematics. In articulating their concept of harmony, the modernistas 
compounded a number of sources including Pythagoras and the Orpheus myth to 
construct a theory of harmony that poets were particularly adept at harnessing and 
hearing in the world. According to Gullón: 
…la armonía es fecunda porque implica un acto de amor, un conocimiento 
de lo que está fuera de nosotros y de lo que no somos nosotros. Si una 
partícula del universo nos entrega su secreto, el universo entero empezará 
a hacerse inteligible. Por su receptividad, por su actitud para integrarse e 
identificarse con las cosas, es el poeta quien mejor puede poseerlas, 
dejándose poseer por ellas. El mismo Valle decía: “donde los demás 
hombres sólo hallan diferenciaciones, los poetas descubren enlaces 
luminosos de una armonía oculta”, y para describir esa operación de 
comprensión e identificación utiliza una imagen cuya procedencia salta a 
la vista; “transmigrar en el Alma del Mundo.” (23)28 
Embedded in this idea of universal harmony and the Soul of the World, is the notion that 
with enough information, the entire universe is knowable. If one listens properly and can 
find a way to tap into the great unconscious of the universe, there are elements of the 
world unseen by ordinary man, but available for those who seek it, particularly the poers 
                                                       
28 The harmony is fecund because it implies an act of love, a knowledge of that which is outside of us and 
that which is not of us. If one particle of the universe reveals to us its secret, the entire universe will begin 
to make itself intelligible. For his receptivity, for his aptitude for integrating himself and identifying 
himself with things, it is the poet who is best able to possess them and allowing themselves to be possessed 
by them. Valle tells us the same thing when all the rest of men only find differences, poets discover 
luminous links of occult harmony, and in order to describe this operation of comprehension and 
identification he utilizes an image whose precedence jumps into view; “to transmigrate in the Soul of the 
World.  
  
 108 
and the seers who are more receptive to learning and hearing the mysteries of the world. 
An age-old concept, it reaches from the Delphic Oracle to the music of the spheres, to 
Newtonian physics. In the modernista era, it was a concept facing a real challenge in the 
public imagination. Recent advancements in physics had begun to overturn these ideas of 
a deterministic, predictable world.  
 This sentiment of a universal harmony and a knowable universe is one that 
meshed with ideas of science in the 18th and 19th centuries. In 1795 mathematician Pierre-
Simon Laplace gave a lecture that articulated scientific determinism and probability in a 
way that mirrors these same concepts. For him, the universe is a chain of causes and 
effects. In the often-cited passage from his work Philosophical Essays on Probabilities 
explains the kind of universal intellect described in theories of modernismo: 
We ought then to consider the present state of the universe as the effect of 
its previous state and as the cause of that which is to follow. An 
intelligence that, at a given instant, could comprehend all the forces by 
which nature is animated and the respective situation of the beings that 
make it up, if moreover it were vast enough to submit these data to 
analysis, would encompass in the same formula the movements of the 
greatest bodies of the universe and those of the lightest atoms. For such an 
intelligence nothing would be uncertain, and the future, like the past, 
would be open to its eyes. The human mind affords, in the perfection that 
it has been able to give to astronomy, a feeble likeness of this intelligence. 
(2) 
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This idea that finds its root in Newton’s Philosophae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, 
posits that if one could understand one element of the universe completely, then through 
deduction and analogy one could understand all other parts of the universe. There is still 
space here for an intelligence greater than the human, something with the capacity to 
process the vast data and information that would come from this knowledge. Laplace 
asserts: “All these efforts in the search for truth tend to lead the mind continually towards 
the intelligence we have just mentioned, although it will always remain infinitely distant 
from this intelligence. This tendency, peculiar to the human race, is what makes it 
superior to the animals; and their progress in this respect distinguishes nations and ages, 
and constitutes real glory” (3). The pursuit of this greater intelligence is a very human 
activity even though this intelligence is always out of reach. For the modernistas, this 
human pursuit was one that was worthy of salvation in the face of increasing pressures 
from modern developments in science that would remove this space for contemplating 
the divine or the infinite.  
Developments in early 20th century physics begin to undo this notion of a 
knowable universe that operates on general laws and that can be replicated and verified. 
In 1924, Werner Heisenberg complicates this notion of predictability with his 
“uncertainty principle.” Along with realizations of knowing that one thing can 
encapsulate disparate features simultaneously, there are more far-reaching 
realizations that there are aspects of the universe that do not have solutions, things 
that cannot be determined absolutely, and there are concepts that can have no 
empirical solution. Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle asserts that there is no way 
to ascertain both the position and the momentum of an electron. Observing things 
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requires being able to see. Seeing requires light to bounce off an object and be 
received by the eyes. Due to the microscopic size of the electron, viewing it 
involves using gamma ray microscope. The energy used by the microscope to view 
the electron disrupts it. Therefore, by attempting to observe the particle, the viewer 
has fundamentally changed the particle’s actions (Gribbin 156). The ramifications 
of such a statement explode the Newtonian idea that we could “predict the entire 
course of the future if we knew the position and momentum of every particle in the 
universe” (Gribbin 157). Since man cannot know the position and momentum of 
even one particle it is impossible to know the course of what this particle will do in 
the future. In this new conception, the universe is still vast and mysterious, but in 
removing the space for knowability, the place of the human and the potential of human 
intelligence to ascertain the boundaries of such a universe become much smaller. 
Therefore, the poet, the seer, the antenna of the race, is no longer needed if the universe 
can no longer communicate a cohesive message. Modernismo acts to retain this space, 
reformulated for a modern existence that must acknowledge science, but safeguard the 
place for the human.  
 The voice, a uniquely human possession, functions as an arena for this battle 
between material science and humanist aesthetics in modernista texts. Benjamin Fraser 
suggests that sound, and the voice function both metaphorically and structurally in this 
era to reconcile a universalist sentiment with the modern:  
… el sonido demuestra la preocupación del modernismo por la 
musicalidad como elemento estructurante formal, como símbolo o como 
vía reconciliadora universal – y por extraño que sea, falta algo para 
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completar el pensamiento que indaga en el sonido como significado, como 
referente, como contenido, como tema. (795)29 
Rhythm, meter and rhyme are all functions of sound in poetry and have historically been 
the foundations of a universal harmony. Extrapolating that use into prose, sound retains 
that possibility of unification and wholeness, as evidenced in Lugones’s linking of 
emotion to speech in “Yzur” and his use of Orpheus’ lyre as a catalyst for 
experimentation in “La fuerza omega.”  
Lugones exploits this shifting ground with his Omega Force, splicing together 
these older notions of physics with contemporary ones to create an unstable narrative. In 
order to give more credence to the possibility of a machine that can manipulate sound 
waves and the harmony of the human voice, Lugones’s scientist extensively cites 
contemporary advances in physics, which, to the ordinary citizen, might seem equally 
plausible as this fictional machine.  
Es un gran hallazgo, ciertamente, pero no superior a la onda hertziana o al 
rayo Roentgen. A propósito – yo he puesto también un nombre a mi 
fuerza. Y como ella es la última en la síntesis vibratoria cuyos 
componentes son el calor, la luz, y la electricidad – la he llamado la fuerza 
Omega. (100)30 
The scientist puts his own invention in line with the Roentgen ray (a precursor to the X-
Ray) and the Hertzian wave. These theories are examples in advancements in wave 
                                                       
29 Sound demonstrates modernismo’s preoccupation with musicality as a formal, structural element, as a 
symbol, or as a universal road of reconciliation – and strange as it seems, lacks something to complete the 
ideas that explores sounds as signified, as a referent, as content, as a theme.  
 
30 It is a great achievement, certainly, but not superior to the Hertzian wave or the Roentgen ray. By the 
way, I have also given a name to my force. And as it is the ultimate in the synthesis of vibration whose 
components are heat, light and electricity – I have called it the Omega Force.  
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theory and experiments in the electromagnetic qualities of light. Lugones was well read 
on these subjects and well-versed in the most recent developments in these fields. His 
knowledge allows him to tread the careful line between the fantastic and the plausible. 
In the general populous, rather than produce skepticism about prior beliefs in the 
same way ideas of electricity explained lightning to exclude folk tales of gods throwing 
lightning bolts, these experiments in physics reopened old discussions of older beliefs 
that now corresponded to scientific possibilities (Sarlo 130). For instance, Charles 
Lallemand, vice-president of the Academy of Sciences in Paris reformulated on of Jean-
Marie Charcot’s theories in 1925 that likened thought to a vibration. Therefore, like any 
other vibration, it could pass from one mind to the other “physiologically harmonized” 
with the first. Starting from commonly accepted ideas of vibration, Lallemand, a well-
respected man of science in a position of authority, opens the possibility for thinking of 
ESP and telepathy as real objects of study and as possible phenomena in the world 
(Gasparini 182).  
This logic is little different from the scientist in Lugones’ story. If heat, light, and 
electricity are all forms of wave energy, then it stands to reason that sound waves 
function similarly and can be harnessed in the same way. The scientist’s device is made 
of four tiny tuning forks with a filament stretched between them that connect to a 
trumpet-like microphone. When he presses a lever the machine forms a quadruple wave 
from the tuning forks that is expelled through the microphone in a burst of “dynamic 
ether” (107). As he explains to his observers, this energy is potentially lethal: “Si la onda 
va al centro molecular del cuerpo, éste se desintegra en partículas impalpables. Si no, lo 
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perfora con un agujerillo enteramente imperceptible” (107).31 While the scientist’s initial 
demonstration to show the effects of the ray’s friction on a disc fails, he manages to turn 
a paving stone in the doorway and bands of steel into dust. 
In this utilization of sound based on the most perfect harmony of the human 
voice, it is notable that the machine makes no discernible noise. The narrator and the 
other spectator watch the demonstration with trepidation as they are surrounded by an 
uncanny sound: 
El botón comenzó a actuar con ruidecito intermitente y seco, ante nuestra 
curiosidad todavía incrédula; y como el silencio era grande, percibimos 
apenas una aguda estridencia, análoga al zumbido de un insecto…La 
maciza rueda no era más que un sombra vaga, semejante al ala de un 
colibrí en suspensión, y el aire desplazado por ella provocaba un torbellino 
dentro del cuarto. (107)32  
Its force is so strong it shakes the house and sends the neighbors running in to see what 
the disturbance is. The sound itself is so profound it is beyond human hearing, producing 
a deafening silence. The presence of this all encompassing sound is also the absence of 
sound turning sound into pure energy. The sheer magnitude and power of this force, 
reaffirms the mystic power of the Orphic chord. To know the chord and unleash it on the 
world releases a tremendous and terrifying power, one that the human who unleashed it 
cannot control. 
                                                       
31 If the wave travels to the molecular nucleus of a body, it disintegrates the nucleus into impalpable 
particle. If not, it will perforate the body with an almost imperceptible little hole. (77) 
 
32 The lever was engaged and the cylinder began to actuate with a dry, intermittent whirr. Our curiosity was 
exceeded only by incredulity an, so momentous was the silence, that we could barely discern a strident 
keening, resembling the buzzing of an insect…The massive noise was no more than an errant shadow, like 
the sound made by the wings of a hovering hummingbird, and the air it displaced provoked a whirlwind 
inside the room. (77) 
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 Sound carries this same enormous power in Blavatsky’s theosophical writing and 
figures prominently in The Secret Doctrine as a powerful force of both creation and 
destruction.  
We may say that SOUND, for one thing, is a tremendous Occult power; 
that it is a stupendous force, of which the electricity generated by a million 
of Niagaras could never counteract the smallest potentiality when directed 
with occult knowledge. Sound may be produced of such a nature that the 
pyramid of Cheops would be raised in the air, or that a dying man, nay, 
one at his last breath, would be revived and filled with new energy and 
vigour…For Sound generates, or rather attracts together, the elements that 
produce an ozone, the fabrication of which is beyond chemistry, but within 
the limits of Alchemy. (Qtd in B. Fraser 796) 
In Blavatsky’s view sound contains untapped potential as an energy force. Moving far 
beyond the audible, sound has the power to move mountains and reanimate bodies. As 
the unifying force of all forces, it brings together other elements into a more powerful 
force, but only with the help of Occult knowledge. Here again there is a conflation of 
contemporary ideas of science with the reference to hydroelectric power from Niagara 
and to ozone and the occult. The use of sound as a malleable tool is very similar to 
Lugones’ application in “La fuerza omega.” Also, like Lugones’ scientist who is the only 
one who can unlock the power of his machine, the theosophist has the knowledge to 
advance the comparatively paltry discoveries of modern science to new heights by 
combining ancient knowledge with new.  
 The similarity between Lugones’ use of sound and Blavatsky’s would seem to 
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indicate an allegiance and promotion of this particular world view, yet the scientist in 
Lugones’ story meets his demise at the hands of the very machine he has built. The 
narrator and the other witness to the experiment come back to the scientist’s house and 
find a grisly scene:  
La autopsia confirmó su dicho, certificando una nueva maravilla del 
portentoso aparato. Efectivamente, la cabeza de nuestro pobre amigo 
estaba vacía, sin un átomo de sesos. El proyectil eterno, quien sabe por 
qué rareza de dirección o por qué descuido, había desintegrado el cerebro, 
proyectándolo en explosión atómica a través de los poros de su cráneo. 
(109)33 
Brain matter has ended up on the walls of the laboratory while the scientist’s skull 
remains intact. His death supports his claims that the machine can disrupt atoms on the 
smallest scale, and also displays the machine’s capacity as a weapon. While alive, the 
scientist had never wanted to test it on animals as one of his more pragmatic and 
materialist friends had suggested. He never wanted to use it to inflict pain, but rather to 
unlock the hidden potentials of sound and the harmonies of the human voice. Once this 
knowledge is released on the world, however, the scientist no longer has control of its 
uses and its deadly precision is clearly one that could be applied to a number of nefarious 
uses. As Luis Cano notes, this trope of the death of the semi-sane narrator is common in 
early works of science fiction and the fantastic as a way to contain these technologies 
from being replicated (110). As is the case here, the scientist is unsure as to how exactly 
                                                       
33 The autopsy confirmed what he had said, verifying a new capacity for the portentous apparatus. 
Evidently, the head of our poor friend had emptied; not an atom of brains was left. The etheric projectile, 
who knows by what freak of direction or by what carelessness, had disintegrated his cerebellum, expelling 
it in an atomic explosion through the pores of his skull. (77) 
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his machine functions, and no one but him can operate it. Therefore, the machine dies 
with the man.  
While the machine proves successful and demonstrates the validity of both the 
scientist’s and therefore theosophy’s claims about the power of sound, the scientist does 
not survive his experiment. Often in science fiction stories, killing off the scientist 
functions as a punishment or moral corrective when the scientist has crossed a limit, 
stepping outside the regulated bounds of experimentation (Haywood Ferreira 139). These 
endings condemn those who try to “play god” censuring them through the malfunctioning 
an invention or through the catastrophic consequences of their actions. In this case, the 
story resists a simple critique or condemnation of science or theosophy. The extensive 
scientific citations that explain the genealogy of the experiment give authority to science 
while the theosophical tenets work in tandem with the scientific method to produce the 
desired results. The aim of the text appears two fold: first, to convert the narrator’s strict 
sense of “proper” science with a faith in materialism to include a respect for more 
mystical thinking; and second to censure the inventor for his arrogance at attempting to 
harness these mysteries and apply them for his own ends. His is not a dismissal of science 
out of hand, but a more complex critique of the limits and morals between science, 
mysticism, and the human.  
In these two stories the voice is figured as a powerful and unifying force and to 
tamper with it results in disturbing consequences. As is true with Pygmalion, voice is the 
most powerful when linked to an appropriate body and not removed, falsified, or trained. 
When the connection between speaker and authentic voice is broken, a crucial element of 
the speaker’s selfhood is lost. In “Yzur,” the reverse proves true. Returning the voice to 
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the speaker after millennia of absence alters the monkey’s relation to the outside world. 
The addition of the voice creates an unsettling new awareness of the sadness and weight 
of the world now articulated through language. Both works reaffirm speech as the seat of 
the soul, an attribute that defines, shapes, and molds the individual. Without 
acknowledging this deep-rooted connection between spirit and speech, any attempt to 
change this relation will lead to failure. This same anxiety is present in some of the more 
conservative factions of posthumanism that see the increasing influx of data as semi-
sentient and mediation through technology as a breakdown of intrinsically human 
elements (Hayles 277). These fears are cyclical and reoccur in moments of perceive 
threat at the hands of leaps in technological advancement.  
While “La fuerza omega” also turns on ideas of the voice, its trajectory moves in 
a different direction that pulls Lugones toward the future trends in literature. His 
incorporation of modern physics and contemporary ideas of science warns of the 
potential to use science as a weapon. Placing the purest harmony of the human voice at 
the center of this examination implicates the human in the modern project. As science 
advances, if there is no regard for the subject, the alteration of the human space within the 
discourse of science, there is the danger of turning advancements against the subject 
itself. Theosophy is an attempt to maintain that distance, but the rapid advancements in 
science and technology in the next decades would be too much to keep at bay. By the 
1930s Lugones’ vision had become a reality with technology completing the separation 
of voice from the body. 
Lugones is just one example of a thinker of this era who uses the discourse of 
theosophy to counter the dominating narrative of materialism. Argentina’s history of 
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public scientific debate through literature, and in publications like Caras y Caretas and 
Philadelphia, provide the space for this kind of dialogue to begin in South America. 
Though Lugones was one of the first, he was certainly not the last to mix spiritualism 
with modern fiction, a combination that leads to the development of literature of the 
fantastic and later magical realism in South America. These new forms attempt to capture 
the unique perspective of Latin America and offer an alternative concept of time, 
narration and the use of science. By the 1920s and 30s, Lugones’ world in which the 
occult could exist alongside of modern science had eroded. Mexican author Jaime Torres 
Bodet writes of the dissolution of the mystical world in his novel Proserpina rescatada. 
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CHAPTER IV 
AURAL REPRESENTATION AND THE MODERN SENSORIUM IN JAIME 
TORRES BODET’S PROSERPINA RESCATADA AND “PARÁLISIS” 
 
While Mary Pickford and Douglas Fairbanks graced American screens in the 
1920s and 30s, the Mexican film industry was a booming enterprise. With the likes of 
Delores del Río on camera and visionaries like Luis Buñuel behind it, the spectacle of 
moving images captured the imagination of the public. Within a few decades cinema had 
moved from photography to zoetropes to feature films. In this progression, film moves 
from silent to sounded, bringing together the previously isolated gramophone to the 
cinematograph combining sound and film dynamically. Yet in these early days, the 
recombination of image and sound is not an easy one, often creating a discontinuous, 
asynchronous effect. Sound technology in the 30s is unable to simultaneously record 
image and sound, leading to sound’s artificial removal from the mouth of the speaker 
followed by its recombination after filming. This disjunction calls attention to the new 
nature of speech, mediated through technology and converts this aspect of the human 
experience to one that can be captured, saved and replayed.  
The hyper-awareness of the presence of sound, and the now disembodied nature 
of the voice, opens new questions of representation and its changing nature in the 
mechanical world. This issue becomes a preoccupation not only for those looking to 
develop new modes of recording and playback, but also for authors and writers. The shift 
in the modern sensorium from a predominantly sight based configuration to one that has a 
heightened awareness of sound requires new modes of writing. Author Jaime Torres 
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Bodet writes both his novel Proserpina rescatada (1931) and his short story “Parálisis” 
(1928) in this same historical moment in the development of sounded cinema in Mexico. 
These two works experiment in building a more complex textual sensorium that can 
represent characters phonically as well as visually through auditory metaphors and 
through characters whose perspectives encompass three dimensions rather than the linear 
view that sight alone provides. These techniques are representative of a modern narrative 
sensibility that is forced to compete with the sights and sounds of the mechanized world. 
Though these texts are not about cinema or sound recording, they confront the 
problematic dislocation of body from voice, and representation from reality, that result 
from these technologies.  
The flood of technology that opens the door for vanguard experimentation in 
literature begins with the rapid industrialization in Mexico under the modernization 
project of Porfirio Díaz at the beginning of the twentieth century (1876-1910) that ushers 
in a wave mechanical innovations. These inventions significantly alter the way the 
populace perceives and interacts with the world around it, particularly in urban centers 
where modernization and mechanization are most concentrated. While these innovations 
are effective in moving into a new economic sphere, they come at the price of repressive 
social policies. Writers and artists largely retreat to the aesthetic space in opposition to 
the regulated sphere of efficiency, modernization and instrumentalization that is 
associated with the Porfirato. When this regime collapses and modernization becomes a 
way forward rather than a conservative space, these technologies are embraced in a new 
way, engaging with the new vanguard in literature and art in a way that was impossible 
under Díaz. In this new moment, technology can take on a different resonance and the 
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collapse of the Porfiriato and the ensuing revolution create a new discursive space that 
allows for the acceptance of these devices and advances as progressive additions to the 
vanguard’s project.  
Modernista Amado Nervo is representative of this initial hesitation toward 
technology as it began to encroach upon the literary sphere under the Díaz regime. He 
fears that the combined powers of the phonograph and the cinematograph would mean 
the demise of novels: “no more books; the phonograph will preserve the old extinguished 
voices in its dark urn; the cinematograph will reproduce prestigious lives” (Qtd. in Paz-
Soldán 2). In 1898, the machines take on an ominous tone for Nervo. The phonograph 
preserves dead voices, not in the optimism of its inventor Thomas Edison, who sees their 
preservation as a boon to history and posterity, but instead in terms of embalming, or 
entrapment, as if in a mausoleum. The voices of the dead echo forward into the future, 
while the cinematograph replicates the past, restoring and preserving the manufactured 
histories of the nation; an eventuality that is true of Diáz’ use of cinema to extol the 
virtues of his presidency and sing the praises of his dictatorship. In this formulation there 
is little room for text, in a world that is now a simulacrum of human experience preserved 
on celluloid and wax. For Nervo, technology is a destructive force that consumes the 
other media around it with books falling into obsolescence.  
The Contemporáneos, the literary group of which Torres Bodet was a founding 
member, inherit a broader sense of modern progress, one that embraces moving toward 
the future through technological, educational, and scientific advancements. At the same 
time, they also reject the most positivistic and materialist aspects of modernization that 
were hallmarks of the Díaz regime which had created an aesthetically, and morally, 
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bankrupt vision of the future in the embrace of pure capitalism like that in the United 
States. The Contemporáneos formed their group largely out of their connection to José 
Vasconcelos a major philosopher and thinker engaged with Mexican politics throughout 
the Revolution, and who later served as Minister of Education. Vasconcelos was also a 
founder of the Ateneo de Juventud, an intellectual movement that emerged in 1907. This 
group of intellectuals that included literary men, architects, painters, and doctors 
envisioned themselves as oppositional to the Porfiriato and rejected notions of positivism 
that were inherent in the modernizing project under Díaz in favor of a more humanistic 
approach (Legrás 37).  
The intellectual space that the Ateneistas occupy provides the scaffolding for the 
ascension of Francisco Madero, the presidential candidate who takes down Díaz’s 
government. Díaz finds an unlikely challenger in Madero. Small of stature, a vegetarian 
and slightly eccentric in his beliefs in spiritism, Madero provides an odd contrast to the 
authoritarian, military man. At the same time, he is from a landed, wealthy family that 
gives him credibility among Díaz’s constituents. In addition, his business reputation 
among his workers and his eye toward reform are able to tap into portions of the 
population who have been disenfranchised under Díaz. The Ateneistas are an important 
part of that contingent helping to mobilize the young intellectuals and university students 
in favor of Madero (Gonzales 72). Although Madero wins the election, the triumph is 
short lived. In the aftermath of his overthrow just a year later, the indigenous and peasant 
class supporters find themselves again outside the reach of any real reform, setting the 
stage for the Mexican Revolution which would see the rise of Pancho Villa and Emiliano 
Zapata to prominence and a rapid succession of governments through 1940.  
  
 123 
Vasconcelos’ politics of finding moral solutions to social problems and 
addressing the economic system that had disenfranchised large swaths of the Mexican 
populous are inline with the more liberal perspective of the Ateneistas (Legrás 39). 
Vasconcelos’s essay “La raza cósmica” exemplifies his politics when it comes to Latin 
America’s position on the world stage and in establishing a Latin American identity in 
opposition to the discourses of progress and evolution proffered by Anglo-Saxon rhetoric 
particularly as it came from the United States.  
Si, pues, somos antiguos geológicamente y también en lo que respecta a la 
tradición, ¿cómo podremos seguir aceptando esta ficción inventada por 
nuestros padres europeos, de la novedad de un continente que existía 
desde antes de que apareciese la tierra de donde procedían descubridores y 
reconquistadores? (6)34  
The imperial narrative of a single, linear trajectory of progress that sees white Anglo-
Saxon men as the endpoint of civilization does not hold up to any logical view of history, 
particularly on the continent that had seen the rise of such prolific civilizations long 
before the arrival of Europeans. Accepting the imperial narrative would mean accepting 
the definition of Latin America as backwards, primitive, and underdeveloped.  
Vasconcelos’s text aims to reverse this narrative to envision a future that is led by a more 
universal culture. The coming race would be more reflective of that in Latin America 
where races and cultures had mixed to form a new kind of peoples. In contrast to the 
United States’ policies of segregation and racial purity, the mixed, universal race 
                                                       
34 If we are, then, geologically ancient, as well as in respect to tradition, how can we still continue to accept 
this fiction invented by our European fathers, of the novelty of a continent that existed since before the 
appearance of the land from where they derived discoverers and reconquerors? (8) 
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advances civilization adding a creative and unique perspective, whereas the “purified” 
white race decays.  
Torres Bodet is an adherent of Vasconcelos’ politics, and at just nineteen, he 
serves as personal secretary for the older statesman (Karsen 8). He also runs the 
Secretariat of Public Education (SEP) with Vasconcelista principles and later serves as 
President Miguel Alemán’s ghostwriter in the late 1940s helping to restructure the 
constitution and end the socialist education implemented by President Cárdenas (Oropesa 
18). His position as a diplomat, bureaucrat, and author give shape to his role with the 
Contemporáneos. His vision for Mexico would help build the post-revolution nation and 
strengthen its artistic and educational profile on the world stage. In its combination of 
both local and universal aims, this literary movement is a key connector in examining the 
network of global modernity in the historical moment of this project. 
From the Ateneistas and Vasconcelos, the Contemporáneos inherit an intellectual 
position with a focus on education and raising Mexico’s prominence on an international 
scale. They form in the late 1920s as a “grupo sin grupo” (Gordon 1096) a loose 
association of writers and artists with a similar concern for creating a cosmopolitan vision 
for Mexican letters. They emerge on the literary scene along with a number of other 
vanguard groups including the more radical Estridentistas, a group whose hyper-
masculinist rhetoric and manifestoes are akin to Marinetti’s Futurists. In contrast to other 
young avant-gardes, as Henrique González Casanova describes them, they belong to the 
upper middle class, the group most effected by the Revolution creating the desire to form 
an aristocracy of thought and expression “una generación precoz, ingeniosa, y curiosa, 
desilusionada e intelectual, afanosa y escéptica, que pone en duda todos los valores 
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cuando más está creyendo en ellos” (Sheridan 15).35 In a tumultuous political era, these 
young artists were eager to engage with the changing political landscape. At the same 
time, this more cosmopolitan ideal carries with it an urban intellectual elite perspective 
that at times impedes the kind of reform most needed in the era. 
In the complex political structure of Mexico, the Ateneistas, and the 
Contemporáneos that follow them, are concerned largely with the urban Mexican 
experience and look outward toward the global community rather than engage with the 
principle issues of the revolution, i.e. agrarian policy, land use, and widespread, crippling 
poverty among the lower classes of Mexican society. Although they are reform minded it 
is a limited reform. This position can be seen in Vasconcelos’s condemnation of Villa 
and Zapata’s revolutionary tactics. 
After the death of Zapata, who was the disgrace of Zapatismo, there 
remained his best aides, the learned and the self-sacrificing; those who did 
not take land, or execute people with voluptuous pleasure, or participate in 
the excesses committed in the name of the revolution by many. (Qtd. in 
Parra 20) 
Though Vasconcelos has sympathy for the roots of revolution and the goals of the 
Zapatistas, the violent manner in which it was carried out was unpalatable for him. 
Politics, for Vasconcelos, is better served when it remains in the hands of the educated 
and the “civilized” rather than in the rough grasp of peasants like Villa and Zapata (Parra 
20). The class differential inherent in this commentary is what foregrounds the 
Contemporáneos’s outward looking stance that seeks to find new space for Mexican 
                                                       
35 A precocious, witty, and curious, generation, intellectual and disillusioned, eager and skeptical, calling 
into question all values when more are believing them. 
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letters and to engage with artists and writers from Europe and elsewhere in Latin America 
rather than writing novels or discourses on the revolution itself, which was the occupying 
motive of many other contemporary authors. Building the Mexican and Latin American 
profile on the world stage and promoting a humanistic path to reform through the 
betterment of the individual could, in turn, offer redress to the larger political problems of 
the Mexican state in flux. 
While he and many of the other vanguard figures were interested in the 
renovation of form, and participation in international ideas, the Contemporáneos were 
also attuned to the need for a Mexican culture on this world stage as represented by the 
nation’s cultural output in the form of literature and film. This attitude is present in 
Torres Bodet’s response to Ortega y Gasset’s essay “La deshumanización del arte.” In the 
essay, Ortega y Gasset expresses what he sees as the future of art in the ashes of the First 
World War and in the middle of years of strife on the European continent. He laments 
that art is progressively becoming less human, focused less on incorporating 
representations of life or experience and instead relying solely on the aesthetic for 
meaning.  
Aunque sea imposible un arte puro, no hay duda alguna de que cabe una 
tendencia a la purificación del arte. Esta tendencia llevará a una 
eliminación progresiva de los elementos humanos, demasiado humanos, 
que dominaban en la producción romántica y naturalista. Y en este 
proceso se llegará a un punto en que el contenido humano de la obra sea 
tan escaso que casi no se le vea. Entonces tendremos un objeto que sólo 
puede ser percibido por quien posea ese don peculiar de la sensibilidad 
  
 127 
artística. Sería un arte para artistas, y no para la masa de los hombres; será 
un arte de casta, y no demótico. (23)36  
The result of this dehumanized art is a rift between average citizens and those with a 
particular artistic sense as well as a bifurcation between art for the general populous and 
art made for those who have the capacity to understand it. In order to purify art into its 
most pristine, purely aesthetic form, art would have to be divorced from anything that 
might link it to the masses, to a base audience. This kind of art would move away from 
representations of the real or recognizable scenes of everyday life. The transition to this 
type of non-representational art can already be seen in the cubist and dada movements in 
art. Both movements distance themselves from connecting with the viewer and distort 
and reject traditional notions of art. This new “inhuman” art has within it a necessarily 
ironic turn which recognizes itself as only art, a work created for the sake of art and not 
for any transcendent meaning or inspiration (14). Ortega sees this trend as developing 
among the younger artists of the day, and though not endorsing it, he sees these 
characteristics emerging in music, the visual arts and in literature. Removing art from the 
vernacular leaves its demystification in the hands of artist/clerics who would possess an 
exclusive ability to understand, and comprehend the aesthetic value of art. 
 While these may have been the conditions in modern European art, it was not an 
analysis that fit Latin America at the time. Torres Bodet’s counter to this article reveals 
the foundational ideals of the Contemporáneos movement. Its cosmopolitan influences 
                                                       
36 Even though pure art may be impossible there doubtless can prevail a tendency toward a purification of 
art. Such a tendency would effect a progressive elimination of the human, all too human, elements 
predominant in romantic and naturalistic production. And in this process a point can be reached in which 
the human content has grown so thin that it is negligible. We then have an art which can be comprehended 
only by people possessed of the peculiar gift of artistic sensibility—an art for artists and not for the masses, 
for “quality” and not for hoi polloi. (“The Dehumanization of Art,” Trans. Helene Weyl 12) 
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are clear, yet the movement articulates a vision for Latin American art apart from that of 
Europe, and specific to its historical position in relation to its former colonizer.  
…los apuntes que Ortega ha ido obtenido como resultado de las 
observaciones emprendidas, con rara atención inteligente, a través de los 
diversos modos y temperaturas que el arte moderno ha instaurado en 
Europa. Y es así como en esta definición de los propósitos de la obra, 
encontramos la limitación de su espíritu. La Deshumanización del Arte es 
un libro europeo, con datos europeos, escrito para europeos. Podrá esta 
circunstancia ser un mérito más para el que la escribe, pero, de fijo, es un 
peligro para los jóvenes de América que no se atrevan a soñar aún un arte 
propio, libre de herencias sentimentales y de esclavitudes biológicas. 
(125)37 
Though Ortega’s analysis might fit well with European modes of artistic expression, 
Torres Bodet does not accept this vision as a universal one, especially not for young 
artists in Latin America only just beginning to conceptualize an independent art. For 
these artists, dehumanization is not on their horizon. They are trying to discern and create 
a new mode that can encompass their own reality rather than distancing themselves from 
the real or from the history of art. He agrees with Ortega’s notion that art has slipped in 
cultural relevancy and no longer holds the same prominence as it once did, but “no 
                                                       
37 The notes that Ortega has obtained as a result of observations taken with rare intelligent attention through 
various modes and temperatures that modern art has established in Europe. And so, as in this definition of 
the propositions in the work, we find limitation of its spirit. The Dehumanization of Art is a European 
book, with European data, written for Europeans. It could be that this circumstance is a merit more for the 
one who writes it, but, assuredly, it is a danger to the youth of America who have not even dared to dream 
of an itself, free of sentimental heirlooms and biological slavery.  
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aceptar[á] nunca la existencia de un arte invertido, sin raíces, sin ramas—sólo flor y 
aroma” (128-9).38 
From this position, Torres Bodet and the Contemporáneos aim to renovate 
Mexican literature in a way that would connect it to other vanguard movements while 
still differentiating it from Spain and from other Latin American literary endeavors. For 
Torres Bodet, this meant not a nationalist poetry like that of Argentina that he describes 
as filled with “ombú” trees and peasants sipping maté. “El esfuerzo más paciente no 
logrará, por cierto, en materia de color local, el resultado de una sola intuición 
desinteresada” (Torres Bodet C 119)39. Local color alone was not enough. Instead, poets 
and authors felt they needed to use their poetic eye to represent the world around them 
and their experiences as Mexicans. Likewise, it is not enough to resort to the same old 
fonts of literary inspirations like classicism and decadence as had Rubén Darío’s 
modernistas who dominated the preceding generation of authors. While the modernistas 
were also invested in placing Latin American literature on the global stage, their 
renovations were centered on philology and recreating a metaphorical content that could 
compete with European, particularly French literature in terms of density and complexity 
(González 21). In Torres Bodet’s view, these methods sacrifice reality to the symbolic: 
“las flores, en realidad gardenias, lirios o margaritas silvestres, aparecieron disfrazadas de 
rosas o de violetas, según se tratara de significar la hermosura o la modestia que son, 
como se sabe y es natural, aptitudes opuestas” (C 116).40 Rather than simply restructuring 
                                                       
38 He will never accept the existence of an inverted art, without roots, without branches—only flower and 
aroma. 
 
39 Local color material will not achieve the most patient force; the result of a disinterested feeling. 
 
40 The flowers, in reality, gardenias, lilies, or daisies, appeared disguised as roses or as violets, trying to 
signify beauty or modesty that are, as one knows and is natural, opposing aptitudes.  
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old metaphors into a regional context, his generation needs to find a new path that did not 
retreat into the symbols, rhythms, and structures of old, but that could resonate with the 
new realities of Mexican society and increase the visibility for Mexican letters. 
In his commitment to expanding Mexican letters on the world stage, Torres Bodet 
is a frequent contributor to Ortega y Gasset’s magazine. In 1929 he publishes “Parálisis” 
in Revista de occidente.  The journal brought together the most prominent writers and 
thinkers not only from Spain, but also from nations across Europe and Latin America. In 
its pages, essays by Albert Einstein, James Jeans and Arthur Schrodinger sit beside works 
by Waldo Frank, Wyndham Lewis, and Torres Bodet. It is a hub for the cosmopolitan 
exchange of ideas and circulation of materials in Spanish and a contact point for many of 
the intellectuals of the era. Torres Bodet is a frequent contributor and writes both 
“Parálisis” and  “La muerte de Proserpina,” while living in Madrid and in contact with 
the most prominent figures on the Spanish scene.  
“Parálisis” is an exploration of new modes of representation in an era where 
traditional notions of sense have been disrupted, Torres Bodet uses the trope of paralysis 
to isolate sound from sight and explore a narrative form that relies more heavily on 
metaphors of the ear than of the eye. In the story, the narrator has become paralyzed after 
an illness. He is bedridden and can no longer speak. All that remains in his world is the 
presence of his wife, Luisa. As he cannot turn his head to look at her, or leave his sick 
room on his own accord, the sound of her voice and of her movements become his only 
mode of perception. He longs for her to play the piano as she used to or spare him a few 
extra kind words, his ears straining on her every footfall building his entire mental world 
out of his domestic soundscape. Each of these familiar sounds from the noise of a spoon 
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in a teacup to how many steps Luisa takes to get to the garden deepen his imprisonment 
as he aches to reach out to her and break his tortured silence. 
De esa acumulación de los ruidos se hace, más profundo, nuestro 
completo silencio. ¡Cómo quisiera, para romperlo, poder decir algo en voz 
alta; mover la silla en que los demás suponen mi descanso; vaciar, del 
golpe de una mano sana, el contenido de las fracasos de tinturas y de 
cápsulas que la luz diagonal de la veladora dibuja en la pared! (148-9)41  
In his broken body, sound is the crucial element that connects him to the world and is the 
last remaining thread that links him to the living world. Yet, his inability to participate in 
it depends his isolation. His “único laboratorio vivo es la conciencia de Luisa” (151)42 
and without her he is completely alone.  
In his limited sensory world he compares his state to that of a child who is 
supposed to be sleeping listening to his parents hosting a party below, listening to the 
clatter of dishes and the laughter of the invited guests. “Con el pulso alterado, evoca el 
sabor de cada uno de los manjares que no prueba, reconstruye cada uno de los misterios 
de ese rito de que la enfermedad le priva, y goza, en el abandono de su pasajera orfandad, 
con las delicias que sólo le representa la imaginación” (147).43 While this rhetorical child 
presumably will rejoin the world downstairs, the narrator will not. As his proximity and 
                                                       
41 In that accumulation of sound, our complete silence becomes more profound. How I wish I could break 
it, to say something out loud, to move the chair in which others suppose I rest, to empty, with a strike from 
a healthy hand, the contents of the failed tinctures and capsules that the diagonal candlelight draws on the 
wall.  
 
42 Only living laboratory is Luisa’s consciousness. 
 
43 With an altered pulse, he evokes the flavor of each of the delicacies that he can’t try, reconstructing each 
of the mysteries of that ritual that illness keeps from him, and enjoys, in the abandonment of his passing 
orphanhood, with the delights that only his imagination can represent.  
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participation in life’s events dwindles, his imagination must compensate, yet by now his 
memories seem fleeting and without depth, like the constantly shifting images of  “los 
personajes de una película se continúan, se persiguen a si mismos, y desaparecen” 
(151).44 Flickering before him, these images are all his imagination can muster and like 
the images on film, they are a mere representation of the real. In this analogy there is a 
diaphanous quality to film, something ethereal and untethered to reality. The longer he 
exists without physical input, the more his own connection to reality erodes.   
As his separation from language and expression grows over time, the connection 
to the living world deteriorates. The narrator theorizes this loss citing William James’ 
theory of emotion. The theory reverses typical notions of response. According to James, 
the physiological reaction causes emotion, rather than the other way around (e.g. running 
from a bear triggers the emotional response of fear, rather than fear causing someone to 
run). If the physiological reaction shapes the emotional response, then it follows that 
someone without the ability to experience physical pain or pleasure will have only a 
limited ability to experience emotion. The narrator feels his emotional capacity slipping 
away beneath his immobile body.  
¡Si siquiera, muerta dentro de mis músculos la alegría de los movimientos 
perdidos, hubiese conservado la voz! Frente a la sombrea, ensayo—con la 
garganta inmóvil, con la lengua perezosa y amarga—algún sonido, y es 
como si, colocado ante un espejo, quisiera reconocerme dentro del óvalo 
de mi semblante paralizada. Sí, esos son los ojos míos, como el timbre de 
esa queja es mi voz; pero ¿qué fué de la inteligencia de la mirada que los 
iluminaba? Y de la otra inteligencia mayor de la voz, satisfecha de 
                                                       
44 …the characters of a film continue, pursue each other and disappear. 
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modelar las palabras con la arcilla de cada sonido suyo, hermoso y blando, 
¿qué ha quedado en esta informe sonoridad? (149-50)45  
Though his face is his own and his features remain unchanged, without the animation of 
the voice to bring forth expression, he sees only an emptiness and an unfamiliar self. For 
him, these elements cannot be replaced in silence. Without the physical capability to fully 
feel or embody his emotions; a part of his intellect is lost. The names and works of once 
loved authors float through his head in Luisa’s voice, as echoes and shadows of their 
former prominence in his mind. Without lips to smile or tears to cry his ability to feel, 
emotionally and physically he is eroding. His paralysis is “no sólo una enfermedad, una 
ineptitud física, sino también un límite de mi espíritu y un vicio de mi imaginación” 
(155).46  
 The atrophy of language denies a critical aspect of expression and here the 
narrator imagines a different form of art that would better capture his new mode of 
thinking and interpreting the world. For Torres Bodet the trope of paralysis isolates 
hearing in a way that highlights art’s dependence on vision. With vision removed, it is 
conceivable that a new art could be made specifically for the ear. As the narrator 
describes: 
Si pudiera hacerse el retrato de una persona para los oídos y no para los ojos, y 
alguien hiciera el de Luisa, este fondo sería el que más habría de convenirle. El 
                                                       
45 If only, dead in the joy of my muscles’ lost movements, my voice had been saved! Facing the shadows I 
attempt, with an immobile throat, with a lazy and bitter tongue, some sound, and it is as if, placed before a 
mirror, I would like to recognize myself in the oval of my paralyzed likeness. Yes, those are my eyes, like 
the timbre of that complaint is my voice, but what was of the understanding that they illuminated? And the 
other greater intelligence of the voice, satisfied with modeling words with the clay of its own sound, 
beautiful and soft, what had remained in this informed sound? 
 
46 Not only an illness, a physical ineptitude, but also a limit of my spirit and a defect of my imagination.  
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músico que aprovechara, así, la presencia de estos rumores para rodearla en el 
tiempo, superaría la inteligencia del pintor que, para situarla en el espacio, se 
sirviera sólo de la forma de los objetos que los producen. O ¿será que 
acostumbrado, por la inmovilidad, a adivinar, escuchándolos, el movimiento de 
los seres que me circundad, he llegado a preferir al calor y la realidad de sus 
acciones, el lenguaje en que el oído las traduce? (156)47  
Though Torres Bodet presents a complex art form that is difficult to imagine, the narrator 
has already become accustomed to it in his current physiological state. The inversion of 
sight for sound changes the nature of art and forces a new kind of perception. This new 
perception situates its object in both time and space rather than simply in space, as is the 
function of the painter thereby shifting the very nature of a portrait. The “musician” 
creating a portrait of sounds would be able to capture an additional level of 
representation. More than a symphony and not quite a film, a sound portrait would 
depend on conveying the sense of the object in three dimensions without the aid of the 
visual. In this new art, the reliance on the ear creates a soundscape that acts as scaffolding 
and support for all of the other senses. According to Michel Chion, “the presence of a 
human voice structures the sonic space that contains it” (5). That is to say, the human ear 
separates out the human voice from all other sounds in its acoustic space and orders all 
the rest as subordinate to the voice. For the narrator, his wife’s voice is the ordering 
principle in his immobile world.  He can imagine what his wife might be doing in the 
                                                       
47 If one could make a portrait of a person for the ears rather than for the eyes, and someone made one of 
Luisa, this would be the form that suits her best. The musician that takes advantage of the presence of the 
sounds that surround her in time, would surpass the intelligence of the painter who, in order to situate her in 
space, serves only the form of the objects he produces. Or will it be that I, the one who has become 
accustomed through immobility, to divine the movement of the beings that surround me by listening to 
them, that I have come to prefer to the heat and the reality of her actions, the language into which sound 
translates them? 
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house and how she might look by filling in the visual detail from the sound cues in his 
environment with her voice as the most crucial for establishing his orientation. The 
sounds of movement color his world and fill the void left by her visual inaccessibility. 
The story, however, holds open the possibility of accessing this kind of sensorium 
for those still equipped with sight and feeling, which in turn opens new possibilities for 
writing, particularly the novel. According to Ulrika Maude, literature has a long history 
of investment in sight ranging back to Aristotle and Plato’s linking of sight to reason. She 
asserts that scientific advancements and experiments in the nineteenth century further 
solidified this connection. Photography, x-rays and studies of motion like Etienne-Jules 
Marey’s experiments in stop motion photography, emphasize the visual while at the same 
time pointing out the limitations of the human eye without the aid of prosthetic 
technologies. Art then, aestheticizes the visual adding to the bodily experience of taking 
in the visual. “This can be evidenced, for instance, in the various movements in the visual 
arts that modernity has experience—impressionism, postimpressionism, expressionism—
that emphasize the manner in which human vision is tinged with emotion, memory and 
imagination” (Maude 122). Similarly, in the beginning of the twentieth century the 
advent of sound technologies like the telephone and the gramophone introduce 
technology for the ear creating a mediated presence of the voice artificially preserved. 
“[S]ound technologies function in a similar manner to visual technologies in that they can 
operate as a form of prosthetic memory; can reproduce various individuating and 
embodied qualities, but, as in the case of visual technologies, they also somewhat 
problematically suggest the body’s reconfiguration” (Maude 124). Prosthetic 
technologies augment the capability of the human body but also call attention to its 
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deficits and limitations. “Parálisis” dramatizes this reconfiguration calling attention to the 
failures of the body and the dependence of art and expression on vision is exaggerated 
through paralysis.  
In this narrative mode, the narrator’s memory, distanced from the actual presence 
of Luisa or the current state of the house, is the conduit for any visual description in the 
text. As he has no way to recover or record his memories, he must strain to absorb all of 
these acoustic details and Luisa is perpetually slipping out of his grasp. At the same time, 
she is in full control of the aural data he receives. By simply removing her shoes as she 
walks across the carpeted stairs, or closing the door to her husband’s sick room, she has 
the power to erase her presence, to render herself inaudible, and therefore invisible. 
Without the dominance of the male gaze, he has lost the ability to re-create Luisa in text 
and she remains elusive and represented only in fragments of sound. Even when she 
comes into view at the end of the text, he cannot narrate his experience. “¡Ay!, pero la 
palabra tierna que va a decirme, que todavía la indiferencia de su actitud me roba de 
antemano, ¿cómo hacer para que no la pronuncie ahora, para que no la pronuncie jamás?” 
(156).48 Luisa looks past him now with a sadness for their life that once was. Without 
language, his existence is entirely corporeal for Luisa and he has lost the vocabulary for 
his emotions. He cannot reassure her, comfort her, or deceive her into thinking things will 
one day return to as they were. She is left to tend only to his bodily needs rather than his 
emotional ones without an access point to this part of his existence.  
Although the story does not offer any real engagement with the politics of 
disability, it does provide a platform for an examination of dominant tropes of the senses 
                                                       
48 Ah, but the tender word that she was going to say to me, that the indifference of her attitude robbed from 
me in advance, how can I do that which I cannot pronounce to her now, that which I will never pronounce? 
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in literature. The trope of paralysis affords the space to isolate sound from sight and, in 
doing so Torres Bodet exposes the reliance of literature on imagery, and figurative 
language that privileges sight. In reconfiguring this space toward the aural, a sense 
equally difficult to represent in text, he creates a literature with an additional complexity. 
This possibility is one he further explores in his later novel Proserpina rescatada as a 
way to capture the modern world full of urban noises, sounded film, and machinery.  
Proserpina rescatada is, according to many critics, the most representative of the 
Contemporáneos’s prose style. Its engagement with technology, modernity and 
modernization, are indicative of the struggle of the arts to come to terms with a new 
mechanized world, while the structure of the novel, fragments connected via memory, is 
representative of experimental fiction in a post-revolution Mexico (D’Lugo 1). In the 
novel, Doctor Delfino Castro Valdes, receives a phone call from his old friend and lover 
Dolores “Proserpina” Jimenez asking him to help her end her life in the last stages of 
diabetes complications.  The novel takes place in the span of just twelve hours between 
the phone call and the moment he administers a fatal dose of morphine to Proserpina. The 
remainder of the novel is told in a series of Delfino’s memories as he reminisces about 
their time together from medical school on through their sporadic encounters in the 
ensuing years. Similar to “Parálisis” in which the narrator’s memory reconstructs his 
wife’s image from the memory of her presence, Delfino tries to imagine the present day 
Proserpina through pieces of memory. Delfino, despite being one of the few people in her 
life she is close to, has a difficult time piecing together the incongruencies and 
complexities of this woman.  
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The focus on memory stems from Torres Bodet’s belief that, “la mejor cualidad 
del novelista moderna estará pues, en su escrupulosa fidelidad a la memoria” 
(“Reflexiones” 14).49 He cites Proust and Kipling as examples of authors who intensify 
moments of plot or the tensions of the text not through straight description, but through 
memory and Proserpina rescatada draws the readers’ attention directly toward the 
mechanisms of memory. The novel’s structure relies on spontaneous flashbacks sparked 
by memory that connect the main characters, illuminate their relationship, and bring the 
past into contact with the present (Karsen JTB 73). The space between memory and 
reality is the constant tension in the novel as Delfino tries to connect the woman he once 
knew with the woman she has become. Through Delfino’s inability to conceptualize her, 
Torres Bodet shows the limitations of a purely positivistic, technologically mediated 
epistemology.  
 This concept of memory is the aspect most commented on by scholars of this 
book. Edelmira Ramírez Leyva, for instance, includes Proserpina in a survey of Torres 
Bodet’s narrative techniques in relation to memory in which she cites the author and the 
Contemporáneos as making possible a new mode of perceiving the world particularly by 
structuring description and narrative memory through contact with other forms of art 
(sculpture, photography, cinema etc) (67-73). Fernando Burgos cites the dissolution of 
memory in Proserpina as a symptom of the modern experience of fragmented time and 
that the reclamation of memory in its totality is an impossibility (143-4). Sonja Karsen 
draws further attention to Torres Bodet’s conceptions of time as they relate to memory, in 
that the flashbacks spawned by involuntary memory “fuse the past and the present which 
then become a moment possessing qualities common to both an earlier day and the 
                                                       
49 The best quality of the modern novelist will be in his scrupulous fidelity to memory.  
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present” (76) creating a structural duality in the text. In Torres Bodet’s literary world, 
most critics agree memory is not solely an exercise in interiority or psychology, but is 
also a structural element that ties memory to time. This project adds the dimension of the 
voice to these notions of memory. In Proserpina, the voice activates the progression of 
the plot, and even when mediated through artificial modes of memory and recording 
including the gramophone, film, and spiritist contacts through mediums, the voice 
connects them all. The frustratingly ephemeral spoken word gives shape to memory in 
this text and Proserpina’s voice, like her entire being, is fleeting, not to be captured or 
contained.  
Proserpina is a woman out of sync with the world. She is representative of an age 
gone by, a mystic and a medium. At the same time, she is a physician attempting to exist 
in the modern world. At the turn of the nineteenth century through the 1920s, this hybrid 
position was a sustainable one. However, by the 1930s, it is no longer possible to 
maintain her dual position. She must choose one or the other, or risk falling into 
obscurity. Through her, Torres Bodet examines the effects of replacing a metaphysical 
means of knowing the world with a positivist materiality. As Proserpina fades into illness 
and death as a manifestation of her obsolescence, so too do the machines around her.  The 
gramophone disk breaks, the photograph crumbles, and neither technology can preserve 
Proserpina’s image or her memory forever. They are inarticulate and frozen moments in 
time. The phonograph and the photograph have failed to preserve her, yet the text, the 
very story in which she exists, has in fact fixed her in time and preserved her existence 
for the reader. In this formulation, Proserpina and her outmoded technologies, cannot 
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exist in Delfino’s modern world. They have fallen into decay, leaving only text and 
Delfino, the linguistic architect, as survivors.  
Text as the ultimate arbiter of representation is consistent with Torres Bodet’s 
views on new media. While film is better able to confront the themes and topics of the 
modern world, the structure of the novel is a more flexible form. Finding inspiration in 
the likes of James Joyce and Marcel Proust, Torres Bodet sees modern literature as 
capable of breaking old paradigms of time. There is no longer a requirement for the 
author to disclose five, ten or twenty-five years of a character’s life to the reader. The 
expectations, in light of works like Ulysses, have changed and the present moment, a 
single instant, or a matter of hours is sufficient for exploration in its own right. 
El asunto que el novelista de ayer veía al revés de sus anteojos de teatro, 
alejándolo, reduciéndolo, el novelista de hoy lo contempla con una lente 
de aumento. De tanto exagerar la realidad, la impresión que resulta es esa 
extrañeza en que se reconoce la presencia de todo arte sano, nuevo, 
incapaz de resignarse a aprovechar los modelos de la tradición-que 
amaestra a los mediocres. (“Reflexiones” 19)50  
The linear trajectories from birth to death, or story arc from exposition, to conflict, to 
resolution, are no longer the only tools available to the modern author. Now an entire 
novel could be set using the present as the scaffolding for the entire narrative structure. 
This technique, dependent much more on the intense development of the characters’ 
psychology, is much more difficult for film to embrace. The necessity to advance a story 
                                                       
50 The issue is that the novelist of yesterday saw through the reverse lens of the theater, distancing it, 
reducing it, the novelist of today contemplates it with a lens of augmentation. From so much exaggerating 
reality, the impression that results is that of surprise in that one recognizes the presence of all art, healthy, 
new, incapable of resigning itself to making the most of traditional models-which train the mediocre.  
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through pictures and sound, particularly in the early years of cinema, requires a more 
linear approach. It is only in recent decades that non-linear multi-stranded film narratives 
have become the norm, and even still, a technique that is reserved for the art house, rather 
than mainstream cinema. 
The influx of technologies of recording and the experience of modernity shifts 
and expands the possibilities for text and creates the space for the polyphonic, polyvalent, 
multiplicity of Proserpina. While still utilizing classical imagery like the modernista 
tradition in the use of Persephone as a guiding motif, Torres Bodet uses her in a manner 
akin to James Joyce’s Ulysses, using the mythic mode to interrogate the modern Mexican 
world. In the mythological version, Persephone lives a cursed life, divided between two 
worlds. As a child, Hades abducts her from her family, rapes her, and takes her to live as 
the queen of the underworld. Her mother Demeter, aggrieved by the loss, asks for 
Persephone’s father, Zeus’, help in returning her. He dispatches Hermes to find her, but 
just as she is about to leave Hades makes her eat six pomegranate seeds which curse her 
to have to return to the underworld for one third of the year. Her departure marks the 
death of crops and the coming of winter and her return marks the coming of spring and 
abundance. The image of the dualistic woman representing both barrenness and fertility 
is an image that survives through the ages and makes a major resurgence in modernist art 
after Sir James Frazer brings her story as well the Homeric Hymn to Demeter back into 
popular imagination in The Golden Bough in 1922. References to Persephone, or Kora, 
her alternate name in mythology, permeate modernist texts including Ezra Pound’s 
Cantos, William Carlos Williams’ Kora in Hell: Improvisations, and H.D’s prose work 
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Kora and Ka (Davenport 177). She is often used to signal change in a larger cycle of time 
or the promise of rebirth. 
Torres Bodet’s use of Proserpina takes on a darker tone. Rather than the promise 
of return to the living world and the return of spring, he connects her to death and to the 
return to the underworld. In his 1930 poem, “Proserpina,” she is cast as a frightful and 
tragic figure.  
Llama de mármol en la antorcha fría 
de la estatua de un ángel funerario, 
no proyectabas sombra pasada ni futura 
sobre el presente universal del sueño. (“Proserpina”)51  
 While for many authors, Persephone is the ultimate figure of eternal return, here Torres 
Bodet speaks of her in the past tense, as if she has died, leaving no possibility for rebirth. 
Represented as a marble statue like that of a funeral angel she is frozen in time and 
unable to project her shadow into the future nor to the past. In part, this statue is a 
reference to Kore statues in Greek art, often associated with Persephone as the maiden. 
They are usually marble, and depict a young woman with braided hair and a robe folded 
under her left arm. In the poem, this statue marks Proserpina’s entrapment in the eternal 
present, forever in this form.  
 In this reconfiguration of Proserpina, Torres Bodet also invokes a less common 
part of her mythology. In some versions of her story, her power as the queen of the 
underworld is so strong that many are fearful to speak her name allowed. Persephone is 
the name Kora acquires after her rape at the hands of Pluto. No longer a maiden and now 
                                                       
51 Marble flame in the frigid torch/ Of the statue of a funereal angel,/You did not cast a shadow into the past 
nor the future/Over the universal dream of the present. 
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a queen by force, the name change marks this transition and her new role. Here, Torres 
Bodet puts a heavy focus on the sound of her name, but does not include this sense of 
terror, instead one of fragility.  
Tenías 
en la memoria de los silencios interrumpidos 
un nombre tan sonoro, 
de vocales tan duras y tan densas 
--Atalanta, Ifigenia, Proserpina--, 
un nombre todo de mármol, 
que daba miedo pronunciar de prisa 
por temor de romper, 
al dejarlo caer sobre las frases, 
los secretos de las palabras… (“Proserpina”)52  
Pronouncing her name is like speaking the name of god, or casting a spell. There is a 
secret power behind these syllables that must be handled with care. Though the name is 
like marble, dense and hard, it can be shattered, letting all of its power fall loose. The 
sounding of this name also occurs in the “memory of interrupted silences,” slicing 
through the silence and echoing out with its full weight. The contrast between the spoken, 
mystical word and silence creates the space for this power to coalesce. The utterance and 
the possession of this name work hand in hand. Far from the feared Queen of the 
Underworld, this Proserpina is locked away in marble, frozen and breakable in a 
sympathetic vision of a complex figure. Maintaining this connection to both sound and 
death, Torres Bodet draws on this re-imagined Proserpina for his novel Prosperpina 
rescatada. The original version’s title, “La muerte de Proserpina,” and the novel’s 
                                                       
52 You had/In the memory of silences interrupted/A name so sonorous,/Of vowels so hard and so dense/--
Atalanta, Ifigenia, Proserpina--,/a name all of marble,/that scares one to pronounce quickly/for fear of 
breaking it,/to let fall the phrases,/the secrets of the words… 
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ending, invoke death leaving no chance for rebirth or renewal. “The Death of Proserpina” 
ends any discussion of a returning spring. In addition, to rescue Proserpina would, 
according to mythology, mean to save her from the curse of the underworld and allowed 
to live in the light, above ground, with her mother Demeter, while in the novel, rescuing 
Proserpina means releasing her to the hands death. Death becomes the only way to break 
her curse in Torres Bodet’s creation.  
In the literary version, Proserpina, like her mythical counterpart, lives in two 
worlds, but not the underworld and earth. Instead, she lives as both a modern and a 
mystic. She exists in the modern positivist world in her role as medical student and 
doctor, and in the world of the spirits as a spiritual medium for séances. In her duality she 
is a symptom of a rapidly shifting modern world ready to embrace science and 
technology but still clinging to the remnants of superstition. For Proserpina these two 
sides are distinct and incommensurable, while Delfino her friend, colleague, and lover 
struggles to connect these two sides into a single cohesive narrative. Delfino is a man of 
science and his first person narration relies on modern technology as the mediation 
between him and Proserpina. In doing so, Torres Bodet also places the positivist, Delfino, 
in opposition to Proserpina who exists in the realms of both the positivism and spiritism, 
with Delfino the victor. Her death then, and the conclusion of a cycle of rebirth, signals a 
kind of modern decay without a Persephone to re-enchant its cruel realities.  
The technologies of the voice operate as conduits in the novel, connecting 
Delfino’s modern world with Proserpina’s sphere. Telephones and telegraph lines 
crisscross through the text creating both interruptions and connections. Delfino is a man 
of science and his first person narration relies on modern technology as the mediation 
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between him and Proserpina. Delfino is comfortable in his modern environs and at ease 
with the mechanical world and its steady hum of electricity and machines, in the opening 
scene; however, he finds solace in the quiet, occasional moments of silence and reflection 
between technological interruptions.  
Por fortuna, nadie viene. Nada suena. Nada se interrumpe. Los cables 
depositados en Europa a las siete a la mañana siguen llegando a México a 
las doce de la noche, siete horas antes de haber sido escritos. La catarata 
del Niágara continúa arrastrando un millón de litros de encaje por 
segundo. Me consuelo. El mundo empieza, por lo visto, a cansarse de las 
guerras, de las revoluciones, de las teorías de la relatividad. Los días en 
que una familia entera de astrónomos amanecía sin empleo, porque el 
señor Einstein había alejado todas las estrellas de un centésimo de 
milímetro en el plano de la esfera celeste, parecen definitivamente 
acabados. Satisfecho, el silencio de la antesala cuenta las rosas de las 
alfombras, mide el resorte de los asientos, esmerila maliciosamente mi 
voz. Afuera, el invierno sigue llenando de un vino azul profundo la copa 
amarilla, de aire, de los árboles deshojados…(20)53 
In the quiet of the winter, the world seems to be at peace, taking a respite from the 
revolutions of politics as well as those in modern science. Delfino takes his comfort from 
his faith in the forward march of progress and time. Steady and slow, the water of 
                                                       
53 Fortunately nobody comes. Nothing rings. Nothing interrupts. The cables deposited in Europe at seven in 
the morning continue arriving in Mexico at twelve at night, seven hours before having been written. 
Niagara Falls continues pulling a million liters of flow per second. It consoles me. The world begins, 
apparently, to rest from war, from revolutions, from the theories of relativity. The days in which an entire 
family of astronomers woke without employment, because Mr. Einstein had moved all of the stars a 
hundreth of a millimeter in the celestial plane, seem definitively finished. Satisfied, the silence of the 
waiting room count the roses in the rugs, measure the springs of the chairs, maliciously frosts/grinds my 
voice. Outside, the winter continues filling the yellow cup with a deep blue wine, of air, of leafless trees.... 
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Niagara will keep flowing, the cables will arrive on time, and the winter will eventually 
turn to spring. While there he finds solace in these certainties, he takes on a mocking tone 
in his discussion of Einstein. Einstein’s tiniest of adjustments to calculations of the 
universe do not simply lead to the unemployment of a generation of astronomers, but also 
lead to the reshaping of the scientific landscape and create a new understanding of the 
world, a change that seems disproportionate to its effect. Rather than these dramatic 
moments of discovery, revolution and upheaval, Delfino prefers the quiet steady pace of 
gradual progress. 
 What cuts through this moment of calm is Proserpina’s voice stretching across 
time and space to reach Delfino. The unexpected phone call disrupts not only this solace, 
but also sets the novel in motion. Much like Einstein’s recalculation, Proserpina’s phone 
call has a disproportionate and chaotic effect on Delfino’s quiet life. She short-circuits the 
steady flow of the universe. Proserpina need not introduce herself. Her old friend needs 
no context for voice on the other end of the line as he describes: “Me dice simplemente: 
‘Te necesito’. Todo desaparece de mi memoria. Todo” (PR 21).54 Proserpina’s voice is a 
touchstone that ignites the narrative while drawing Delfino out of his own world and back 
into hers. The duality of the previous scene with the scientific coexisting with natural 
elements loses its balance as her voice cuts through. Her voice also stops time and halts 
the forward flow of the universe in the previous passage. Two words from Proserpina are 
enough to erase all other thoughts from his mind. No longer is he worried the winter 
outside or the waters of Niagara; this voice transports him. In erasing memory, he is 
drawn into her world and is completely at her mercy.   
                                                       
54 She simply says, “I need you.” Everything disappears from my memory. Everything. 
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Although Delfino claims that everything disappears from his memory, what 
follows for nearly the entirety of the book is Delfino’s recollections of Proserpina in the 
present moment from the phone call on. There are no further details of Proserpina’s end 
of the conversation on the telephone, only what Delfino extracts from the exchange: 
Está enferma. Lo adivino en la forma de sus frases. En la calidad de su 
voz. ¿Por qué esta costumbre suya de aparecer por sorpresas, a través del 
teléfono, del telégrafo, del espiritismo, en el secreto de una clausura 
distante, cercada por las compensaciones comerciales de un cuarto de 
hotel? (21)55  
Proserpina’s voice is the stand in for her physical body. A few words are all that the 
receiver has access to. Delfino must piece the rest together from his intimate knowledge 
of Proserpina and translate her message into a complete communication. As Gustavo 
Pérez Firmat explains, “Sound has replaced vision…Proserpina projects a phonic, and not 
a visual image of herself.… As a purveyor of words, of text, Delfino must endeavor to 
transform his acoustic perceptions into verbal images” (96-97). Delfino enacts this shift 
from auditory to the visual after Proserpina hangs up the phone. “Del otro lado de la 
línea, el silencio se estira, cruje, se rompe hasta dejar pasar, como el tambor rasgado de 
una orquesta, la cara severa, invisible, inolvidable, de Proserpina, que me saluda (PR 20-
21).56 Her voice and the silence that follow conjure up the visual image of her face 
bridging the space between the visual and the aural. Michel Chion theorizes the impact 
                                                       
55 She’s sick. I predict it from the form of her sentences. In the quality of her voice. Why is it her custom to 
appear by surprise, across the telephone, the telegraph, spiritism, in the secret of a distant cloister, 
surrounded by the commercial compensations of a hotel room? 
 
56 On the other end of the line, silence stretches, crosses, breaks until it passes like the drum roll of an 
orchestra. The severe, invisible, unforgettable face of Proserpina greets me.  
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that technologies of the voice in forcing the receiver into reconstructing a whole. He 
argues that “isolating the voice as they do, telephone and radio posit the voice as 
representative of the whole person…So in explicitly depriving us of one element, both 
radio and silent cinema cause us to dream of the harmony of the whole” (125). Without 
access to input from the other senses, the mind must create, or re-create, the missing 
pieces. In dreaming or imagining a wholeness, nuance and detail are inevitably lost in this 
act of mental translation. While Proserpina’s voice sparks, and simultaneously erases 
memory, the momentary vision cannot be maintained. As quickly as Proserpina’s 
presence emerges through memory, it recedes perpetually slipping out of hand.  
 The technologies referenced in the novel represent this desire to halt time and 
hold on to memory. With newly available devices, recording and preserving both sound 
and image become a real possibility. These tools promise to deliver a new kind of world 
where communication is faster and swifter, reducing the distance between people. As 
Thomas Edison described in an 1888 article detailing the potentials of the phonograph: 
The phonograph, in one sense, knows more than we do ourselves. For it 
will retain a perfect mechanical memory of many things which we may 
forget, even though we have said them...it will teach us to be careful what 
we say...exerting thus a decidedly moral influence by making men brief, 
businesslike and straightforward, cultivating improved manners, and 
uniting distant friends and associates by direct vocal communication. 
(“Phonograph” 649-650) 
While the recorded voice can be played over and over again and can capture the small 
details that might be missed in the course of a normal conversation, Torres Bodet, fifty 
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years past this celebratory announcement, finds this mechanical memory faulty. It does 
not retain all, and the direct communication between people over long distances stretches 
sound and voice, disassociating it from the present and the speaker. Human intervention 
is still necessary to interpret the data and piece it back together into a cohesive message.  
 In addition, the moral component that Edison indicates belies a concern for 
brevity, politeness and speaking for an audience rather than for a concern, necessarily, for 
authenticity or complete accuracy. The machine acts as a regulation on the human body. 
There is an editing already applied and a need to present a moral or appropriate self for 
future generations. Thereby, the recording, though an efficient and world changing 
advancement in technology and communication is already edited, cleaned and sanitized. 
Even in the early years of recording technology, there was a feeling that these recordings 
were made for posterity.  An 1888 Mexican newspaper article features an interview with 
a member of Edison’s staff that discusses the tests they were performing on 
“phonograms,” a form of audible correspondence. This format was to change the mail 
system and connect the furthest reaches of the world. The discussion also furthers this 
idea of sound technology as preserving the voice for the future. 
El “registro hablado” de más importancia hecho hasta ahora es, por 
supuesto, el famoso “primer fonógrama” de Edison, recibido por mí el 26 
del mes pasado, y que será el número 1 del “Álbum fonográfico” de las 
voces de los grandes de todas las naciones en el cual se encontrarán algún 
día las voces de los vivos y de los muertos. (“Maravillas”)57  
                                                       
57 The most important “spoken record” made until now is, of course, Edison’s famous “first phonogram,” 
that I received on the 26th of last month and that will be the number 1 of the “Phonographic Album” of the 
voices of the greatest of all the nation on which they will some day find the voices of the living and the 
dead. 
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The phonographic album was the result of a test run of the phonogram mail system. Discs 
were sent all around the world from New Zealand, to India, to Ecuador to test the 
viability of the discs in all weather and climate conditions. It was an exercise in global 
communication on a scale that was unmatched even by the fledgling telegraph industry. 
At the time the technologies held enormous potential and opened possibilities that 
seemed more fantastic than real. The voice, the most personal aspect of communication, 
could now be preserved, shipped, and saved with the recording operating as a form of 
mechanical memory.   
This mechanical memory, though astounding in its era, can never quite hold the 
entirety of the physical voice, its immediacy, or the tone in a larger continuum of the 
speaker’s patterns of speech, as is the case with Proserpina, whose mediated presence 
begins in childhood. As Delfino tells it, her father was an administrator of a phonograph 
agency in Ciudad Victoria (34) and instead of handing out love notes or photos to her 
friends; she gives them audio recordings as a gift. Delfino has kept his copy into 
adulthood and it contains the confessions of the young Proserpina he had first met in 
medical school. The recording holds details of her innermost thoughts about her youth, 
her petty cruelties, her relationship with her parents, and her desires. Yet, “el disco se ha 
roto en el minuto en que las confesiones de Proserpina empezaban a interesar[lo]” (43).58 
This machine made to retain and record the voice, proves insufficient in containing the 
elusive Proserpina. The most important details of her words are missing, broken or lost. 
While Delfino has listened to the record countless times before, this piece is now broken 
and, importantly, not available for the reader. In this moment the narrative puts 
Proserpina at a double remove. Delfino refuses to fill in the gap that the broken record 
                                                       
58 the disc broke in the minute that Proserpina’s confessions began to interest him.  
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leaves. He knows the content but the reader is left out of this bit of knowledge 
represented by “a spatial break and the narrator’s words beginning the next fragment 
stating that the record has stopped” (D’Lugo 39). Both the form and the content erase 
Proserpina. In projecting a sonic presence of herself, the gramophone is key in 
disseminating this form and preserving her most complex essence to her friends including 
Delfino, but this static format can only provide a shadow of Proserpina.  
When configured in this manner, Proserpina suffers the same fate as Benjamin’s 
work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction. In his essay, Benjamin describes the 
effects of mechanical reproduction on the original piece of art. What is lost is the 
original’s “aura” or specificity in space and time. “The technique of reproduction 
detaches the reproduced object from the domain of tradition. The presence of multiple 
reproductions substitutes a plurality of copies for a unique existence. And in permitting 
the reproduction to meet the beholder or listener in his own particular situation, it 
reactivates the object reproduced” (Benjamin 5). With each reproduction, and each time 
Proserpina’s presence is mediated through technology, whether that is through the 
telephone, telegraph or gramophone, Delfino reactivates her presence, yet this presence is 
lacking the unique presence of Proserpina herself. The authentic, original version is 
absent. Her history, the changes that have occurred to her physical body and her 
emotional growth over time can never be captured in the reproduction, leaving only 
traces of her presence for Delfino. Accordingly, Delfino shares the desire of Benjamin’s 
modern masses to “bring things ‘closer’ spatially and humanly, which is just as ardent as 
[his] bent toward overcoming the uniqueness of every reality by accepting its 
reproduction” (Benjamin 6). His technological stand-ins for Proserpina’s realities allow 
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him to reconstruct the missing pieces of her history in his own way, assuming and 
creating her motives from his knowledge of the original.  
Even when Proserpina’s physicality is present in the text, she has a diaphanous 
quality to her. She is light and energy rather than a human body. In the course of her 
relationship with Delfino, she appears and disappears from his life, often without 
warning. When Delfino first sees her at a conference in New York after several years 
apart he sees her as markedly different from the other travelers around them.  
Por contraste con las actitudes pausadas de las otras viajeras, sus 
movimientos irradiaban, en cambio, una nerviosidad eléctrica de radio, 
que la devoraba por dentro. Inmediatamente empezó a consumirme. 
Sin guantes, sus manos delgadas derramaban un fluido magnético, 
perceptible al tacto y a la mirada, que la hacía envejecer a simple vista 
rompiéndole el barniz de las uñas, enmoheciéndole el oro de las pulseras, 
el iris de las pupilas, la sonoridad de la voz. (72)59 
The elements that are missing from her mechanical reproductions, her physicality, her 
energy and the touch of time are evident when Delfino sees her again. These additional 
elements seem to spill out of her in excess, consuming her. Her innate energy devours her 
physical body as if she were simply a host for this force outside of herself. The metaphors 
of magnetic fluid and radio electricity connect Proserpina as an elemental part of the 
modern world. Whereas the energy of machinery can be put to productive use, hers 
                                                       
59 In contrast to the paused attitudes of the other travelers, her movements irradiated, however, a nervous 
radio electricity, that devoured her from the inside. Immediately it began to consume me. Without gloves, 
her slender hands poured out a magnetic fluid, perceptible by touch and by sight, that made her age with a 
glance, breaking the varnish of her nails, dulling the gold of her bracelets, the iris of her pupils, the tone of 
her voice.  
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radiates outward as a destructive force to both herself and to those around her and cannot 
be harnessed, contained, or copied despite Delfino’s best efforts.  
 The modern forms of scientific energy in the above passage parallel the psychical 
forms of energy that flow through her as a medium. During this same trip to New York 
Delfino learns of her career change and attends a séance with her. Her new role as a 
spiritist seems at odds with her previous career in the hard sciences. To dabble in the 
occult would for many doctors or scientists be heretical. In Proserpina’s case, the 
transference of energy unites this incongruity.  
Entretanto, la voz demasiado joven iba envejeciendo, segundo a segundo, 
junto a nosotros. Llegó a endurecerse. Sus frases no obedecieron ya 
exactamente al temblor de labios de Proserpina. ¿Por qué existirá siempre 
este desacuerdo entre la voz de una médium y su alma, entre la sonoridad 
y la fotografía de una película parlante? Se retrasan. Se anticipan. La 
sincronización no es perfecta. Los ventrílocuos de antaño operaban con 
mayor nitidez. (144)60  
Proserpina becomes a conduit for the voices of the dead, with her body acting as host to 
these other energies. While Delfino is clearly not a believer in contact with spirits or 
otherworldly souls, his thoughts linger on the disjunction between voice and body. As is 
the case with Proserpina, her image and her sound do not quite match up with her 
physical being. Delfino is always a quarter second behind, always filling the space 
between utterance and the present. Pérez Firmat characterizes this phenomenon as 
                                                       
60 In the meantime, the voice that was too young grew older second by second in front of us. He arrived and 
hardened himself. His phrases did not yet obey the tremble of Proserpina’s lips. Why is there always this 
disagreement between the voice of the medium and the soul, between the sound and the picture of a talking 
film? They are delayed. Anticipated. The synchronization is not perfect. The ventriloquists of the past 
operated with more clarity.  
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Proserpina’s oscillation “between a disembodied voice (on the recording) and a voiceless 
body (in her capacity as a medium). Or rather, between a disembodied voice and a 
multivocal or polyphonic body, since the problem is not lack but abundance” (98). The 
separation between these two elements wrenches her apart and denies her the ability to 
ever form as a cohesive or completely rounded character. No matter which mode, or 
which side of the equator, or which persona Proserpina inhabits, the voice, either lack or 
presence, tears her in half again, much like her mythical counterpart. As a medium, she at 
least has the freedom to connect her thoughts to the voices of others, ventriloquizing 
wholeness.  
Proserpina’s erratic and disconnected presence stands in contrast to Delfino’s 
current love interest, Hortensia. She is a nurse in his practice and functions in the text as a 
representative of ‘order and progress.’ Delfino describes her as someone who is 
predictable, reliable, and does not believe in superstitions: “¡Tan rectilínea, tan pura, tan 
exigente de los trabajos bien hechos, de la ropa muy limpia, de los mandiles acabados de 
planchar!” (15).61 Unlike Proserpina the “Princesa de los Paralelogramos,” (31) Hortensia 
exists squarely in the modern world. She is competent and cohesive while Proserpina is 
askew and unpredictable. In alignment with her modern positioning in the text, Hortensia 
is introduced in relation to cinema, a more modern technology than Proserpina’s 
gramophones and telegraph lines.  
No comprendo, de pronto, qué significan este rostro excesivo, radiante, en 
“primer plano” de actriz cinematográfica, estas pupilas azules – en que la 
                                                       
61 Philosophic Hortensia! So rectilinear, so pure, so exacting of jobs well done, of very clean clothes, of just 
ironed aprons! The idea that someday I could someday show herself docile to the whims of a person that I 
don’t know penetrates my temples, without noise, like a shot through a superimposed photo, through a 
certain cinematic trick, through to the undamaged person, in my real photograph.  
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sombra rubia de las pestañas acaricia el recuerdo de un campo de trigo –, 
estos duros, jugosos labios que el beso no podría tocar sin exprimir. Es 
Hortensia.62 
Like the image of a film actress, her face rises up in its resplendent glory in front of him 
defamiliarized from its quotidian existence. He sees her in pieces detached from her work 
as she assists in the surgery he is performing. Blue-eyed and blonde haired she looks like 
the quintessential American movie star and for a moment he forgets who she is, 
captivated. It is this woman who, as Proserpina fades out of existence, immediately fills 
her place in Delfino’s thoughts. She is the one who will exist in Delfino’s modern world, 
the film star, rather than the eccentric mystical woman of the gramophone. 
The connection between film and Hortensia’s well-ordered personality is one that 
is rooted in the origins of cinema in Mexico. Its arrival marks a marvelous advancement 
in technology, one that perfectly aligns with Porfírio Díaz’s campaign of “ordén y 
progreso” in his attempts to modernize the nation. Díaz quickly recognizes the medium’s 
potential and it’s ability to reach larger audiences and harnesses it for his regime. Early 
Mexican film is not the cinema of attractions as it is in the U.S., but rather images and 
staged scenes of Díaz (López 61). These images help to present a more homogenous 
version of Mexico than exist under the gloss of Porfirian progress. As Carol D’Lugo 
explains, “Although to outsiders the Díaz regime may have given the impression of 
Mexico as a controlled society undergoing massive productive growth in the form of 
industrialization and economic development, there remained a fixed class system that 
deeply divided the rich and the poor” (1). The use of cinema for political ends and 
                                                       
62 I didn’t understand, all of a sudden, what this excessive, radiant face in the “first plane” of a cinematic 
actress, signified with these blue pupils that the shadow of her blonde eyelashes caressed like a field of 
wheat, these hard, playful lips that a kiss could not touch without using up. It is Hortensia. 
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propaganda is an asset to advancing technology and developing its possibilities, but it 
also creates a skeptical viewing audience aware of the disjoint between the proud 
nationalistic images on screen and the realities of violence and poverty outside the theater 
(López 59-60). 
As tides shift for Díaz, the cinema turns to recording the Mexican Revolution. 
Similar to its uses in Russia, Mexican filmmakers put political struggle on the big screen 
for matinee audiences. For the first time, images of conflict, armed resistance, and 
governmental collapse are available for public consumption. Francisco Madero’s armies 
become the stars of this new era. Audiences’ desire for information and news on the 
fighting drives production with the Alva Brothers’ 1911 Insurrección de México, meeting 
with a wide success (López 66). Film serves not simply a diversion, or aesthetic purpose, 
but a political one, disseminating information, propaganda and visual imagery of the 
Revolution to mass audiences (Rocca 24). Somewhat ironically, the technology 
developed and adapted under Porfirio Díaz’ regime is turned against him and plays a 
significant role in his loss of power.  
By the time Torres Bodet wrote Proserpina in 1931, Mexican cinema had already 
developed into a formidable production system with major movie studios in the 1910s 
and 1920s, entrenching the public in these new modes of perception. The increasing 
presence of this new media forced a reflection on the state of writing in this moment. 
Torres Bodet identifies this shift in his linkage of the demise of naturalist literature with 
the arrival of the cinematograph.  
[La novela naturalista] ha caído en desuso porque no era una forma 
literaria pura y porque, no siéndolo, no pudo competir con el 
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cinematógrafo, más inteligente en recursos industriales, alimento sólido 
para ese hambre de imaginación sin esfuerzos que caracteriza a los 
hombres cuando integran un público. (C 10)63  
Competing with new technologies of representation opens new challenges for the 
vanguard. Novels must carve out a new space for text in the increasingly crowded field. 
Cinema can reach the masses, particularly the working class most often represented in 
naturalist fiction with much more ease and with more efficiency than a novel, whose 
readership requires literacy. Because in the 1920’s nearly half of the Mexican population 
is unable to read (Gallo 126), cinema is better equipped to navigate the space of the 
industrial world and to have the widest reach in the public sphere. If naturalism is passé, 
then a new form is required to better compete with this new reality. Although vanguard 
literature still requires a literate population, a vanguard literature is a “purer” form that 
embraces the facets of literature that will withstand this new test to text. Experiments in 
form like Torres Bodet’s use of interiority and memory in text are elements that preserve 
the specificity of literature as an artistic medium. 
In 1930, Fernando Vela, a contemporary of Torres Bodet in Madrid, discussed 
this challenge to text and explained the impact that cinema and the gramophone had on 
representation in this era in his essay “Literatura fonográfica” published in the Mexican 
magazine La voz nueva in 1929.  
Cine y gramófono crean, no reproducen, una nueva expresión, imágenes y 
sonidos para uno solo. Para el espectador del cine aislado en la sombra son 
como figuraciones de su retina ilusa, cosas que se ven en un 
                                                       
63 The naturalist novel has fallen into disuse because it is not a pure literary form and because, not being 
one, it could not compete with the cinematograph, more intelligent in its industrial resources, solid food for 
this hunger of imagination without force that characterizes men when they make up an audience.  
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fosforescencia, desfiles en el tablado del ensueño; para el oyente en su 
cuarto, lejos del mitin de los conciertos, la voz lejana y grave que tiene la 
inflexión de voix chéres qui se sont tues. (Vela)64  
In Vela’s view, the cinema and the gramophone do not simply represent or recast 
expression; they have the power to create an entirely new form. The illusory images of 
the cinema are dreamlike, and the recorded voice takes on a distant quality as if floating 
on the wind or a remembered voice of a dear friend. Their uncanny nature and their 
dislocation from a human body render image and sound ghostlike and ephemeral. In 
doing so, they break open traditional notions of sense and apprehension. 
 In this atmosphere, writing takes on a new capacity in representing the realities of 
mechanized production of sound and image. Text must shift and work to capture these 
enhanced and altered realities. 
E[s]te es el lirismo moderno, que crea irrealidades a máquina y hace 
íntimos y expresivos, hasta lo más humano, los productos del maquinismo. 
Se apodera de ellos y marca allí su impronta de dolor, ese contraste que 
impone a presión con su carne hasta hacerse daño. Una imagen de cine es 
más nuestra e interior que una escena de teatro; una voz de gramófono, 
más nuestra e interior que un aria en la Opera. (Vela)65  
                                                       
64 Cinema and the gramophone, create, not reproduce, a new expression, images and sound “para uno solo” 
For the spectator of the cinema isolated in the darkness they are like figurations of his naïve retina, things 
that one sees in a phosphorescence, parades on the stage of dreams; for the listener in his room, far from the 
concert meetings, the voice, distant and grave, has the inflection of “voix chéres qui se sont tues.” (French 
is a quote from Verlaine’s poem “My Familiar Dream”). 
 
65 This is the modern lyricism, which creates irrealities to machines and makes the products of 
mechanismo, intimate and expressive up to the most human. It takes hold of them and marks its stamp of 
pain, this contrast that imposes pressure to its flesh to the point of injury. A cinematic image is more ours 
and more interior than a theater scene; a gramophone voice, more ours and more interior than an aria in the 
Opera. 
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Vela sees these irrealities produced with the aid of technology as the most human of 
expression. Rather than creating distance, the relation to technology makes these 
representations even more human, more unique than any other possible creation. 
Playback and recording allow for images and sound to be preserved and experienced in 
isolation, the public performance can be simultaneously private and isolated, giving the 
audience a sense of proximity to the production. Vela marks this contrast between 
lyricism and mechanical production with physical pain, a flesh that can be injured. 
Modern lyricism leaves an indelible mark on these most human of productions and has 
the ability to mirror this closeness, to represent this new way of interpreting the world.  
It is evident from Torres Bodet’s inclusion of references to film in both 
“Parálisis” and Proserpina rescatada that neither he nor the Contemporáneos are 
completely opposed to film, instead they see it as an innovative technology that can 
produce a new kind of art with the imaging techniques unique to film. The possibilities 
are exciting and the group begins to write film criticism, essays, and to organize a film 
club. They also begin including these imagistic techniques into their writing utilizing 
quick short cuts of image and scene and approximating the effect of montage in the text 
(De los Reyes 150). Sergei Eisenstein, the Russian experimental filmmaker and authority 
on these new techniques travelled to México and had established a presence there in the 
artistic community from 1928 to 1932 (De los Reyes 164). His visit energizes the 
vanguard community and created excitement about cinema as an emerging art form. 
Evidence of this surge in interest lies in issue 36 of Contemporáneos (May 1931), an 
issue devoted almost entirely to film. It includes a translation of part of Eisenstein’s Film 
Form as well as the founding statement of the Cineclub. The club was similar to other 
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international cinema clubs of the era in adopting film as a legitimate, modern artistic 
category. Their goals were to obtain and exhibit the best in vanguard films from Europe, 
the Americas, and Asia and discuss the aesthetic, scientific and social importance of 
cinematographic productions (Aragón Leyva “Cineclub” 189). In this issue, Aragón 
Leyva describes Eisenstein’s impact on the cultural community as well as the artist’s 
position in this mechanized world: 
Uno de los privilegios de esta generación, que basta por sí solo para 
compensar la incomodidad de haber venido a la duda en esta era de 
mecanizada brutalidad, consisten in poder abarcar con una mirada de 
veinticinco años el nacimiento, desarrollo, madurez y purificación de un 
arte nuevo en su técnica y nuevo en su concepción….La obra mexicana de 
Eisenstein, en la que lo secunden Edouardo Tissé y Grischa Alexandrov, 
será un género nuevo de la cinematografía. (185)66 
As witnesses to the advent of this new, revolutionizing art, artists in this moment have a 
unique vantage point to see the limitless possibilities of this new form. Eisenstein’s 
arrival energizes the Mexican vanguard to participate in the cultural explosion of film, 
with the Contemporáneos leading the charge.  
 The arrival of sound technology interrupts this initial enthusiasm for film, 
however. By 1931, the same year that Torres Bodet writes Proserpina rescatada and the 
tail end of Eisenstein’s stay, sound has definitively come to Mexican cinema (García 
178). The age of the silent film is coming to a close, and rather than embrace this 
                                                       
66 One of the privileges of this generation, if it were enough to compensate the inconvenience of having 
come without a doubt in this era of mechanized brutality, consists in being able to contemplate with a view 
of 25 years the birth, development, maturity and purification of an new art in its technique and new in its 
conceptions. Eisenstein’s Mexican work, backed by Eduoard Tissé and Grischa Alexandrov, will be a new 
cinematic genre.  
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remarkable addition to cinema as they did film itself, many members of the 
Contemporáneos and filmmakers including Eisenstein and Chaplin were vociferously 
against the addition of sound to film. The initial attempts at adding sound were not 
entirely effective. The recordings captured all sorts of ambient noise and sounds not just 
from the actors, but also capturing the background noise from the crew on set. The failure 
was such that early filmmakers saw this technology as retrograde, defiling the aesthetic of 
the film itself and distracting audiences from the work of the camera and the visual 
techniques on screen. It was seen as such a distraction that Chaplin, Eisenstein, and D.W. 
Griffith all signed a manifesto condemning the use of sound in film (García 160). They 
“argued against using sounds as flat literal illustrations of images, and in favor of 
audiovisual counterpoint, wherein sounds declare their independence and act 
metaphorically, symbolically” (Chion 11). In their view, sound would erase the visual 
specificity of the medium of film and become a detriment to its aesthetic possibilities if 
used simply applied to voice the actors’ speech. 
Torres Bodet joined them in this critique calling silent film “el único que tiene 
validez relativa apara el espíritu,” while spoken film was for him a “pesadilla de un teatro 
para neurasténicas, a medias entre la realidad de la opereta y las ridículas abstracciones 
del método Berlitz” (qtd. in García 161). 67 The addition of sound paradoxically makes 
film more ordinary. The overwhelming sensation of noise and image has, by this point, 
become more aligned with the reality of an urban life, a world already inundated by 
machines and noise. In placing sounded film between an operetta and the Berlitz method, 
a mode of immersive language instruction, he sees film’s strange use of sound as akin to 
                                                       
67 …a nightmare of a theater for neurasthenics, a cross between the reality of the operetta and the ridiculous 
abstraction of the Berlitz method.  
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the imitative methods required in speaking an unknown language and the illusion of 
reality in a stage play; there is a forced and somewhat false feeling about it. In this 
formulation, the promise of new technologies of sound is not enough to counter-balance 
the aesthetic loss of the specific art created by moving image.  
The reference to neurasthenia, a disease of the nerves produced by the chaotic 
atmosphere of the machine age, reveals Torres Bodet’s resistance to placating the masses 
with an entertainment that simply mirrors their daily existence and does not challenge the 
viewer to actively engage with the film and instead encourages a passive absorption. This 
critique is similar to Walter Benjamin’s concept of “shock effect” in his essay “The Work 
of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” Shock effect is the result of the constant 
motion of film that leaves the audience unable to contemplate the work of art as he would 
a painting or a sculpture. With film, the cuts are too quick and just as one scene is 
absorbed, it changes, and the audience cannot rest or think, they are kept in a constant 
state of distraction. The conditions of film as an aesthetic object change notions of 
perception, and encourage a passive, absent-minded absorption of art rather than a 
contemplation of a specific piece of art rooted in tradition and cultural value. (Benjamin 
22-23). As modern art continues on this trajectory toward distraction, the public loses 
their ability to act as critic. For Torres Bodet, this shift to sound reduces film to the 
ordinary, a tool to placate the masses, more susceptible for co-optation for political 
purposes and reducing the aesthetic possibilities to realist representation. 
Despite these lamentations, the addition of sound to film is a natural progression 
in keeping with André Bazin’s concept of “total cinema.” According to Bazin, it was the 
goal and guiding myth of the earliest film technicians to one day achieve a total cinema 
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or an “integral realism, a recreation of the world in its own image, an image unburdened 
by the freedom of interpretation of the artists or the irreversibility of time” (236). In the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, the limitations of film technologies hinder this 
goal. The addition of sound is simply the next step in creating a filmic representation that 
inched every closer to the unburdened image. While this trajectory seems now an organic 
one as evidenced by the rise in 3-D effects and CGI technologies today, in this moment, 
the addition of sound removes the specificity of the visual as a means of relaying 
aesthetic meaning through the silent moving image. The potential of this aesthetic on its 
own appears in the recently developed concepts in Russian film theory including montage 
and the Kuleshov effect. Therefore, the addition of sound creates a regressive art for the 
masses rather than a progressive art that could advance aesthetics through technology. 
Sound then becomes a dominant preoccupation in this era. The attempts at 
synchronization with film call attention to the disjunction between sound and image, as 
well as to the artificial recombination of the two. Because the recombination could not be 
a seamless one given the limitations of the technology of the era and the nature of 
recorded sound, the recorded voice finds itself at a double remove, removed from the 
body of the speaker, and again removed from the associated image mouthing the silent 
words.  
Proserpina’s move toward spiritism mirrors the complex reaction to technology in 
the era. Unlike Hortensia’s association with medicine and the modern marvel of the 
cinema, Proserpina’s position as divided between the spirit world and the scientific is 
increasingly untenable. The novel parallels the development of the city and its technology 
with Proserpina. Both Mexico City and New York serve as markers for rapid 
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industrialization in the text. In these locations, new technologies emerge while others 
recede into the past; the telegraph station begins to crumble (PR 160) and the most 
elegant hotel from the time of Roosevelt is now a talcum powder factory (PR 94). Set 
against these cityscapes, Proserpina begins to lose her relevance and her duality becomes 
untenable. Delfino sees her fading through the eyes of Mr. Lehar, an American 
businessman he meets at Proserpina’s séance. He has built his fortune making player 
pianos (another technology that mediates sound and imitates the presence of a human 
agent), and finds the séances to be an interesting distraction, but as a man of the 
capitalist, industrialized world, Lehar will soon tire of these kinds of parlor games. In this 
context Delfino describes Proserpina as a product, and perhaps a symptom, of the era of 
the 1920s. 
La fatalidad, el deber, la fe en los proverbios, la melancolía –las 
condiciones profundas de aquella época-, ¿no eran también las 
condiciones profundas de Proserpina? Sentí una gran lástima de su fuerza 
presente, de su orgullo, de su reloj de pulsera, de su seguridad de sibila. 
Sobre el rostro entusiasta del Mr. Lehar en 1924, que parecía decir al oírla: 
“¡Qué mujer tan maravillosa!”; mi imaginación trazaba rápidamente el 
rostro entusiasta del Mr. Lehar de 1934, que diría, sin duda: “¿Proserpina 
Jiménez?...No me hable usted de ella. La conozco. Cierta pobre muchacha 
mexicana que se creyó la Pitonisa de Delfos…” (95-96)68 
                                                       
68 The fatality, the duty, the faith in proverbs, the melancholy—the profound conditions of that era—were 
they not also the profound conditions of Proserpina? I felt sorry for her present force, her pride, for her 
wristwatch, for the safety of sibyl.  On the enthusiastic face of Mr. Lehar in 1924, that appeared to say upon 
hearing her “What a marvelous woman!”, my imagination rapidly traced the enthusiastic face of Mr. Lehar 
in 1934, that would say, without a doubt: “Proserpina Jiménez?...Don’t talk to me about her. I know her. A 
certain poor Mexican girl who believed in the Oracle of Delphi…” 
  
 165 
While her skill as a medium is something that leaves her audience in awe, it is a bit of a 
bourgeois novelty. Delfino recognizes the limited shelf life of this line of work. For the 
moment she captures the zeitgeist of her world, and she can float between science and the 
occult, embracing both. By the 1930s, however, this position cannot be sustained. Reason 
and science have already overtaken the role of the supernatural in the public sphere and 
to cling to Proserpina’s duality is to cling to the past, and to be left behind in the onward 
march of progress.  
The novel’s preoccupation with memory and erasure reflects this dismantling of 
the supernatural in favor of progress and science. Delfino’s contemplation of the nature 
of time, and therefore memory, is a linear one: 
Vivir…es un asunto de tráfico. Los resolvemos casi siempre por medio de 
calles en una sola dirección. Detrás de nosotros, mientras caminamos, 
parece que una mano invisible va cerrando las puertas, las ventanas, los 
ojos, las avenidas, convirtiendo a las personas en maniquíes, a la cuidad en 
teatro, al recuerdo en representación. (165)69  
As life continues on, the past drifts away from the seeing eye and the listening ear. The 
forward progress of time closes off access to these moments, decisions, and memories. 
Once these doors of perception are shut, the mind can only recreate them as a poor 
imitation of the original. Memories are facsimiles of the real, therefore Delfino’s 
reminiscences of Proserpina fall victim to this same fate, reconstructed, dramatized and 
pieced together. The impossibility of return shadows the possibilities for the future.  
                                                       
69 Living…is a matter of movement. We solve it almost always by streets that go in a single direction. 
Behind us, while we walk, it seems as if an invisible hand were closing doors, windows, eyes, avenues, 
transforming people into puppets, the city into a theater and memory into representation. (trans. Karsen p. 
87) 
  
 166 
As the clock reaches four in the afternoon, the time he is supposed to meet 
Proserpina, his thoughts return to the initial phone call that started him on this journey 
through memory. Memory redoubles on itself and the phone call has become a new layer 
in his history with Proserpina. The meta-memory of the text pushes Proserpina even 
further into the recesses of abstraction. After the phone call, he recreates her image and 
their history, and then with this discussion he revisits the memory of her memory. Like a 
game of telephone, as the number of mechanical reproductions increases, the message 
becomes more and more obscured the further away the transmission from the original 
speaker, the further she moves away from solidification the more unreachable and 
incomprehensible she becomes for Delfino. 
If forward motion is equivalent to living in Delfino’s configuration of this 
solidification of memory, the lack of motion, would mean death. Delfino’s quest to 
totalize Proserpina, to locate and define her in a static representation, would necessarily 
end in her destruction. Delfino struggles constantly with his representation of Proserpina, 
his memories of her, and her actual presence.  
El recuerdo de Proserpina servía de red a los contrincantes. ¡Un límite! 
Siempre el papel de mi amiga había de consistir en trazar un límite entre 
dos atmósferas. Una frontera entre el verano—al que pertenecían sus 
mejillas, sus cabellos rizados, la sonoridad de su voz y el invierno en el 
que se precisaban sus ojos, sus dientes, la fragilidad de su risa, la solidez 
de sus uñas, su modo inimitable de decir que no a los recuerdos. (136)70 
                                                       
70 The memory of Proserpina served as a net to her opponents. A limit! Her role as my friend had always 
consisted of drawing a limit between two atmospheres. A border between the summer-to which belonged 
her cheeks, her curly hair, the sonority of her voice and the winter in which she fixed her eyes, her teeth, 
the fragility of her laugh, the strength of her nails, her inimitable way of saying no to memories.  
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Memory is tied here to Proserpina’s bifurcation as it relates to the classical myth. A 
memory of her as she was, blocks access to connecting to her in the moment, a 
connection that shifts depending on which half of her life she is living. The broken 
phonograph record and Proserpina’s aging photograph function as the conduits for 
memory that holds Delfino partially in the past. These frozen records of history can only 
preserve her momentarily and their steady decay throughout the novel shows their 
dissolution into the irretrievable past. Even these items meant to preserve the past, are not 
immune from the passage of time. Technology can stave off the march of time, 
temporarily, but cannot sustain this halt on its own. In the novel, memory functions as 
both a preserver and an obstacle to insight. She shifts, moves, and escapes from one 
world to the other and any attempt to immortalize or contain her proves impossible.  
Like her mythological counterpart, Proserpina can only exist in each world (here 
coded as winter and spring, northern and southern, as well as reason and spirit) for a 
limited time. Every time she disappears from Delfino’s grasp she leaves him a note. The 
last one he received reads: “De Proserpina, a Delfino, antes de regresar a sus Infiernos” 
(157).71 The note is the last he hears from Proserpina until she calls his office years later. 
The content recalls her mythical counterpart in that she leaves the note as Delfino is 
leaving New York to travel back to Mexico to return to his work. The mythical 
Proserpina cyclically travels from the underworld to the world of the living, from winter 
to spring, and life to death. Here the novel’s Proserpina is slipping away from Delfino as 
he traverses the borderline between north and south, leaving Proserpina’s spiritual world 
for his scientific one. Cloaked in secrecy and distance, her notes are always mediated 
through either technology (the telephone and telegraph) or through her role as a medium, 
                                                       
71 From Proserpina, to Delfino, before returning to your Hell. 
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conjuring spirits, and speaking through the voices of the dead. Proserpina is a memory, a 
recording, a note recorded and retold in Delfino’s words.  
She only speaks in the present moment of the text in the final pages of the novel 
where she is slipping into unconsciousness and death. Delfino finds her on waiting for 
him in a hotel, surrounded by the impersonal trappings of an anonymous room. She is 
already hovering near death and for the first time in the novel, Delfino comes face to face 
with the woman he remembers. His mental image of her does not match this reality.  
Lo reconozco. Es el semblante de Proserpina. Como en su fotografía 
mutilada de pronto, para la despedida misteriosa de Nueva York, distingo 
inmediatamente, bajo las cejas, la ausencia de las pupilas obscuras. ¿Será 
posible que el presente de este rostro de momia corresponde a las 
facciones de la Proserpina que amé? (168)72 
None of Delfino’s memories match her present image. Already decaying, Proserpina is 
wasting away before his eyes like the crumpled photo he has held onto for years. He can 
barely recognize her as the woman she was and this meeting comes as a shock to him. He 
has not left room in his thoughts or ruminations about Proserpina to account for change. 
He has held onto a static image that cannot be fixed. 
Proserpina’s presence short-circuits whatever assumptions Delfino has about her, 
up to and including the cause of her illness. Delfino believes she is dying of 
complications from diabetes, a diagnosis she herself had given him. Yet in these final 
moments she claims she is dying of “impatience” (174), a body exhausted by living in 
                                                       
72 I recognize her. She is the semblance of Proserpina. As in her now mutilated photo, from the mysterious 
departure in New York, I distinguish immediately, under her brows, the absence of her dark pupils. Can it 
be possible that this present face of a mummy corresponds to the parts of Proserpina that I loved? 
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pieces. Her final plea, her final interruption is not a phone call or a broken recording or 
the voices of the dead, but her own voice.  
Proserpina me interrumpe: 
-No me rejuvenezcas. Adivino todo lo que estás pensando. No quiero ser 
un recuerdo. ¿Entiendes?…No quiero ser nunca un recuerdo de mí. (170)73 
Here on the brink of collapse, she refuses to be immortalized. Specifically, she refuses to 
become a fixed memory, flattened and unrecognizable. Her desire for disappearance is 
consistent with her elusive presence in the novel. She has run from Delfino’s attempts to 
get closer to her, disappearing for years at a time leaving only cryptic messages behind. 
Her final wishes are to disappear into nothingness, to erase the copies of herself once the 
original version, her actual presence, is gone.  
With all of her erasures, and uncertainties, the only technology she cannot escape 
is writing. Delfino finally fixes her presence in text, immortalizing her through the novel 
itself and recreating her life through his own perspective. She has called Delfino to help 
her die. She knows that he will administer the dose she needs to be at peace. This scene is 
the first time in Proserpina has been physically present in the novel, and it is the first time 
she speaks for herself, not as Delfino’s memory, but in her own voice. Yet, Delfino is the 
narrator here and even in this final moment, Proserpina is at the mercy of his text. As she 
fades out of existence, Delfino himself can no longer differentiate between her voice and 
his own. In a horrible moment of egoism, Delfino’s mind drifts from the task of giving 
Proserpina a fatal dose of morphine. He hears the clock strike outside and wonders 
whether or not he will have time to stop by the jeweler’s to buy Hortensia a Christmas 
                                                       
73 Proserpina interrupts me: Don’t rejuvenate me. I know what you’re thinking. I don’t want to be a 
memory. Do you understand? I don’t ever want to be a memory of myself. 
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present. As he is staring out the window the text includes the reassuring comment, “No te 
inquietes. Los sábados, los almacenes cierran más tarde. Si te apresuras…” (176).74 Yet 
the Torres Bodet does not clarify whether this comment was in Delfino’s mind or if it 
was a plea from Proserpina to hasten his administration of the morphine. The banality of 
the comment given the circumstances is unnerving as is Delfino’s uncertainty as to its 
origin. He asks: “¿Es a mi amiga a quien ha despertado esta frase? ¿Es a mí? No podría 
decirlo con certidumbre” (176).75 Delfino has claimed even Proserpina’s voice has his 
own, completing her disappearance. It is as if when Proserpina dies, the only voice left is 
Delfino’s. The line between them completely collapses. In this one moment in which the 
reader has an opportunity to approach Proserpina, Torres Bodet denies any direct contact. 
Instead, Delfino entirely mediates her presence through his own consciousness.  
Proserpina offers a unique challenge in that her bifurcated personality exists as 
both the modern girl of the early twentieth century with her wild abandon and spiritism, 
and as a modern girl as a professional, educated doctor. To be both of these things is 
already paradoxical, particularly in the 1930s, and in the presence of Delfino it is a 
double challenge to the male gaze to comprehend the complexities of either side of this 
persona. Both “Parálisis” and Proserpina conceptualize the link between memory and 
voice and its simultaneous separation of voice from body. Delfino’s condition, though 
able bodied, may not be as far from this paralyzed existence as it appears. His inability to 
hold onto Proserpina in any sense of permanence mirrors that of the husband whose wife 
is completely inaccessible to him and whose powers of perception are slowing falling 
away. As a paralytic he cannot reach out and embrace his wife nor can he react to her in 
                                                       
74 Don’t worry. On Saturdays, the stores close later. If you hurry… 
 
75 Is it my friend who has raised this phrase? Is it me? I could not tell with certainty.  
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any significant way. She must intuit from his silence his desires and his needs that are 
both invisible and inaudible to her. Similarly, Proserpina is always just out of Delfino’s 
reach. At best she is his for just part of the year as true to her mythological counterpart. 
She slips out of his grasp at every turn and when she does circle back into his life it is as 
a changed creature less accessible than the first.  
Both texts show a failing in perception that is gendered. The shift of the dominant 
sensorium from the visual to the aural alters the dominance of the male gaze, a totalizing 
vision of women based on their all-consuming spectatorship.  Sight and clarity are the 
signifiers of reason, and therefore masculinity, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Men are imagined to possess a clearer sense of vision that penetrates the dark recesses of 
science and philosophy. In a patriarchal society, men are in control of the social 
structures with women playing a subordinate role. As Laura Mulvey famously explains, 
men’s power to drive narrative structures manifests in the ability to look with women as 
the object of that gaze. “In a world ordered by sexual imbalance, pleasure in looking has 
been split between active/male and passive/female. The determining male gaze projects 
its fantasy on to the female figure which is styled accordingly” (837). The pleasure of 
looking, particularly at the female form, drives cinematic construction and voyeuristic 
images of women pervade narrative cinema, normalizing a heterosexual, misogynistic 
vision.  
 This vision is similarly present in literature, particularly in the heavily male 
dominated modernist movements. Women are often figured as mere images or easily 
extrapolated as metaphors. Their presence as characters in literary works is often 
incidental and they functions as objects for conquest or jealous contention between the 
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male characters rather than fully formed beings on their own. When vision is the 
dominant trope, these women are easily explained, consumed, and dominated by male 
narrators. Modernist texts often further this gendered sensibility. Sara Danius uses James 
Joyce’s Ulysses as a model to explain that “male characters…often perceive the world 
‘cinematically’…while major female protagonists…tend to perceive the world in what 
seems a more ‘organic’ manner’” (176). There is a gendered division in the hierarchy of 
senses that reaches from Ancient Greece through to modernity that defines the masculine 
and the feminine in terms of their modes of interpreting the world. When the script is 
flipped, dethroning vision for sound, the male gaze is rendered impotent. Removing male 
vision from the ultimate method of understanding the world means this vision can no 
longer fully interpret or assume mastery of women, or of the universe that surrounds her. 
  In Torres Bodet’s experimental inversion of the senses, the gendered nature of 
perception is still present, perpetuating the notion that women are more perceptive, or 
sensitive. Proserpina’s role as a medium emphasizes this characterization of women. She 
is a conduit for the voices of others. While still a passive role, simply ventriloquizing the 
speech of others, it is a realm that is cordoned off from men. According to Jeffrey 
Sconce, “the majority of mediums were women, and mediumship itself was thought to be 
a function of the unique ‘electrical’ constitution of women (12). Similarly, W.B. Yeats’ 
wife Georgie is the conduit for his automatic writing, acting as scribe for their 
“communications.” Her role is an indispensable one in the production of Yeats’ work, 
though Yeats downplays her participation as her writings are attributed to spirits. In these 
cases women are the vehicle, or the vessel that can contain communication or relay it, 
leaving little space for women to create or articulate information in their own right.  
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Torres Bodet further complicates this binary, however, by emphasizing the 
limitations of his male protagonists. In Proserpina’s case, she is fully capable of 
participating in Delfino’s world of reason in her capacity as a doctor and opts out of his 
world, a decision that is entirely illogical to Delfino. Her choice to exist in the world of 
spirits rather than science is baffling to him and pushes her even further out of his reach. 
In “Parálisis,” Luisa is the last connection the narrator has to the living world. Straining 
to hear all of these tiny details, her memory and, therefore, her image, are always fleeting. 
By simply closing the door to her husband’s sick room, she has the power to erase her 
presence to render herself inaudible/invisible. Despite their seemingly passive 
positioning, the aural, intuitive women escape the grasp of their narrators. They cannot be 
narrated or represented fully by these men who are limited, broken, and lacking in their 
sensory capabilities. While these women do not exactly have agency of their own, they 
do avoid capture. At the same time, the agency of the men is reduced in this modern 
sensorium. Reason alone seems insufficient as an antidote or organizing force in a chaotic 
mechanized world. The impulse to order the world still exists, yet in the face of prosthetic 
technologies that highlight the profound limitations of human perception; reason seems 
small and desperately inadequate.  
The destabilization of masculine power in these stories and other works from the 
Contemporáneos does not go unnoticed. The disruption of masculine power forms part of 
the defamatory accusations launched against the Contemporáneos by the nationalist 
factions of the vanguard. The disrupted male gaze is directly contradictory to the hyper-
masculinist discourse of the Estridentistas and their “virile” vision for the avant-garde, 
similar to the Italian Futurist cries to make a clean break from the decadent past and find 
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a love for speed, cars, and mechanism. Manuel Maples Arce’s 1923 “Manifiesto 
Estridentista” affirms as one of its key principles: “La exaltación del tematismo sugerente 
de las máquinas las explosiones obreriles que estrellan los espejos de los días subvertidos. 
Vivir emocionalmente. Palpitar con la hélice del tiempo. Ponerse en marcha hacia el 
futuro” (Maples Arce).76  This cutting manifesto also calls on Estridentistas to “shit on” 
popular idols, including Charlie Chaplin, and in the concluding section he directly asserts 
that “ser estridentista es ser hombre. Sólo los eunucos no estarán con nosotros” (Maples 
Arce).77 The Estridentistas arrive on the art scene alongside of the Contemporáneos. 
More radical and more experimental in their work than the Contemporáneos, the 
Estridentistas are also more aligned with the creation of a new Mexican nationalism.  
Like the futurists, nationalism becomes tied to a reassertion of hyper-masculinity in 
politics, art and in a vision for the future. 
The differences between the Contemporáneos and the Estridentistas carry 
resonances beyond a division between competing artistic movements. In 1934 Maples 
Arce, from his position as a parliament member during the Cárdenas administration 
openly attacked the Contemporáneos in a session in the House of Representatives calling 
to end, “la comedia de los maricones y el cinismo de los pederastas que se amparan bajo 
la naciente publicidad de Proust y Gide” (qtd. in Sheridan 132)78.  His attempts to cleanse 
the Mexican literary scene of what he sees as “effeminate” artists whose bourgeois 
international ties dilute the potency of Mexican culture, is part of what Salvador Oropesa 
                                                       
76 The exaltation of the suggestive theme-atism of machines, the labor explosions that smash the mirrors of 
these subverted days.  To live emotionally.  To palpitate with time’s propeller.  To put oneself in step with 
the future. 
 
77 To be an estridentista is to be a man. Only eunuchs will not be with us.  
 
78 The comedy of these fags and the cynicism of the pederasts that bolster themselves under the nascent 
publicity of Proust and Gide. 
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calls a “centuries-long tradition” (105) reaching back to the colonial era during which the 
Indian was stigmatized as a “sodomite.” Coding any “other” as effeminate or morally 
perverse reaffirms the “correct” moral stance of the dominant powers and acts as a 
division delineating those with power and those without.  
The nationalists of the Mexican Revolution adopt this same stance. The popular 
heroes of the Revolution like Villa and Zapata represent the outlaw, the hero, and 
embody the most masculine ideals of bravery and gumption. They mirror this masculinist 
speech as evidenced in Villa’s epithet for Obregón, leader of oppositional forces and later 
president, “El Perfumado” or sissy. The name questions both Obregón’s manhood and his 
military skill (Gonzales 148). This kind of rhetoric becomes the standard for the project 
of nation building. As these figures rise to prominence, nationalists, though representing 
two extremes of politics, fascists on one side and communists on the other, attacked the 
avant-garde, including the Contemporáneos, for their moral decadence and their 
affiliations with non-Mexican artists (Oropesa 11). These accusations ultimately result in 
the loss of bureaucratic positions in government for many Contemporáneos, as well as the 
dissolution of the group itself. Though this “grupo sin grupo” had its own internal 
problems and the tenuous links between the members were beginning to erode, the 
political pressures and the wider public turn toward a Estridentista/nationalist vision of 
Mexico are too much for the group to overcome.  
  The accusations against the Contemporáneos were not made on the members’ 
personal lives alone, but their texts were also used as evidence of their corruption of the 
artistic landscape through decadence. Pérez Firmat offers a detailed account of the critical 
reception of vanguard prose that marked it as degenerate or denaturalized. These novels 
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are described in contemporaneous reviews as not novels “but rather poems barely 
structured by feeble plots,” fragmentary, plotless, and as a “group of pearly snails, 
drooling metaphors” (36).  In describing vanguard novels with adjectives of decay and 
failure, these critical assessments transfer the same descriptors to the authors themselves, 
questioning their virility. Pérez Firmat summarizes this inclination as stemming from the 
notion that “the true novelist fathers; he begets a world; his creations are his children. But 
vanguard novelists are sissies, fags, or simply impotent. Their puny and ambiguous 
offspring bear witness to their enfeeblement” (37). Rather than viewing vanguard work as 
experimental and pushing the edges of genre and canon, these works are seen as 
regressive and even without a genre at all, falling somewhere between novel and poem. 
The broken male figure and the shift in the sensorium to a less masculine focused 
understanding of the world are threatening to the nationalist conception of Mexican 
literature and when the existing power structures are threatened their instinct is to re-
entrench established beliefs and virulently defend them.  
The possibilities for the future were wide open in this historical moment.  Sound 
recording, cinema and similar technologies opened the space for groups like the 
Contemporáneos to experiment and test new forms of expression. Yet, while the 
opportunities for a mechanized, globalized future can hold out an optimistic future with 
new epistemologies, they also destabilize the foundations of old epistemologies. These 
movements can be successful when they align with power structures as was true of the 
Italian Futurists, for example, whose hyper-masculine rhetoric fed into Mussolini’s 
fascist politics. Where they fail, as with the Contemporáneos is when they stray too far 
from the dominant cultural message. In the tumultuous political history of Mexico, the 
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nationalist factions found a sympathetic ear, closing the space for this type of sensory 
shift.   
The move toward fascism by groups like the Estridentistas and the Futurists is one 
that Benjamin predicts. For him fascism is the result of providing a means through 
technology for the masses to express themselves without access to a change in property 
rights. “Fascism is the introduction of aesthetics into political life” (Benjamin 23). While 
Benjamin was writing from Germany during the rise of Hitler and Mussolini, this same 
process can be seen in Mexico from the filming of Díaz’ regime, to Maples Arce and his 
political stand against the Contemporáneos and their “feminine writing.” According to 
Benjamin, the revelry in the future and in technology evidenced in the Estridentista and 
Futurist manifestoes only leads to war and destruction as the abundance of technological 
advancement and production outpaces their utilization. “The destructiveness of war 
furnishes proof that society has not been mature enough to incorporate technology as its 
organ, that technology has not been sufficiently developed to cope with the elemental 
forces of society” (Benjamin 24). Not yet ready for the powerful forces of the machine 
age, society renders useless the human potential. People like Proserpina have no home in 
this world while those like Delfino march forward with science as their god and reason 
their light, losing sight of the value of full human potential in favor of a technologically 
mediated world.  
This mediation increases with the proliferation of technologies. Proserpina 
rescatada functions as an example of this reciprocal relationship between the new 
configuration of the body through technology and the necessity for new modes of 
representation in text. While Delfino may be secure in his worldview, the darker side of a 
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technologically mediated become manifest in the modern security state. When 
technology, particularly that of surveillance, is used against the citizen there is little 
escape from the state’s monitoring, regulation and confinement of the body. Writing 
under these conditions in post-independence Ireland, Flann O’Brien reveals the horrors of 
listening and juridical manipulation in his satirical novel The Third Policeman. 
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CHAPTER V 
“I DO NOT CARE FOR CELERY”: SOUND, REPETITION, AND SURVEILLANCE 
IN THE THIRD POLICEMAN 
By 1939 in Ireland, the voice has taken on new resonances not from the 
technological advancements or aesthetic inventions, but instead from innovations in 
policing. The recorded voice becomes part of a state apparatus that turns voice against its 
own people. During the Civil War of the 1920s using informants, eavesdropping, and 
wiretapping are common practices in the military tactics of the war, the scars of which 
are still fresh in the 30s. Ireland’s declaration of neutrality in the initial moments of 
World War II also make the island a strategic location for espionage and spying activities 
for both Germany and England. In this space of listening, language, particularly the use 
of Irish, becomes a political issue. The Free State and Eamon de Valera’s government 
utilize these same tactics of interrogation and repression that were used by the British 
during occupation and by the Irish during the Civil War, against the IRA and other para-
military groups who refuse to recognize Ireland as a partitioned state and are dedicated to 
the cause of reunification. The subversion of these groups is seen as a threat to the fragile 
peace won after the Civil War and the new government passed legislation such as the 
“Offences Against the State Act” in order to contain them. In this atmosphere, speech is a 
dangerous liability. Government efforts to contain and to modernize come at the price of 
silencing Ireland’s citizenship, making speech a powerful form of dissent.  
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Under the pressures of modernity, a return to Ireland’s deep connection with 
orality opens up new possibilities of resistance. David Lloyd marks this space of 
resistance in the power of the “Irish orifice” a metonym for Irish culture and all that is 
associated with it, from famine to storytelling, to alcoholism. As both a site of 
degradation and of pride, the orifice has a long tradition in Irish culture, and one that has 
had the power to resist, react, and restore the Irish people. According to Lloyd, “an oral 
space is the resistance of certain forms of cultural and physiological practices of pleasure, 
desire, affect, and even need and grief, to the rationality of the modern state. The space of 
the ‘Irish orifice’ is…a counter-space of modernity” (15). The threat of the oral is visible 
in the Irish government’s repressive censorship regulations and unprecedented national 
system of policing (Lloyd 11), while its power in creating identity is evidenced in the 
new nation’s push for an Irish speaking state to differentiate it culturally from the 
English. From the “poor mouth” of the Famine, to the use of the Irish language as a 
political weapon, the Irish mouth has survived despite the traumas of colonization, civil 
war, and the threat of incarceration for dissidents.  
As a bilingual writer coming up in this tumultuous era, Brian O’Nolan79 exploits 
his deep linguistic knowledge to write satire that embraces this mode of resistance, 
exposing the holes, contradictions, and failures of the Irish government in the 
postcolonial state through ingenious language play and complex patterns of concordance 
between Irish and English. His novel The Third Policeman, written in 1939-40 and 
published posthumously in 1967, works together with a set of articles “The Cruiskeen 
Court of Voluntary Jurisdiction” and “The District Court” from 1942 to satirize the Irish 
                                                       
79 Although he is most widely recognized as Flann O’Brien, I will be referring to the author as Brian 
O’Nolan for clarity as this project deals with works written under two separate pseudonyms.  
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penal system and its obfuscation of language. His consistent and interconnected critique 
across these pieces shows a deep concern for the pressures of the modern state on 
language use. He exposes the legal dangers of restricting language use while also 
demonstrating the depth and possibilities of the Irish language when fully utilized, rather 
than as a nominal feature of a nationalist schema.  
O’Nolan’s work sits on the margins of most discussions of modern Irish literature. 
Though gaining importance, his work is notoriously difficult to classify. He uses a mythic 
mode and elements of pastiche like Joyce, and bends universes and realities like Beckett, 
yet he is often taken as a lesser version of them both. Much of the criticism surrounding 
his work begins and ends with a discussion of where to place him in the canon and where 
he falls in the spectrum of modernists and postmodernists. No cosmopolitan exile like 
these two greats, O’Nolan is an entrenched Dubliner, living, breathing, and working in 
the city. Therefore, analyzing his writing requires a broader knowledge of Ireland, its 
history, and its language, than even necessary for Joyce’s work. This cultural specificity 
is perhaps one reason why his work has not received a wider international audience. 
Adding to the complexity, O’Nolan’s work spans genres and shifts tone and style across 
each. He is the author of several novels, including At Swim-Two-Birds (1939), An Béal 
Bocht [The Poor Mouth] (1941), and The Third Policeman, as well as short stories, plays, 
television scripts, and over 3000 newspaper articles under his column “Cruiskeen Lawn” 
in The Irish Times, that ran from 1940 until he died in 1966 (Young, 112). His output is 
enormous, but because much of this work appeared in newspapers, it has only just begun 
to receive serious critical attention. This volume of work is reflective of just the work 
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written under his most familiar pseudonyms, Flann O’Brien and Myles na gCopaleen. 
Each of these pseudonyms has its own personality, voice and style.  
The criticism of his work often focuses on his Irish language novel An Béal Bocht 
as it relates to ideas of nationalism and responses to the Irish revival, or on his first novel 
At Swim Two Birds that draws heavily on Irish mythologies and history for its humor. 
Scholars of The Third Policeman are primarily concerned with the novel’s use of 
philosophy and epistemologies. Others see it as emblematic of the stagnant malaise of 
1930s Ireland with its cyclical plot and futile philosophies. My reading of O’Nolan’s 
work, brings together several of these threads. Rather than a postmodern exercise in 
futility as some critics claim, or a Derridian nightmare of non-ontology, O’Nolan’s 
linguistic network builds on these alternate philosophies to create a sprawling literary 
universe that opens out beyond the pages of the book rather than collapsing inward. The 
Third Policeman, while concerned with failing epistemologies, is not apolitical or an 
exhaustion of meaning, but rather a complexly layered satire on the limitations of 
language, and the pressures on that linguistic system in a security state, particularly a 
nominally bilingual state like Ireland. O’Nolan roots his satire in the gaps between the 
Irish and English languages and in the inconsistent policies of nationalism that this 
language division creates. O’Nolan’s levels of reference to his other texts, specifically his 
more clearly politically charged newspaper column, illustrate a continuity across his work 
that extends my reading of The Third Policeman outside of the bounds of the novel and 
into the political world of the young Irish Republic.  
As a member of the Irish Civil Service, O’Nolan works in the heart of Ireland’s 
political system, which, for many, failed to live up to the promise of revolution. 
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Independence came with the high price of deep economic recession worsened by an 
economic war with England that blocked Irish trade from the British markets (Rubenstein 
102). “Along with these historical obstacles came the social-psychological trauma of 
years of revolution and civil war, the exhaustion of revolutionary energies, and the return 
to the often sordid pragmatics of survival and everyday life” (Rubenstein 102). For 
O’Nolan, the best way to counter this malaise is through humor and absurdity.  
Satire has a long history as a political form. From Dryden and Pope to Swift and 
Cervantes, in times of political upheaval, satire often becomes a way to reveal the 
political violence that the state conceals (Connery 7). In addition, satirical works are 
often a blending of other forms and genres where the humor comes from joining disparate 
parts. This position is particularly useful for a postcolonial subject like O’Nolan, who 
inhabits a hybrid space of both his native Ireland and a transformed Ireland after British 
rule. From his vantage point, O’Nolan can see the incongruencies of these systems from 
the inside and from an outsider position using satire as mode of resistance to the political 
force of the new state. According to Clement Ball, “when satire blends languages, styles, 
or discourses in its parodic mode or as a form of humorous incongruity, satire theories are 
inclined to set up linguistic gaps as hierarchical determinants of evaluation” (23). The 
multilingual postcolonial environment magnifies the opportunity for collisions of 
language when the official language clashes with the local languages.  
 In Ireland the definitions of local and official languages are further complicated. 
In an effort to cast off England’s cultural dominance over Ireland, the new nation 
reclaims Irish as the official language of the state despite the fact that after hundreds of 
years of linguistic dominance, English was in fact the local language for the vast majority 
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of Irish citizens. O’Nolan was in a position to take full advantage of the collisions of 
language. His work is layered with linguistic play between these two languages, often 
capitalizing on the gaps in translatability and creating puns based in elaborate points of 
philology. As an Irish speaker “at a time when it was neither profitable nor popular” 
(Myles 203), he is acutely aware of the politics of language. British rule had instituted 
all-English classrooms and severely limited the teaching of Irish, even for those students 
for whom Irish was their first language, and issued fines for using Irish in the public 
sphere (Ó Buachalla 79). The independence movement and the Irish revival claimed the 
language as a marker of patriotism and defiance. In the Free State, it maintained this 
cultural significance and speaking Irish and regaining ancient traditions played a key part 
in nation building and in creating a new national identity apart from England.  
O’Nolan’s most complex uses of Irish as a site of linguistic resistance appear in 
his weekly newspaper column Cruiskeen Lawn. The column appears in the Irish Times 
from 1940-1966 under the name Myles na Gopaleen. His column iss polylingual with 
some posts written in Irish, many in English and several with heavy passages of Latin and 
French. Satirical and often hilarious, the columns show a particular fascination with the 
specificity of language and O’Nolan is a master of the pun. Regardless of which 
vocabulary he uses, O’Nolan, writing as Myles, continually calls attention to the gaps 
between languages and takes advantage of his linguistic fluidity to pun through both 
languages and invoke Irish syntax and connotations in English writing. From this 
position, he exposes the holes in the nationalist dedication to Irish language policies in a 
country where the majority of the citizenry spoke only English. To this end, the columns 
often lampooned infrastructure, legislation, and de Valera himself. His political satires 
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are most notable in his creation of fictional courtrooms in the series of articles collected 
as “The Cruiskeen Court of Voluntary Jurisdiction” and “The District Court.” 
The political atmosphere of the 1930s is one that is increasingly repressive, 
particularly to writers and dissenters. De Valera’s Fianna Fáil Party takes over in 1932 
and as they begin to solidify power and build a government structure, their policies 
become more conservative, favoring hardline Catholic mores and are increasingly 
intractable against those who deviated from these regulations. Writers and intellectuals 
chaff under these policies as well as the restrictive censorship laws. O’Nolan and other 
writers of his generation see de Valera as a target for their venom, often baiting the 
censors or lampooning de Valera (Dewsnap 28). As governmental restrictions grow, so 
too do the antagonisms and resentment from the populace. Although de Valera did much 
to separate the new nation from England politically, his government relied on harsh 
containment policies that tightened civil liberties and security in Ireland.  
When it comes to social policy, de Valera takes his cues from the Roman Catholic 
Church and reaffirms policies such as the harsh censorship legislation of 1929 that 
demonized writers “as dubious, presumably subversive characters” (qtd. in Fordonsk 70). 
Inciting writers already marginalized politically, the continuation of the Censorship 
regulations was a blow to this group. O’Nolan finds satire an appropriate weapon against 
these policies that render writing subversive and potentially seditious. The Censorship of 
Publications Act of 1929 ban any materials (book, periodical or advertisement) deemed 
“indecent or obscene or advocates the unnatural prevention of conception or the 
procurement of abortion or miscarriage or the use of any method, treatment or appliance 
for the purpose of such prevention or such procurement” (2.6). For the purposes of the 
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bill, the word “indecent” includes any materials “suggestive of, or inciting to sexual 
immorality or unnatural vice or likely in any other similar way to corrupt or deprave” 
(1.1). The terms of this act are interpreted broadly with the Censorship Board deciding 
individual cases. The punishments for being found guilty of these crimes of obscenity 
include a fine of up to fifty pounds and/or imprisonment for up to six months (2.10.2). 
These punishments extended not just to the author, but also to anyone who prints, 
publishes, sell, or mails offending documents; because the liability extended this far, 
publishers and editors become increasingly reluctant to take a chance on anything that 
might be construed as “indecent.”  
As Myles, O’Nolan used the “Court of Voluntary Jurisdiction” to expose the 
idiocy and ineffectiveness of de Valera’s cultural policies. In one column, a shopkeeper is 
named a defendant in a case regarding the selling of a book “while not indecent, was in 
its general tendency indecent” (141). The lawyers, Faix on the defense and Lax on the 
prosecution, argue for the judge to rule on the book, which Lax admits he has never read. 
The judge quickly agrees to read this “nefarious trash” so as not to sully the lawyers. 
Upon his return, he concludes that the cover is from Flaubert’s Madame Bovary and that 
this image “while tending to immodesty according to the severer standards of the present 
age, could not reasonably be held to be indecent” (142). In Madame Bovary’s obscenity 
trial in France in 1857, the prosecutor, Ernest Pinard thought it impossible to read the 
entirety of the novel to the jury due to its length and settled for summarizing it and 
reading only the offending portions aloud in the courtroom (Karolides 383). The irony is 
of course, that in order to protect the people from these horribly offensive sections, they 
have to be read allowed in open court. In this original case, which generated an immense 
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amount of media attention, Flaubert and his publishers were eventually acquitted. 
Although, the French courts saw the text as offensive enough to bring to trial, only the 
particularly offensive scenes were deemed worthy of scrutiny. Part of O’Nolan’s critique 
is directed at this blind assessment of literature. The censors themselves are rarely 
evaluating the whole of any text, simply the passages flagged and underlined by the 
offended party (Adams 73).  
O’Nolan’s satire extends to an additional level in this article, as the text under 
review is not Flaubert at all. The judge declares that, “the tone throughout is elevated, 
urbane, even technical. It appears to be ‘An Outline of Irish Grammar’ and is the work of 
the Irish Christian Brothers. This work bears no obvious relation to the illustration I have 
mentioned” (142). While the cover is from Bovary, the contents are an Irish grammar 
book. The case is dismissed on these grounds, which leaves at issue why the contents 
would be so different from the cover. O’Nolan reverses the traditional notion of banned 
material. Typically, when one buys a smutty magazine or a banned book, he or she might 
replace the dust jacket with another, or hide the magazine inside a mundane one. Here, a 
mundane grammar book is hidden inside a book that had famously been banned.  
This reversal operates on at least two levels. First, it makes Irish grammar 
something shameful, as someone looking to buy Madame Bovary undoubtedly would be 
very disappointed to find this incongruence. Keith Booker also proposes that the judge 
has kept Bovary for himself and replaced the contents with a grammar book, secretly 
more tempted than he should be in his position as arbiter of the censorship laws (29-30). 
Second, it ties issues of Irish language policy back into an accusation of an offense 
against the morality of the state. In this case, the defendant is characterized as a “member 
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of the Gaelic League, a fluent speaker of Irish and a graduate of Cardinal Newman’s 
university” in other words a good and loyal citizen of the new state upholding all of its 
cultural tenets. In the court’s eyes, he would seem beyond reproach and hardly a 
candidate for prosecution. His cultural affiliations are provided as a defense for the 
charge of immorality.  
Finally, it satirizes the blind fury in prosecuting censorship. Mr. Lax refuses to 
even look at the accused text, much less read it. Censorship boards are rarely noted for 
their artful interpretations of texts and act in response to public outcry without much of 
their own analysis. The reactionary politics of censorship are evident in the case of the 
Ulysses, a persecution that O’Nolan laments. Though he often has sharp words for Joyce 
and his obliteration of comprehensible language, O’Nolan understands the monumental 
place Joyce’s book holds in literary history and though not surprised, is dismayed that it 
too falls victim to the whims of the censorship boards (Clissman 223). The choice to use 
Madame Bovary as the example of indecent literature and censorship at first seems 
strange. Ulysses’s obscenity trial or even Oscar Wilde’s might be a more Irish referent in 
this scenario. The use of Madame Bovary, however, distances O’Nolan from directly 
critiquing the Irish censors providing a safer position for satire. Although the courtroom 
is still clearly Irish, adding a banned Irish text as a marker would bring O’Nolan’s 
criticism into too sharp a relief. It would lose the humor of the incongruence and risk 
slipping simply into a direct critique of government policy. At the same time, the images 
of Madame Bovary on the cover more clearly create a visual link between pornography 
and literature. This connection, and the court’s inability to differentiate between the two, 
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is the object of O’Nolan’s ire. The court appears absurd and non-functional in this 
column exposing censorship as the ridiculous sham that it is.  
The series of articles that comprise the “Cruiskeen Court of Voluntary 
Jurisdiction” are primarily concerned the power of language to offer an escape from the 
restrictive legal policies, including censorship, through wit and double speech. The series 
as a whole is an extended pun on the word jurisdiction, to speak or say law. In the 
courtroom there is a fixation on legal jargon and the hazards of obscurantism in the legal 
system. The first column in the sequence describes the fictional origins of this alternative 
court: 
Owing to (pressure) (of work) in the courts of justice, withdrawal of 
judges, electric heaters, bicycle-crime and other matters, the public 
spirited Myles na gCopaleen Central Research Bureau has persuaded 
several impatient litigants to bring their differences before the Cruiskeen 
Court of Voluntary Jurisdiction. This institution conducts its proceedings 
in English and ‘recognizes’ only those statutes which are ‘recognisable for 
the purposes of the court’. Since nobody knows what this means, the 
‘lawyers’ do not like to spend too much time rehearsing jargon and citing 
‘cases’, fearing that the whole spiel will be ruled out as ‘inadmissable’. (na 
gCopaleen 137) 
Judge Twinfeet, who presides over this courtroom, polices language more than any law, 
refusing the use of “Latinities” in his presence. His name alone already calls attention to 
an idea of doubling, and standing on both sides of the law. By setting the rules of 
language, dictating what can and cannot be said, the Judge alters the code of law at whim. 
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The lawyers cannot fully explain their case when the Judge perpetually corrects, strikes 
and redefines words in the middle of the proceedings. Only those statutes deemed 
recognizable can be utilized and then those statutes are rendered useless when the 
language they are written in cannot be used in full. The use of gratuitous parentheses and 
quotation marks in the above passage enacts this undercutting of language, putting these 
seemingly innocuous words under suspicion with parentheses and quotation marks. 
Furthermore, the judge decrees that, “every word uttered in this court is legal” (Myles 
138). In deeming every utterance in court legal, he grants all words equal power in the 
space of the courtroom. At the same time, his rules deny the possibility for illegality of 
speech. Without boundaries or delineations, law becomes both omnipotent and useless. In 
a space where language is already exacting and performative, the arbitrary policing of 
these terms breaks down the contract between speaker and listener. In very few spaces 
does the speech act have more of an impact than in court where testimony is evidence and 
speech is the key weapon in either denying or obtaining liberty; when this contract is 
broken, justice becomes impossible. 
O’Nolan enacts this critique most clearly in “The District Court” articles in 
Cruiskeen Lawn. Here, the defendant is a man who gives his name as Myles na 
gCopaleen charged with “begging, disorderly conduct, using bad language and with 
being in possession of an arm-chair. He was also charged with failing to register as an 
alien” (149). He “gives his name” as Myles, the same name as the author, but is also 
described as elderly creating distance between the author and the subject of the article 
and complicating notions of identity. From the first encounter “Myles” has with the 
police his identity is unclear and he is immediately under suspicion. He identifies himself 
  
 191 
as a republican soldier who “had as much right to obstruct the throroughfare as the 
‘Fianna Fáil crowd’” (149). The defendant invokes the name of de Valera’s party that had 
control of the government at the time this piece was written, separating himself politically 
from this party claiming the same rights as those in power. In identifying himself as a 
republican soldier, one who would have fought against the Fianna Fáil government in 
favor of a unified Ireland, he creates even more distance, marking himself as a dissident 
and an outsider. The police read him as such explaining to the judge that: “this type of 
person gives the police a lot of trouble” (149). By the time he walks in the courtroom, the 
police and the judge have already made decisions about him and his role in Irish society.  
Raising the suspicions of the police even more, he enters the courtroom speaking 
Latin rather than English. The court officers do not understand him and assume he is 
speaking Irish. The inability of the police to understand him calls into question the charge 
against the man for the use of bad language. The term bad is never qualified and could 
mean an incorrect usage of English, offensive language, or simply incomprehensible 
language. In front of the judge the Detective Sergeant later proclaims: “This man had no 
difficulty in speaking English when he was lying in the street. This sort of thing makes a 
farce of the language movement” (149). The farce of it all lies in the symbolic declaration 
of Irish as the official language of the state. While official representatives of that state, 
including legal professionals and the Gardá who were required to know the language for 
entry into service (Ranelagh 220), here they cannot even distinguish the national 
language from Latin, much less speak it or conduct the affairs of the nation in this 
language. The Irish orifice in this case uses the Irish language as a tool for evasion, 
manipulating language to avoid detection. 
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The Latin Myles uses is not simply conversational Latin, instead he intersperses 
quotes from Horace and Cicero into his conversation The quotations are not randomly 
placed in the text and, when translated, fit into the English discussion. They also carry a 
political charge. For instance, when the police first confront the suspect he responds with 
the opening line from Horace’s Epode 6 “Quid immerentes hospites vexas, canis, Ignavus 
adversum lupos?” (149).80  This erudite invective marks the policeman as a cowardly 
aggressor and the defendant as simply a harmless passerby. While Horace’s work rails 
against misuses of iambs and poor poets, here the phrase takes on a more menacing tone 
establishing a power struggle between the police and the republican. The article can be 
read without the Latin gloss and it still holds power as a critique, but the additional 
understanding of the quotations gives the article a much darker tone. For Catholics, these 
passages from Horace and Cicero might have been familiar from Latin lesson books and 
translation exercises. In the 1930s, Catholic mass is still said in Latin and the echoes of 
this language are far more familiar to that audience, learned or not. In the text, O’Nolan 
also includes stage directions, of sorts, with “(Laughter)” following each of the 
defendant’s speeches, indicating at least the courtroom audience has caught on to the 
humor. Irish speaking Catholics have the benefit of all three languages and are in on 
Myles’ joke. For those who do not have linguistic access, much of the political thrust of 
this set of articles is lost.  
The article also contains two passages from the Pro Sestio, Cicero’s address to the 
Senate in defense of Sestius against charges of “public violence” (Kaster 18). Cicero 
defends Sestius’ character and also paints them both as good patriots of Rome. In 
                                                       
80 Why do you harass unoffending strangers, dog, but flee at the sight of wolves? (Watson 256) 
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O’Nolan’s piece “Myles,” is defending himself against charges from the state and has 
already positioned himself as a republican, one who would have seen himself as a 
champion of the state of Ireland as a unified nation. “Myles” cites section 47 of this work 
in his response to the Justice: 
 Justice:…Are you married? 
 Defendant: Are you? 
 Justice: Impertinence won’t help you. 
Defendant: It won’t help anybody. The questions you put is apparently 
equally offensive to both of us. I am a victim of circumstances. Maioribus 
praesidiis et copiis oppugnatur res publica quam defenditur, propterea 
quod audaces homines et perditi nutu impelluntur et ipsi etiam sponte sua 
contra rem publicam incitantur. (149)81 
While the question itself is banal, the response with its use of Cicero reveals a much 
larger critique. Rather than simply a vagrant or public nuisance as the court would like to 
see him, the defendant articulates his position as a political one, a victim of the 
circumstances of civil war that find him on the losing side. Yet, with this reference, 
“Myles” also sees himself as a necessary guard of the republic, a defender of the nation. 
While in the Roman context, Sestio would be aquitted of all charges, soon after Cicero 
would be exiled from Rome and under threat of death if he returned.  
 This element of exile is present in this set of articles as well. When “Myles” is 
arrested, the Detective Sergeant mentions that the defendant had been previously 
                                                       
81 The wicked would have been beaten. Yes, but they were fellow-citizens who would have been beaten, by 
resort to arms, by a person without public standing who even as consul had preserved the commonwealth 
without a resort to arms. (Kaster 61) 
 
  
 194 
“convicted for loitering at Swansea in 1933” (149). While this detail provides evidence of 
a prior prison record, it also carries further resonances. Swansea is a town and a prison in 
Wales, not in Ireland, making this defendant more than a mere local ruffian and 
presumably arrested in the United Kingdom and not on Irish soil. In addition, O’Nolan 
marks the year of the conviction as 1933, which is the year Fianna Fail begins to 
consolidate its power. In July of 1933, de Valera dismisses Eoin O’Duffy, former head of 
the IRA and an active militant in the war for independence, as head of the Garda 
Siochána. O’Duffy forms the fascist Blueshirts as the “National Guard” and shortly 
thereafter the Fine Gael party with right leaning opposition to Fianna Fail. The resulting 
clashes between the IRA and the Blueshirts lead to a major crackdown from the 
government and both groups are outlawed in 1936 (Ranelagh 227-8). Much like Cicero 
heading into his own exile, 1933 is a moment in which dissidents like “Myles” would 
find their support dwindling and their influence over the functions of government 
eroding.  
 “Myles” comments directly on his political position in the second installment of 
this series. After his arrest, “Myles” is let out on bail, but instead of heading home, he 
breaks back into the prison having “filed through certain iron bars […] He was found in 
an intoxicated condition when found and used bad language. He demanded cocoa and 
used certain threats” (152). The charge of bad language is again levied against the 
defendant after again lambasting the Sergeant with Latin citations, leaving no doubt now 
that the reference to bad language is in using not foul language, but the wrong language. 
In addition, the reason he breaks back into Mountjoy, Dublin’s main prison, is purely 
political: 
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Defendant, in the course of a long address, said that he was ‘a Southern 
Irishman,’ and as such could not accept with equanimity the suggestion 
that he should (by mere reason of being out on bail) reside in Belfast, ‘a 
stern iron town of aspect unendearing of populace contumacious.’ (152) 
Pitting himself as the republican Southern Irishman, calling attention to the partition, the 
defendant would rather stay in jail than stay one night in Belfast, a city that for him is 
occupied territory. Yet here, where the political claim might be the strongest in the 
article, O’Nolan obfuscates the narrative. Whereas much of this article and the others that 
comprise “The District Court” selection are told as if we are reading a transcript of court 
proceedings, in this passage, the narrator/court reporter denies the details of the 
defendant’s impassioned plea. The “course of the long address” is not rendered in the 
article and his additional reasons based on “principles that far transcended expediency” 
(152) remain unheard. While the use of Latin by the Defendant exposes the hypocrisy of 
the Irish legal system, the silencing of the Defendant works as the final arbiter. Removing 
and erasing his words from the narrative gives more power to the narrator/court reporter. 
For all of his articulate citations and well-reasoned defense, “Myles” leaves the 
courtroom in exactly the same position in which he came in. He is cleared of all charges, 
but will likely be right back in the same courtroom, a nameless, powerless defendant.    
In addition to the necessity for a straight translation or gloss of the Latin texts in 
order to grasp the full implications of the text, O’Nolan also plays with the space between 
languages, particularly Irish, English, and Latin. While sound, particularly human sound 
and speech are critical elements of O’Nolan’s work, these sounds are also rendered into 
text shifting their medium and therefore, their impact on the reader/listener. As is true in 
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Joyce’s Finnegan’s Wake, at times you must be able to both read and hear O’Nolan’s 
words to have access to their meaning. According to Brooker, “to think of Flann 
O’Brien’s work as a matter of sound and breath is not to say that speech should be 
elevated above writing, or that the path between them is always straight” (18). Often with 
O’Nolan the phonetic play is only legible in text. Anne Clissman points to a moment in 
O’Nolan’s writings where he laments the limitations of verbal expression in that it cannot 
convey the visual elements of language.  
At dinner some nights ago, I said with great bitterness “Do have some 
Carrageen mBás.” No one laughed at this shiny sarah (or brilliant sally). I 
decided immediately that this oral mechanism is a very poor affair. It 
cannot communicate an essentially visual joke. (22 Feb 1943) (qtd. in 
Clissman 198) 
The element of print aids in the construction of any good pun. Here, he replaces the 
English word moss for the Irish word mBás, a homophone that translates to the word 
death in English. As is the classic case of Derrida’s difference and differánce, being able 
to both see and hear the word in play opens up the dimensions of language in a way that 
is lost to homophones. The dinner guests miss the joke without the visual representation 
of the word.  
In “The District Court” O’Nolan forces the reader to phonetically pronounce 
words in English in order to “hear” the Irish or Latin root behind it. For instance, when 
the defendant becomes increasingly agitated that he is not understood in Latin he 
declares, “Begob if I used the word ownshuck you might take my meaning!” (152). 
O’Nolan spells the Irish word “óinseach” phonetically as if it were in English with the 
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word “ownshuck.” The insult, óinseach means fool or idiot, is called into being through 
English. With O’Nolan, the reader has to hear the text and be able to recognize the 
resonances of the other language and then back translate the words in order to make sense 
of them. In an English speaking court, serving a bilingual population, the necessity for 
understanding across languages is crucial and na gCopaleen exposes the limits and the 
problems of miscommunication in such a legal setting. While the Irish subject is at the 
center of the witticism, the hero of this episode, his body is the mercy of the court and his 
freedom depends on the judge’s ruling.  
Once O’Nolan has set up this pun, he reuses the strategy later in the article, but 
this time in Latin. The court has decided to let the defendant go free. “The Sergeant, 
having consulted with the Justice, said that he was prepared, on behalf of the State, to 
enter a nolly prossy coy. That would withdraw all charges” (153). The Latin phrase would 
be “nolle prosequi”- “we shall no longer prosecute.” Here the meaning is clear through 
the context of the sentence without a translation and the phrase it italicized in the text to 
call attention to it, in a way that the Irish was not. Latin, the root language of the judicial 
system in English becomes intertwined with English and Irish as the punning strategy 
implicates them all at once. When the defendant speaks Latin, it is also in italics, but is 
not spelled phonetically. The only time this italicized, phonetic form occurs is when the 
court officials attempt to use Latin. Nolle presequi is actually a judicial phrase, but it is 
corrupted here in a distortion of language. These kinds of dexterous language maneuvers 
reaffirm the deep connection between the aural, the oral, and the written in O’Nolan’s 
work. Although O’Nolan uses printed writing, a primarily visual medium, as his tool, the 
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aural is pivotal in gaining access to his works, whether that be through visual/oral puns 
like these, cadence, or double entendre, the ear is just as vital as the eye.  
 Although O’Nolan wrote these columns under the Myles na gCopaleen 
pseudonym, these pieces contain elements that provide a continuity across pseudonyms 
and that connect the works to each other. The most obvious connection between the 
column and the novel is the name Cruiskeen, an anglicized version of the Irish word 
“cruiscín,” often translated as little jug. It is also a reference to a measurement of 
whiskey; one might have a pint of beer or a cruiscín of whiskey. The word also carries 
with it the resonances of the folksong “Cruiscin Lan” that sings the praises of whiskey 
and jovial debauchery.82 Therefore, The Third Policeman’s Sergeant MacCruiskeen is 
“son of the full jug” a son of debauchery, or created from drunkenness. The last name 
also gives the Sergeant a hereditary link to the columns, born out of the experiments in 
the press. More significantly, O’Nolan has also used cruiskeen as a word for jail, similar 
to the English expression “in the clink.”83  
The name Myles na gCopaleen is itself a reclaiming of Irish stereotypes as the 
name comes from an 1860 Dion Boucicault play The Colleen Bawn (a title that 
coincidentally rhymes with Cruiskeen Lawn). Myles is a blundering and occasionally 
witty main character who represents the worst of Irish stereotypes for British audiences at 
                                                       
82 In the Cyclops episode of Ulysses, Joyce uses this term with the same anglicized spelling as O’Nolan in 
his description of the citizen: “There he is, says I, in his gloryhole, with his cruiskeen lawn and his load of 
papers, working for the cause” (12.122). The citizen is coded in the Linati schema as the representation of a 
Fenian nationalist and perhaps a parodic inspiration for this Irish language column.  
 
83 In Myles na Gaeilge Brendán Ó Conaire cites some of the expurgated passages from An Béal Bocht…[in 
which] the old grey fellow tells Bónapárt that his father is ‘sa chrúiscín (in the jug) Bónapárt peers into the 
jug, hoping for a glimpse of the man who sired him. This is a prime example of the multi-dimensional, 
linguistic power of a bilingual writer. The ‘jug’ is an English slang word for prison, but the same does not 
hold true in Irish.” (Farnon 96) 
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a time when the Irish are in the midst of famine and real suffering at home (Kiberd 497). 
In reclaiming this name that had been co-opted for foreign consumption, O’Nolan 
defends the image and representation of the Irish through his satire of these 
misappropriations. His parody is a take down of some of these stereotypes written in Irish 
for an Irish audience. The word “cruiscín” connects Myles na gCopaleen the column 
writer, with Myles na gCopaleen the Irish speaking author of An Béal Bocht and Flann 
O’Brien the writer of novels including The Third Policeman. Sergeant MacCruiskeen 
takes on the same linguistic trickery as the court officials of the District Court and 
oversees the jails of the Parish. These similarities expose a continuity across O’Nolan’s 
pseudonyms and works to reveal a more cohesive literary universe than typically ascribed 
to O’Nolan’s expansive career.  
The Third Policeman though not utilizing Irish in the same way as the texts 
written under the Myles na gCopaleen pseudonym, enacts the same obfuscation of 
language as a satirical critique of de Valera’s nation building policies. Here, O’Nolan 
takes the Irish orifice to its furthest extremes, testing the boundaries of language and the 
powers of speech. In the surreal space of the novel, he turns language into a weapon that 
can both be used as evidence in the judicial system and as a physical source of energy in 
supply of the state through mystical machinery. In doing so, O’Nolan ties speech to the 
power of the security state. When speech can very literally be held against you, and when 
the policemen of this surreal world are always listening, recorded speech becomes a 
weapon of the state and makes the citizen a target of constant surveillance.  
Though the novel has dark undercurrents and an unnerving tone, The Third 
Policeman is first and foremost a work of humor. As Keith Booker explains, this text is 
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an example of a Menippean satire that “employs fantastic imagery and situations in order 
to create extraordinary situations for the testing of philosophical ideas” (46). O’Nolan 
creates the space for fantastic situations by placing his narrator in a surreal afterlife. The 
unnamed narrator is an inept scholar who spends his life working on a definitive codex 
for the work of de Selby, an eccentric philosopher. In his concentration, he shirks the 
duties of his own life and falls victim to a con man, Divney, who convinces him to rob 
and murder his neighbor, Old Mathers, for the money to publish the Codex. Divney 
double crosses him and booby-traps the cashbox to explode, killing the narrator. 
Although neither the narrator, nor the reader, will realize he has died until the end of the 
novel, the book is told posthumously as he wanders a hellscape referred to as “the Parish” 
guarded by three strange policemen. In this dream space, neither social nor physical laws 
hold and the narrator must shift his modes of thinking to accommodate the twisted laws 
and logic of this place. While Booker contends that O’Nolan’s satire is aimed at the 
failures of modern epistemologies, I argue that it also satirizes the ineptitudes of the Irish 
government in this era, drawing the satire out from an enclosed search for philosophical 
Truth and into contemporary political contentions. In a world where the laws of physics 
and creation are mutable, speech becomes both a powerful weapon and a serious liability. 
Throughout his surreal journey through the afterlife, the narrator’s ability to speak 
keeps him grounded and provides him with a sense of security in his own existence. 
When the narrator awakes in the Parish everything seems familiar yet the change is 
“indescribably subtle, yet momentous, ineffable” (23); the colors appear too saturated and 
the air feels more rarified. In this world, the man the narrator murdered is sitting before 
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him, alive, and nothing quite makes sense. He only recovers the facility of his senses 
once he begins to speak and to hear the sound of his own voice.   
Suddenly I began to talk. Words spilled out of me as if they were 
produced by machinery. My voice, tremulous at first, grew loud and filled 
the whole room. I do not remember what I said at the beginning. I am sure 
that most of it was meaningless but I was too pleased and reassured at the 
natural healthy noise of my tongue to be concerned about the words. (26) 
His speech begins mechanically as if produced automatically. It is only when he begins to 
regain control of his own voice and his words, that he recovers his sense of self and of 
reality. The words themselves are less important than hearing himself utter human 
sounds; the more human the sound, the more at ease he feels. Here the Irish orifice gives 
him confidence and the self-assurance to navigate this new world. This initial moment in 
the Parish marks an emerging pattern in the novel, in which speaking is not only key to 
maintaining a sense of orientation, but also to regulating the boundaries of this world. 
 The power of the voice to function as a reminder of the narrator’s humanity 
returns in moments when the surreal rules of this hellscape stretch beyond simple human 
understanding. The laws of physics do not function as they do in the reader’s world. Here 
they are bent and twisted beyond human logic, yet familiar in their base analyses. The 
narrator feels compelled to find the police station as a sort of safe haven. He hopes the 
police will help him recover what he has lost. While in his addled, newly dead brain, he 
thinks he has lost his watch, what he actually needs help finding is his home and his 
identity. Yet, the police are no solace. At the station, he discovers they have nothing to 
offer but insane machinery and nonsensical explanations in the face of which he needs to 
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search deeply for his own humanity in order to stay focused and centered. The sound of 
his own voice singing is all that keeps him sane. 
The officer who shares his name with Myles’ column, Policeman MacCruiskeen, 
is a tinkerer. He has created a number of inventions that demonstrate the strange 
capacities of this world, one of which is a series of carved chests that stack like Russian 
dolls, each one holds a slightly smaller version of itself. Instead of stopping at just five or 
six, there are twenty-nine of MacCruiskeen’s chests the smallest of which is so small it 
cannot be seen by the human eye. Confronted with this dizzying logic after observing the 
chests, the narrator finds solace in singing an old familiar song. “I gave him back the 
glass instrument and took to the chair without a word. In order to reassure myself and 
make a loud human noise I whistled the Corncrake Plays the Bagpipes” (74). Though no 
such song exists, its title recalls a children’s song or and old ballad, something nostalgic 
that would bring thoughts of home. At this point, any loud sound will do, the more 
human the better. As reality becomes stranger and stranger, the narrator must retreat to 
the depths of language to find his center.  
The narrator’s refuge into song reflects a deep connection to language as the most 
human as expression, that links him to a history of humans beyond his own immediate 
condition. This sentiment has roots in the Enlightenment philosophies of Condillac and 
Rousseau who mark song as the most originary of all human language. According to 
Rousseau, song reaches back beyond human speech to its origins in emotive, passionate 
cries.  
With the first voices came the first articulations or sounds formed 
according to the respective passions that dictated them…Thus rhythm and 
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sounds are born with syllables: all voices speak under the influence of 
passion, which adorns them with all their éclat. Thus verse, singing, and 
speech have a common origin…the first discourses were the first songs. 
(50) 
Rousseau’s speculative origin of man dictates that the first human words are formed from 
empassioned pleas of pain, desire, or need. Song differentiates these sounds from those of 
inarticulate animals who cannot turn these sounds into the larger framework of formal 
language. In the narrator’s journey through the afterlife, he returns to the beginning of the 
history of speech to find meaning. If no other laws of nature hold true, travelling back to 
the origins of man is one of his few recourses. For him, this is an instinctual act. Talking 
to himself does not work, and in light of even more perplexing details of this world he 
moves even further back in time to access a more direct root emotion.  
Yet, O’Nolan removes even this bit of solace for the narrator when song itself is 
no longer accessible to him. Slowly torturing the narrator through his logical conundrums 
and mystical machines, MacCruiskeen shows the narrator his device that looks like a tiny 
piano that plays notes outside the realm of human hearing. Only MacCruiskeen can hear 
its music and in this scenario, the absence of human sound becomes extremely unsettling 
to the narrator:  
[MacCruiskeen] got up and went to the dresser and took out his patent 
music-box which made sounds too esoterically rarefied to be audible to 
anybody but himself…What he was playing could be roughly inferred 
from his face…The silence in the room was so unusually quiet that the 
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beginning of it seemed rather loud when the utter stillness of the end of it 
had been encountered. (105) 
The image of a gargantuan policeman tapping his feet to what the narrator imagines as 
“obstreperous barn-songs and gusty shanties of the sea and burly roaring marching-
songs” (105) without any sound is an eerie one. The silence becomes nearly audible in 
the absence of any other noise and creates an unsettling atmosphere in which the 
narrator’s typical retreat to voice or song is rendered useless. In his role as a policeman, 
MacCruiskeen has access to classified information of sorts. He knows the limits of what 
is possible in the Parish and has a better command of the rules and regulations than the 
narrator. In his musical performance, he has taken this last refuge of sound out of the 
hands of the narrator. Song can no longer be reassuring if those notes are sung or played 
in a range beyond hearing.  
In The Third Policeman, the reliance on the ear when all other elements of logic 
fail reinforces the archaic nature of speech. Yet, in this world of storytelling, everyone 
lies. O’Nolan’s world is full of conmen, criminals, and policemen. Strangely, the only 
other voice that the narrator can rely on is that of his own soul. This soul takes the form 
of a disembodied voice that acts as a guide for the narrator, urging him to listen to the 
clues around him and warning him of potential dangers. This voice, one he has never 
heard before, comes from nowhere and is dislocated from a physical being.  
Never before had I believed or suspected I had a soul, but just then I knew 
I had. I knew that my soul was friendly, was my senior in years and was 
solely concerned for my own welfare. For convenience I called him Joe. I 
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felt a little reassured to know that I was not altogether alone. Joe was 
helping me. (25) 
Joe knows more about what is happening than the narrator and is more “senior in years.” 
Joe is a source of comfort who provides the narrator with a sense of place and connection 
across time. His voice rings clearly through the chaos and although Joe has no physical 
presence, through his voice he feels more “real” to the narrator than any of the other 
elements in this world. As the narrator attempts his first conversation in the Parish, Joe 
leads him through it, telling him to “listen very carefully” and “ask him to continue” (TP 
29). He helps the narrator determine the boundaries of the world and to adjust his 
thinking, prodding him to “use his imagination” when logic fails him. 
As the narrator becomes more at home in the hellscape, he begins to question the 
nature of this world including the Joe’s possible physical composition. Now that he has a 
basic conception of how this universe operates, he can begin to look critically at its 
components. The narrator ponders what his existence would be if Joe had a physical 
presence of his own. 
What if he had a body? A body with another body inside of it in turn 
thousands of such bodies within each other like skins of an onion receding 
to some unimaginable ultimatum? Was I in turn merely a link in a vast 
sequence of imponderable beings, the world I know merely the interior of 
the being whose inner voice I myself was? Who or what was at the core 
colossus? God? Nothing? (TP 118) 
Each “soul” can only directly interact with the next closest in the chain. The thought is at 
once terrifying to the narrator and awesome. He experiences simultaneously a feeling of 
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interconnectedness and a sense of vertigo as he strains to grasp the enormity of his 
newfound postulate. For the reader, Joe’s voice is the first clue that the narrator is 
actually dead at this point of the novel. In death the narrator has been granted access to 
information about the imponderables of the universe and gains a much vaster perspective 
than afforded him in life, and Joe is his conduit for this information. 
The implication of these multiple voices is that they belong to a longer unending 
chain of voices. The voice is a guide that keeps the narrator focused on his own being and 
establishes a sense of reality. In this dependence on hearing his own voice for 
reassurance, the text re-establishes the importance of the individual voice and presence 
that is missing in the wake of recording technologies and modern surveillance. The 
ability to maintain the cohesion between body and voice is not guaranteed in this world, a 
place where the voice can be recorded, kept and used against the speaker. In the Parish, 
the precious nature of the unique utterance, the ability to maintain the connection 
between the speaker and the utterance, warrants protection. In order to alleviate the 
possibility of words being used against the speaker, he must take care in the words he 
uses and in whose company they are uttered. The interplay between the police who guard 
the surreal world and the accused narrator navigates the space between personal identity 
and state identity through the security state’s instrumentalization of the voice. 
The chain of narrative voices/souls mirrors the themes of serialism at the core of 
the novel is based on the actual Anglo-Irish philosopher J.W. Dunne’s slightly eccentric 
theories of infinite regress and serialism published in his 1934 work The Serial Universe. 
According to Victoria Stewart, Dunne’s ideas come at a crucial point in history between 
the two wars when memories of the recent atrocities and unprecedented death tolls of 
  
 207 
World War I combine with an anxiety about what the future would bring; Dunne’s 
philosophy functions as a welcome respite from these anxieties (62). Though Dunne is 
little studied today, Stewart contends that he was widely read in his era and had a major 
influence on the literary circles of the time, evident in the work of writers as different as 
H.G. Wells, O’Brien and even Jorge Luis Borges. To the literary community at the time 
what Dunne’s importance is not necessarily in the accuracy, or philosophical truth of his 
theories, but instead in their imaginative possibilities (Stewart 76). Dunne’s theories have 
a strange and beautiful optimism. In Dunne’s universe, the future is no longer a place 
where people simply live and die erased from the world in “an indifferently gilded 
execution chamber, replenished continually with new victims” (Dunne 33). His theories 
absolve his audience from the horror of a finite world in which everything is meaningless 
and insignificant. A universe of layered consciousnesses and multiple relative times re-
establishes these “victims” as vital parts of an infinite web of existence. 
The literary implications of this freedom from a linear time that ends in death 
reach much further than the British Isles. Borges writes of Dunne’s play with infinity in 
his essay  “Time and J.W. Dunne,” which acknowledges the logical faults of Dunne’s 
ideas, but is attracted to his notions of time coalescing after death:  
Theologians define eternity as the lucid and simultaneous possession of all 
instants of time, and declare it a divine attribute…Dunne assures us that in 
death we shall finally learn how to handle eternity. We shall recover all 
the moments of our lives and combine them how we please…So splendid 
a thesis, makes any fallacy committed by the author insignificant. (219) 
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In Borges’s view, Dunne offers a conception of the universe that can be known to us in 
death, when all images become clear, ordered, and at our fingertips. Time becomes 
unified and we can combine the elements as we like. It would be hard to deny the appeal 
of a thesis that allows for the glorious power to rearrange the events of one’s whole life 
as one sees fit, and as Borges notes, this appeal more than makes up for any logical errors 
that might form the basis of this theory. With Dunne’s theory in mind, we recognize that 
in The Third Policeman the narrator creates the Parish from the pieces of his own life, 
ordered by de Selbian notions of time and space. He has recreated the world in the image 
of his idol. 
Dunne thinks of time and space as matters of perspective and believes that in 
order to conceptualize self, one must also be able to conceptualize a being outside of self: 
We are self-conscious creatures aware of something which we are able to 
regard as other than ourselves. That is a condition of affairs which it is 
impossible to treat as rational (i.e., systematic) except by exhibiting it in 
the form of an infinite regress…The notion of absolute time is a pure 
regress. Its employment results in exhibiting us as self-conscious 
observers. It introduces the notion of ‘change’ allotting to us the ability to 
initiate changes in a change-resisting 'not-self’. It treats the self-conscious 
observer as regressive, and it describes the external world as it would 
appear to such a regressive individual. (34-35) 
This complicated system requires a self and a simultaneous recognition of a ‘not self’. If 
for instance person A is aware of person B, person B is then necessarily aware of C. Then 
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from A’s perspective both B and C exist, while B does not know of A. Dunne uses the 
following diagram to represent this phenomenon: 
 (Dunne 62) 
There is an endless chain of observers that expands backwards and forwards infinitely 
from a single being. In turn, his structure implies not just infinite observers, but infinite 
levels of consciousness. Like MacCruiskeen’s boxes in The Third Policeman, the 
possibility for existence stretches out presupposing that for every box there is a larger one 
and one even smaller. Taking this theory to its end point requires stretching this timeline 
both forward and backward infinitely. At the furthest reaches of this spectrum, the objects 
or selves are beyond the finite understanding of the human senses.  
O’Nolan parodies Dunne in The Third Policeman through the narrator’s sustained 
analysis of de Selby, a fictional philosopher whose Codex the narrator tries to publish. It 
is evident from the narrator’s comments about de Selby that his philosophies exist on the 
fringe of accepted modes of thinking, and challenge beliefs in both science and 
philosophy. De Selby’s theory of motion is a strange refutation of Dunne’s theories of 
serialism and an extreme representation of Xeno’s paradox. After seeing a motion 
picture, and by seeing he means looking at the physical film reel frame by frame, de 
Selby comes to believe that motion itself is an illusion. Instead he sees motion as “resting 
for infinitely brief intervals in innumerable intermediate places” (TP 50) and attributes 
the illusion of progression to “the inability of the human brain – as it is present 
developed—to appreciate the reality of these separate ‘rests’, preferring to group many 
THE SERIAL UNIVERSE
again, how can this ultimate observer D know
that A2 (containing A^ and Bl are existing in-
dependently of, and being observed by, C, and
are not merely modifications in the structure of C.D cannot discover that by merely observing C.
The answer is that to discover that A2 and Bl are
observed by C is to perceive that C abstracts them
from some more fundamental entities. The en-
tities from which C does abstract them are, as we
have seen, A3 and B2 . Z), therefore, must perceive
that A2 and Bl are abstracted from A3 and J52 by C.
But, as a preliminary to observing this function of
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third row, 'World as observed by D\
World as observed by Bl
World as observed by C
World as observed by D
A,
Then, again, since A3 and B2 and C are observed
by D, they must be characters abstracted from
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millions of them together and calling the result motion” (TP 51). De Selby has the unique 
ability to rely solely on his own observations of the world as sources of truth while 
denying any other interpretation of events. Even the narrator, one of De Selby’s most 
avid followers, finds “it a curious enigma that so great a mind would question the most 
obvious realities and object even to things scientifically demonstrated (such as the 
sequence of day and night) while believing absolutely in his own fantastic explanations 
of the same phenomena” (52). Although in these moments, the narrator is skeptical of de 
Selby’s findings, he is so obsessively devoted to researching de Selby’s philosophies that 
these very theories give structure to the narrator’s hell where de Selby’s odd theories hold 
true. 
Given Dunne’s view of the afterlife as a space accessible to us in dreams, and that 
we reconstruct the moments of our lives in the manner of our choosing, the narrator’s life 
has been filled with violence, criminality and correctional facilities. In the narrator’s 
description of the world of de Selbian scholarship, it becomes clear that following de 
Selby’s theories and epistemologies has a tendency to lead to prison time. O’Nolan 
represents this blind obedience to failed doctrines through a series of de Selby scholars. 
Like a scholarly work of criticism, the narrator cites the work of other de Selby scholars 
weaving together their threads of analysis with this own. Their thoughts are incorporated 
into lengthy footnotes that span pages of the book creating, at times, a separate storyline 
that runs concurrent to the main one in the narrator’s hellscape. Also, like the narrator, 
these de Selby critics find themselves in complicated situations as a result of their 
scholarship. One scholar, Hatchjaw, is arrested in a hotel after a scandal in which he 
accused another critic, Kraus, of forgery (118). Hatchjaw later goes on a crusade to 
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apprehend the false critic and heads abroad heavily armed and prepared for a cataclysmic 
erasure of this corruption from the literary world. Some reports suggest that Hatchjaw is 
unsuccessful in this quest, but is arrested for “impersonating himself” on the continent 
(171). Philosophy is what sends Hatchjaw, and the narrator, to prison. Those who buy 
into this alternate epistemology based on hearsay, shoddy observations, and the denial of 
truths affront the structures of the modern state that finds its strength in reason and logic. 
The power of de Selby’s writing and his speech are enough to create action, and these 
actions always result in incarceration. In the modern security state, prison is the only 
method for handling these rogues. 
The threat of incarceration was not an imagined one in the context of Ireland’s 
politics at the time. On the brink of World War II, the IRA seizes the opportunity to put 
pressure on an already distracted British government. In an effort to contain these forces 
and preserve the power of new Irish Constitution enacted in 1937, Eamon de Valera 
pushes the “Offences Against the State Bill” through the Dáil in 1939 (Dickson 29). This 
bill severely restricts the civil liberties of defendants and provides wide-reaching powers 
to the Gardá, the Irish police, particularly against those who refused to recognize the 
government as legitimate and those identified as belonging to paramilitary forces. Refusal 
to speak, refusing to recognize the authority of the government and providing false 
information to police are key tenets in the bill’s 52 sections. It grants the Gardá the right 
under a search warrant to “(a) demand the name and address of any person found in the 
building or other place named in such warrant, and (b) arrest without warrant any such 
person who refuses to give his name and address, or gives a false name or a false 
address” (Oireachtas 1939 3a-3b). After an arrest of this sort, anyone who should “fail or 
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refuse to give his name and address or shall give, in response to any such demand, a 
name or an address which is false or misleading shall be guilty of an offence under this 
section and shall be liable on summary conviction thereof to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding six months” (Oireachtas 1939 6). The bill receives harsh criticism both at 
home and abroad as a repressive measure and just a year after its enactment, parts of the 
bill were ruled unconstitutional for violating the separation of powers granted in the 
constitution (Dickson 30). The rest of the bill and subsequent versions of it were not 
officially repealed until 2004 (Oireachtas 2004). O’Nolan is writing during this era of 
political turmoil in which speech has taken on serious political consequences. In this 
atmosphere of suspicion and paranoia, the figure of larger than life, all-knowing police 
officers is not simply an exercise in the absurd, but a heavy satire of Ireland’s restrictive 
web of political and criminal justice.  
In order to evade the state, many of the inhabitants of the Parish have developed 
odd habits of speech that allow them to get as much information out of others as possible 
without revealing anything themselves. As Hugh Kenner notes, “The only social 
relationships that obtain are defraudment and persecution; those suffice, it seems, to 
propel a plausible cosmos.” (“Fourth” 100). As such, MacCruiskeen has a set of rules for 
wisdom and two of them focus on speaking. As he explains to the narrator:  “Always ask 
any questions that are to be asked and never answer any. Turn everything you hear to 
your own advantage” (60). While his other rules apply to proper bicycle safety, these two 
mark the importance of listening and the dangers of speaking. In this world, philology is 
king. Whatever is spoken here can be used and turned against the speaker. As Joe, the 
narrator’s disembodied soul warns, “Apparently there is no limit…Anything can be said 
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in this place and it will be true and will have to be believed” (86).  The creative force of 
speech perpetually builds and shapes the limits of this world; with each new utterance, 
the world expands.  
In the Parish, all utterances are what J.L. Austin calls speech acts. In Austin’s 
definition, a “performative utterance” enacts something in the real world. Typically, the 
utterance has to occur in the appropriate setting in order for it to have an active force, as 
saying, “I do” in a dentist’s office would not have the same effect as it would in a 
marriage ceremony, thereby nullifying its ability to create action. In the Parish, however, 
there are no rules for when and how the performative is pronounced. The physical 
boundaries of the Parish are mutable, as the world is bounded by omnium, a substance 
that can create anything. If for instance, a speaker wants one hundred pounds of jam, in 
the presence of omnium it will appear. If it can be spoken, it is possible, and with 
innumerable speakers, there is no end to the fluctuations and iterations in the boundaries 
of the hellscape. In the Parish, language creates the boundaries and purposeful 
obfuscation at the hands of the police and of philosophers leads to dire circumstances for 
the body that is acted upon. When the individual is not privy to the linguistic rules he is at 
the mercy of the system. The text reaffirms the necessity of linguistic precision and 
exposes the dangers of sloppy thinking through taking whatever is said here to its most 
literal extreme (Clissman 216). If whatever is said becomes real, then those who speak 
have a responsibility to speak with caution and to mitigate the consequences of their 
utterances. Without that linguistic contract, chaos ensues. Without physical limitations 
and with the power to create from nothing, all speech becomes performative under 
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Austin’s definition. The context no longer matters because all speech acts can generate a 
physical manifestation.  
 The inhabitants of this world are more adept at limiting their speech, and 
therefore, the actions associated with their words. MacCruiskeen’s aphorisms are similar 
to Old Mathers’ peculiar speech patterns. The Mathers of the hellscape has developed a 
method of speaking that thwarts the iterative power of language. He responds to all 
inquiries and requests in the negative. Communicating with him requires understanding 
his compulsion and asking him questions in a way that allows him to respond with more 
than a simple no. His refusal to answer functions like MacCruiskeen’s rules as a way to 
avoid divulging information and is a mode of protection others’ manipulation. He decides 
“everything you do is in response to a request or a suggestion made to you by some other 
party either inside you or outside” (30). Since, in his estimation, the majority of these 
requests are either sinful or simply bad ideas, he has learned to respond ‘no’ to everything 
he is asked. By defaulting to a simple true/false dichotomy Mathers refuses to participate 
in the performative speech act. He retains his own power as an individual agent who 
avoids entrapment in the speech acts of others. This defensive manner of speaking reveals 
a deep mistrust for those around him, or perhaps a deeper familiarity with the structures 
of speech in this world.  
 His suspicions are not unfounded. In the world of the policemen, voice can be 
manipulated both physically and rhetorically. Here, the voice is not only rarified and 
removed from human hearing, but is also instumentalized as an energy source to fuel the 
police station. In an odd twist of contemporary notions of physics, the policemen capture 
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sound and run it through a mangle to “stretch it out” into energy, as MacCruiskeen 
explains: 
Light is the same omnium on a short wave but if it comes on a longer 
wave it is in the form of noise, or sound. With my own patents I can 
stretch a ray out until it becomes sound…And when I have a shout shut in 
that box with the wires, I can squeeze it till I get heat and you would not 
believe the convenience of it all in the winter…The box is full of noise. 
Myself and the Sergeant spend our spare time in the summer collecting 
noises so that we can have light and heat for our official life in the dark 
winter. That is why the light is going up and down. Some of the noises are 
noisier than the others and the pair of us will be blinded if we come to the 
time when the quarry was working last September. (110) 
With the help of the policemen’s machine, light can be converted to sound and vice 
versa. Much like Lugones’ destructive Omega Force, with this device light, sound and 
heat are collapsed into one single form of energy. In capturing voices, recording them in 
essence, the policemen are able to both to turn those voices into energy, and to stretch out 
light to recreate the original speech or sound that was collected. The fluid movement 
between forms allows the policemen to utilize all forms of energy to their own ends, 
regulating and defining the terms of the system. The morphing of the rules of physics 
renders all speech as the potential property of the realm. Everything can be overheard, 
collected, stored, and utilized. The familiar “everything you say can and will be used 
against you in a court of law,” in American Miranda rights, is in this world terrifyingly 
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true. Words are not only evidence collected at all times and without the speaker’s 
knowledge, but they also serve as energy to literally fuel the state.  
The “recordings” from MacCruiskeen’s mangle do, in fact, hold evidence against 
the narrator and has captured the moment of Old Mathers’ murder. As MacCruiskeen 
stretches out the sound and begins to decipher what the original words might be, the 
narrator experiences an extremely unsettling moment as he realizes the crime he has 
committed in his own world has followed him to the Parish. The hellscape is a distorted 
version of the narrator’s reality. He has arrived here after committing a murder and the 
hellscape is, presumably, his punishment. It is not a parallel universe to the narrator’s, but 
rather a layered one with points of contact to the other. Therefore, the scene in which 
MacCruiskeen stretches out light into sound, doubles the moment the narrator kills Old 
Mathers in the “real” world.  
As he lies dying, Old Mathers mutters something that the narrator can’t quite 
make out: “As he collapsed full-length in the mud he did not cry out. Instead, I heard him 
say something softly in a conversational tone—something like  ‘I do not care for celery’ 
or ‘I left my glasses in the scullery’. Then he lay very still” (16). In the background, 
Divney yells at him to “finish him with the spade” (16). When this scene is replayed in 
the hellscape, MacCruiskeen turns the handle of the mangle until “the light seemed to 
burst and disappear and simultaneously there was a loud shout in the room, a shout which 
could not have come from a human throat” (107). The officer asks the narrator to try to 
guess the contents of the horrifying scream. In the same way he had tried to decipher Old 
Mathers’ last words, here he tries to make out what might be contained in this packet of 
sound: 
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I could not be sure what it was but several phrases sprang into my head 
together and each of them could have been the contents of the shout. They 
bore an eerie resemblance to commonplace shouts I had often heard such 
as Change for Tinahely and Shillelagh! Two to one the field! Mind the 
step! Finish him off! I knew, however, that the shout could not be so 
foolish and trivial because it disturbed me in a way that could only be 
done by something momentous and diabolical. (108) 
Though the narrator cannot decipher the layers of energy, the phrase “finish him off” 
recalls the scene with Old Mathers. He does not, or cannot, explicitly link the two 
incidents together, but the phrases carry more resonance for him than bits of half 
remembered remarks. His own guilt combined with the terror of being found guilty of his 
crimes lies at the base of his deep disturbance. To hear Divney’s words echoed back to 
him is unsettling enough, but to also hear them recounted in a police station where 
confessing to this act would prove dangerous is far worse. In this world, Old Mathers has 
been murdered, but not by the narrator. Nonetheless, the police have determined that he 
must hang for the crime. In the real world he has gotten away with the murder, here he 
will suffer the consequences. This doubling acts as a structural element in the narrative, 
serving as connecting moment in the text and signaling the inescapability of this world. 
While the narrator thinks he has been cunning and has kept his secret, here all is already 
known through the hyper-surveillance of the police, an ominous rendering of the 
omnipresence of the security state.  
In O’Nolan’s Ireland suspicion, and deep mistrust are part of the culture. By the 
twentieth century, Ireland has one of the most elaborate nationwide prison systems in 
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Europe. Beginning in 1815, while Ireland is still under British rule, the British begin a 
wide scale effort in constructing a penal system in Ireland to contain an “unruly” Irish 
population; the extent to which was unprecedented on the continent. After the partition, 
many of these tactics remain in place. “The techniques of surveillance, incarceration and 
interrogation, enabled by the Special Powers Act that had been in force in Northern 
Ireland virtually continuously since its foundation, heralded the gradual formation of the 
‘strong’ or security state that is increasingly the norm for what were the liberal 
democracies” (Lloyd 13). The Special Powers Act of 1923 operates to contain IRA 
factions who are opposed to the partition of Ireland and refuse to accept any nation but a 
unified one. In order to quell violence in Northern Ireland, the Special Powers Act 
authorizes the police to use broad authority to arrest, detain and imprison a suspect for 
“not preserving peace or maintaining order” (Hancock). This phrasing is open enough for 
broad and sweeping interpretations, and the Act’s provisions allow for wide authority in 
searches and seizure, censorship and detention without warrants or trials. Enforcement of 
the legislation remains in the hands of the Royal Ulster Constabulary a primarily 
Protestant force authorized to carry heavy weaponry, and who are known for targeting 
Catholic citizens (Hancock). Though this Act affects mainly Northern Ireland, the politics 
of the two countries are deeply intertwined and the Act remained in place until 1974.  
Interrogation and surveillance were common practices that made the oral, and 
therefore the aural, space a “counter-space of modernity” (Lloyd, 15) in which speaking, 
or not speaking, is a mode of resistance. As David Lloyd explains, the use of language, 
particularly Irish, and the culture it carries with it, threatens the precarious unity of the 
Republic. Lloyd cites Henri Lefebvre’s definition of counter-space in relation to Irish 
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orality and the prison system. For Lefebvre “a counter-space can insert itself into spatial 
reality: against the Eye and the Gaze, against quantity and homogeneity, against power 
and the arrogance of power, against the endless expansion of the “private” and of 
industrial profitability” (qtd. in Lloyd 12). As de Valera’s penal system intensified around 
the containment of dissidents and political prisoners, orality marks a site of resistance that 
even the prison cannot close.  
The undertones of interrogation are evident throughout the novel in the 
construction of energy. Through omnium, the police have total control of this world. 
Their main job is to investigate stolen bicycles, yet by the end of the novel it becomes 
clear that the officers themselves have orchestrated these thefts. The standard tenets of 
law are inverted and there is no possibility of justice when the laws and regulations are 
obscured. The possession of the sounds, stories, and speech of the populace allows the 
police always to be one step ahead of any potential perpetrator. They need no admission 
of guilt, as they always already have the evidence for crime in hand in the form of the 
“criminal’s” own words. At the same time, the police have a particular concern with the 
identities of the inhabitants of the Parish. Their obsession with cataloging and monitoring 
translates to a need to inscribe citizens into their structure. This impulse is of particular 
consequence for the narrator who, as condition of his untimely death, no longer 
remembers his name. When he first awakens in this new world, the narrator asks Old 
Mathers for the cashbox, to which Mathers responds by asking his name. Since the 
narrator has no name, Mathers is perplexed as to how to turn over such an item to him. 
“Then how could I tell you where the box was if you could not sign a receipt? That would 
be most irregular. I might as well give it to the west wind or to the smoke from a pipe. 
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How could you execute Bank documents?” (31). Without a name, a definition within the 
system, he does not exist. He is invisible and under erasure. Anonymity on the one hand, 
offers a protection from the Parish’s justice system in that even if he is recorded and 
watched, without being inscribed and catalogued there is no official “person” to link to 
the crime.  
Paradoxically, since the narrator technically does not exist for the police, he then 
can be guilty of all things unexplained and they can inflict any punishment they want on 
him, since without an identity, “no one” would be punished. “The policemen,” Kenner 
explains “are not cogs in some larger machinery of justice, a-clatter with courts and 
magistrates, lawyers and jailers. No, they are the machinery of justice in a cosmos that 
has regard for only two things, bicycles and documented identities” (“Fourth” 100). The 
narrator’s inability to document his own existence poses a problem for the officers when 
they condemn him to hang for Mathers’ death. Since he cannot remember the basic 
details of his former life and there is no way to verify his identity, he asks the police if 
they can actually hang an anonymous defendant.  
‘It is true,’ [MacCruiskeen] said, ‘that you cannot commit a crime and that 
the right arm of the law cannot lay its finger on you irrespective of the 
degree of your criminality. Anything you do is a lie and nothing that 
happens to you is true[…] 
For that reason alone,’ said the Sergeant, ‘we can take you and hang the 
life out of you and you are not hanged at all and there is no entry to be 
made in the death papers. The particular death you die is not even a 
death…only an insanitary abstraction in the backyard, a piece of negative 
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nullity neutralized and rendered void by asphyxiation and the fracture of 
spinal string. (102) 
The operating principle of the justice system in this world does not depend on any 
concept of guilt or innocence. Rather than shield him from wrongful conviction, the 
stripping of the narrator’s individuality allows the police to prosecute him with abandon. 
The pseudo-legal jargon in the last sentence of the passage satirizes the ability of the 
legal system to manipulate its operations for its own benefits by hiding behind obscure 
regulations and bylaws. If one follows the twisted logic here, then because the narrator 
cannot verify his identity, the validity of his statements can also not be assessed. 
Therefore, anything he says must be a lie. If he has no name, he is not a person and if he 
is not a person, there is no body on which to inflict punishment. Since he does not 
officially exist, his hanging, and therefore his death, cannot be recorded, effectively 
erasing and denying any trace of his existence. Participation in this world requires a 
name, the ability to be transcribed and encoded into the system. The refusal, or the 
inability, to be identified as a participant in this society results in erasure from the 
structure of the police state.  
 In the Parish, Fox is the highest ranking official and the one with control of the 
omnium, and therefore the ability to erase or encode anything into the system. Fox’s 
explanation of the inner workings of the Parish becomes the object of O’Nolan’s sharpest 
satire. Fox is absent for much of the novel and the only trace of his presence is through 
notes he leaves at the station for the other officers. His existence as text rather than 
speech allows him the flexibility and the freedom to move about this world unfettered. 
He is the extreme example of Mathers who answers “no” to all questions. Fox goes one 
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step further in not speaking at all, leaving him impervious to the linguistic manipulations 
of this world. His invisibility and inaudibility grant him a mysterious presence outside the 
grasp of the other policemen. The inability to know him makes him dangerous. When the 
others speak of him it is in hushed tones as if he might appear at any moment. When the 
narrator finally meets him, these fears are justified as he learns that Fox controls all of the 
omnium, the element that orders the world. He creates the conditions for the reality of the 
world including the tasks for the two other policemen. While those two occupy 
themselves with small inventions and regulating the complicated dials and registers that 
keep the world running, Fox is behind it all from his semi-omniscient position. Yet, the 
narrator quickly sees that for all his power, Fox is amazingly shortsighted:  
I could not help smiling at him, not, indeed, without some pity. It was 
clear that he was not the sort of person to be trusted with the contents of 
the black box. His oafish underground invention was the product of a 
mind which fed upon adventure books of small boys, books in which 
every extravagance was mechanical and lethal and solely concerned with 
bring about somebody’s death in the most imaginable way possible. (190) 
While the narrator imagines the limitless possibilities for omnium, Fox is only able to 
come up with the most puerile ideas. Not a great mastermind, or political genius, he is 
simply a man who found himself in charge and in possession of this power. Fox, as the 
holder of omnium, becomes divine. Once the narrator gains a sense of order, he can 
recognize the world for what it is, arbitrary and manipulated by a dictator of sorts who 
enjoys watching the other inhabitants scramble to fulfill the monotonous duties of 
maintaining the state/parish.  
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 Under these political circumstances, evasion becomes standard practice. O’Nolan 
figures this character, who holds the highest level of knowledge in the Parish and is the 
one who can explain the inner workings of the structure of the hellscape, as a “world 
champion gawm,” an idiot. Because he writes the rules, however, it matters not if the 
rules are smart, or just, or real, only that everyone in his jurisdiction must follow them. 
Through Fox, the narrator learns that his entire journey was unnecessary as his search for 
Mathers’ cashbox was a futile one. Fox had taken possession of it “in virtue of section 16 
of the act of ’87 as extended and amended” and had sent the cashbox back to the narrator, 
its rightful owner, and delivered it to his house. All he had to do, presumably, was ask 
Fox the right question and the world was his. Without access to any part of the “act of 
‘87” or any idea what might be included in section 16, the narrator is unable to 
effectively navigate this world and embarks on an entirely useless journey.  
Semantics holds the key to access and political participation. Locked out of these 
paths through legal obfuscation and wrongful accusations, the narrator is at the mercy of 
this system in the same way that an Irish citizen of this era has to renegotiate the familiar 
spaces of a now decolonized territory. Nation building overwrites the colonial history, re-
inscribing its own terms over the colonizer’s maps, laws, and narratives. The average 
citizen then, is in the same position as the narrator forced to traverse the familiar yet 
renamed and reclaimed spaces under a new set of hierarchies that is terrifyingly similar to 
the ones that came before, re-experiencing the same atrocities now committed by a native 
hand. This satire reveals this uncanny terror drawing on Ireland’s rich history of 
storytelling and mythology to connect O’Nolan’s current moment with the long history of 
the Irish people. His intricate language play preserves the cultural oral space while 
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critiquing attempts to close it through satire. His boisterous writing shows the potential in 
the Irish language and the Irish mouth for its capabilities beyond the modern security 
state. With its polyphonic resonances and multilingual play, his work stays one step away 
from the censors and contains enough surface level humor to placate any audience, while 
revealing complex system of correspondences and connotations for those who can go 
with him into Ireland’s cultural and linguistic heritage. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 In each of these texts, sound plays a crucial role in the development of science 
and technology. Their grapplings with these innovations vary politically and structurally, 
yet they all exhibit an engagement with rapid advancements and shifts in modes of 
perception as a result of the intrusion of new technologies. As Ulrika Maude explains,  
Twentieth-century literature can be read as a chronicle of the manner in 
which these auxiliary organs gradually do grow on to us, producing in us a 
double-perception that differs from earlier modes of perceiving. In tracing 
this process of internalization, which changes the way in which we see, 
hear and generally perceive our surroundings, twentieth-century literature 
and specifically modernist writing, maps the manner in which technology 
changes out relationship to the world and to ourselves. (“Modernist 
Bodies” 117) 
These texts illustrate a change in the sensorium and in representations of the world. 
Modernists and Latin America’s vanguard authors open the world to new ways of hearing 
and seeing that grow alongside of technology. They pave the way for the postmodern 
experiments in fragmentary and inchoate realities reflective of an even greater distance 
between the cohesive body and its representation and offer a model for a coping with a 
new, mechanized, future. 
 The modernist era offers a unique perspective in that it is immersed in the world 
of rapidly emerging science, negotiating, adapting and sometimes appropriating scientific 
discourse. The texts chosen here all show an engagement with this burgeoning world, but 
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they also trace the voice of the population at large and register the complicated 
relationship between the individual and the machine. Sound technology marks the 
beginning of the significant interrelation between body and machine and an increased 
dependence on machines in daily life. Literary experimentation in this era struggles to 
find new modes of articulation that can encompass increased, machine-aided perception 
and the development of complex narrative forms reflect this gap as it appears worldwide. 
Multiple modernities and modernisms arise from contact with these new modes of 
perception and shift with the successive arrivals of new technologies as seen after the 
arrival of cinema and computing. With each new discovery, technology becomes 
increasingly naturalized as a normal part of life. In the modernist era, technology is not 
yet fully established itself.  Modernists stand on the threshold of this new world illustrate 
the literary negotiation of the space between technology and the body.  
 The bevy of new technologies moves beyond the printing press and opens new 
avenues of mediation and reliance on new technologies. According to media theorist 
Friedrich Kittler the turn of the 20th century marks a critical moment in the history of 
technology and man’s relation to it: 
Once the technological differentiation of optics, acoustics, and writing 
exploded Gutenberg’s writing monopoly around 1880, the fabrication of 
so-called Man became possible. His essence escapes into apparatuses. 
Machines take over functions of the central nervous system, and no longer 
as in times past, merely those of muscles. And with this differentiation- 
and not with steam engines and railroads- a clear division occurs between 
matter and information, the real and the symbolic. When it comes to 
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inventing phonography and cinema, the age-old dreams of humankind are 
no longer sufficient. The physiology of eyes, ears, and brains have to 
become objects of scientific research. For mechanized writing to be 
optimized, one can no longer dream of writing as the expression of 
individuals or the trace of bodies. The very forms, differences, and 
frequencies of its letters have to be reduced to formulas. So-called Man is 
split up unto physiology and information technology. (16) 
The key transition here is the movement of technologies from replacing physical labor, 
the movement of muscles and the performance of work, to replacing mental labor, the 
mechanical storage of memory. Technologies like the phonograph and cinema now move 
beyond the singular capacity of the physiology of the human body. These tools extend the 
possibilities for human experience. Man, as a concept becomes a fundamentally different 
organism, divided not between body and mind, but physiology and information.  
This shift occurs in the same historical moment as modernismo and modernism 
emerge. If in this moment the age-old dreams are no longer sufficient for a technologized 
future, cultural production needs to re-imagine what this modern life holds and the 
modernists and modernistas, feel this shift and understand the old forms of literary 
expression are not capable of expressing this newly oriented Man. By sampling texts 
from the beginning and the end of the modernist era, this project examines the 
advancement of science and sound technologies through a progression of literary 
responses through this era of change, from a fear of this reassembly of senses and the 
threat to the notion of human at the beginning of the century, to the realization of those 
fears in World War II. As these technologies become more prevalent and ubiquitous in 
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their integration into the daily lives of citizens, literary form becomes more complex, 
mirroring the advances and alterations to the human sense experience. Shaw and Lugones 
toy with the potentialities of mechanical interventions into human experience, fearing the 
loss of human agency and the slippage of the very definition of human. For both authors 
the fear lies in the disintegration of a cohesive self. The space of the human is a space 
that should be preserved in light of these technological disruptions and interventions. In 
their case, the literary expression of this fear is communicated in thematic 
representations.  
Yet for O’Nolan and Torres Bodet, the time for anxiety has already passed. The 
moment of transition has already happened and Man is already reconfigured. Resistance 
to this alteration is no longer effective. Therefore, the literary expression of this change 
also becomes more normalized and is more fully integrated into the form of their writings 
rather than only in thematic resistance. Torres Bodet expands the textual sensorium to use 
metaphors not only of sight but also of sound, while also utilizing new concepts of 
memory aided by machines like the gramophone and guided by telephones, telegrams, 
and urban technologies. O’Nolan introduces formal features to the text that reflect the 
disintegration of a cohesive self. His text features bodiless narrators, fictional footnotes 
and illogical structures of speech and hearing. Both authors are aware of the shifting 
nature of modern life in relation to technologies. While Torres Bodet’s texts operate as 
more of an exploration of these topics through form, O’Nolan, writing the latest into the 
century offers a scathing satire of the dangers of these technologies when they are turned 
against the citizen.  
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My approach crosses national boundaries as well as disciplinary ones through 
technology and sound studies, expanding current methodologies in transnationalist 
Modernist Studies. Rather than applying an Anglo/American model of modernism to 
world literature, I employ a comparatist approach that grounds the text in its own context 
and examines the monumental shifts in literature and art in response to rapid 
industrialization and mechanization, as a simultaneous, interconnected process. Kittler’s 
moment of transition does not happen in isolation in a single location. Instead, the effects 
of these technologies are felt on a wider scale as they proliferate and arrive in distinct 
nations and contexts. Examining this phenomenon from a macro perspective illuminates 
the cross-currents and cross-fertilizations of media and technology as well as the literary 
and artistic responses to its arrival.  
This dissertation functions as an initial investigation into these narratives of sound 
and an inroad into theorizing the human voice and its potentialities. Through this research 
a new connection has emerged between these disparate texts. Many of these authors 
reference Irish born physicist John Tyndall in their texts, specifically in regards to his 
work on energy and sound. Although he died in 1893 and was most active in the 1870s 
and 80s, before the modernist movement, he is mentioned by name in nearly every one of 
the texts examined here. Though an influential physicist of his time, he is hardly 
remembered now. The future iteration of this project will further examine his role as a 
public intellectual and his lasting impact on these modernist writers. 
  
 230 
 
REFERENCES CITED 
 
Adams, Michael. Censorship: the Irish Experience. Alabama, University of Alabama 
Press, 1968. Print.  
 
Aguinaga, Carlos Blanco. "On Modernism from the Periphery." Modernism and Its 
Margins: Reinscribing Cultural Modernity from Spain and Latin America. Eds. 
Anthony L. Geist and José B. Monleón. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc. 
1999. Print. 3-16. 
 
Ahrensdorf, Peter. “Civilization and Barbarism: The Somber Liberalism of Domingo  
Sarmiento.” Interpretation. 34.1 Winter 2004. 33-56. 
 
Ames, Eric. “The Sound of Evolution.” Modernism/modernity. 10.2 April, 2003. 297-
325. Web. 
 
Aragón Leyva, Agustín. “Fundación del cineclub.” Contemporáneos. 36 (Mayo, 1931). 
México. 187-189. Print.  
 
----. “Motivos: Sergio M. Eisenstein.” Contemporáneos. 36 (Mayo, 1931). México. 181-
184. Print.  
 
Armstrong, Tim. “Player Piano: Poetry and Sonic Modernity.” Modernism/modernity 
14.1 (Jan 2007): 1-19. Web.  
 
Agamben, Giorgio. The Time that Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans. 
Trans. Patricia Dailey. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005. Print.  
 
Alexander, Nigel. “The Play of Ideas.” Modern Critical Interpretations: George Bernard 
Shaw’s Pygmalion. Ed. Harold Bloom. New York: Chelsea House Publishers. 
1988. 19-45. Print. 
 
Antezana, Luis. “Desplazamientos poéticos y mass media.” Revista de critica literaria 
latinoamericana. 29.59 (2003): 25-38. Web. 
 
Asúa, Miguel De. Ciencia y literatura: Un relato histórico. Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 2004.  
Print. 
 
Austin, J.L. How to do Things with Words. Ed. J.O. Urmson and Marina Sbisà. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975. Print. 
  
 231 
 
Ball, John Clement. Satire and the Postcolonial Novel: V.S. Naipaul, Chinua Achebe, 
Salman Rushdie. Ed. William E. Cain. New York: Routledge, 2003. Print.  
 
Bazin, André. “Myth of Total Cinema.” 
https://www2.southeastern.edu/Academics/Faculty/jbell/mythtotalcinema.pdf 
 
Beer, Gillian. Open Fields: Science in Cultural Encounter. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1996. Print. 
 
Benjamin, Walter. “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” 
Illuminations. Trans. Harry Zohn. New York: Shocken Books. 2007. Print. 
 
Besant, Annie. Annie Besant: An Autobiography, London, T. Fisher Unwin. 1908, 348-
349. Microfiche. 
 
Booker, M. Keith. “The Impossibility of Knowledge.” O’Brien, Bakhtin and Menippean 
Satire. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995. Print.  
 
Borges, Jorge Luis. “Time and J.W. Dunne.” Selected Non-Fictions: Jorge Luis Borges. 
Ed. Eliot Weinberger. Trans. Esther Allen, Suzanne Jill Levine and Eliot 
Weinberger. New York: Viking. 1999. Print. 217-219.  
 
Brain, Robert M. “Representation on the Line: Graphic Recording Instruments and 
Scientific Modernism.” From Energy to Information: Representation in Science 
and Technology, Art and Literature. Eds. Bruce Clarke and Linda Dalrymple 
Henderson. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002. 178-194. Print. 
 
Brooker, Joseph. “Myles’ tones.” Is it about a bicycle? Flann O’Brien in the Twenty-
First Century. Ed. Jennika Baines. Dublin: Four Courts Press. 2011. Print. 17-32.  
 
Burgos, Fernando. “Proserpina rescatada: Metáforas de una metamorfosis.” De la 
crónica a la nueva narrativa mexicana; coloquio sobre literatura mexicana. 
1986. 139-149. Print. 
 
Campbell, Timothy. Wireless Writing in the Age of Marconi. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 2006. Print.  
 
Cano, Luis C. Intermitente recurrencia: La ciencia ficción y el canon literario 
hispanoamericano. Buenos Aires: Corregidor, 2006. Print. 
 
  
 232 
Castro, Andrea. El encuentro imposible: La conformación del fantástico ambiguo en la 
narrativa breve argentina (1862-1910). Göteborg : Université de Göteborg, 2002, 
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